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| | Questions answered: 0, Questions asked: 0 Easy / 0 PRO | | 0 entries | | Check, Wire transfer, Money order | Sample translations submitted: 5English to French: CMA LETTER - PAUL BLAIS
General field: Marketing
Detailed field: Real Estate | Source text - English
Date
Name
Address
Address
Dear :
Thank you for allowing me this opportunity to provide you with our exclusive Market Analysis for your home. This analysis, especially prepared for you, was researched from reliable information currently available from the local multiple listing service. It indicates what real estate activity has occurred in your area with other properties. While none of the properties are exactly like yours, they do provide a good reference source for a comparative market analysis.
I welcome the opportunity to work as your real estate professional. I encourage you to contact me should you have any questions or require any additional information.
Best regards,
Paul Blais
Re/Max River City
| Translation - French
Date
Nom
Adresse
Adresse
Cher :
Je vous remercie de me permettre de vous fournir un rapport de marché exclusif à votre maison. Ce rapport personnalisé a été élaboré à partir d’informations disponibles au service local de fiches descriptives. Il est indicateur de l’activité immobilière de propriétés dans votre quartier. Bien qu’il n’y a pas de propriétés exactement comme la vôtre dans votre quartier, ces derniers nous fournissent une excellente source d’information pour une analyse de marché comparée.
Je serai heureux de travailler pour vous en tant que professionnel de l’immobilier.
Je vous encourage à entrer en contact avec moi si vous avez des questions ou avez besoin de plus d’information.
Je vous prie d’agréer monsieur/madame, mes sentiments les meilleurs
Paul Blais
Re/Max River City
| English to French: Pamphlet - Picketing - Government of Alberta
General field: Law/Patents
Detailed field: Law (general) | Source text - English
Piquetage
Quand on entame une grève ou un lock-out légal, la loi sur les Relations de Travail de l’Alberta permet aux personnes concernées de piqueter. Ils peuvent, de façon pacifique, essayer de convaincre les gens de ne pas entrer dans l’établissement de l’employeur
ou de ne pas faire affaire avec celui-ci.
Le droit de piquetage, en ce qui concerne une grève ou un lock-out, est sujet à certaines conditions:
o Le piquetage doit être pacifique
o Il doit se faire sur la place publique seulement, devant les entrées du lieu de travail
o Le piquetage ne doit pas comporter d’actes illégaux
[Tiré de la loi sur les relations de travail de l’Alberta #17]
Actes criminels
Les lois Canadiennes sont en vigueur en tout temps et cela inclut les situations de grève.
Voici quelques exemples d’actions illégales:
o Assaut (frapper, donner un coup de pied, gifler, pousser ou toucher)
o Assaut armé (incluant ce qui peut servir d’arme, une roche, stylo ou une auto, par exemple)
o Menacer ou intimider quelqu’un
o Porter atteinte à la propriété privée
o Harcèlement (suivre quelqu’un de façon constante et abusive)
o Port d’arme (incluant ce qui peut servir d’arme)
o Outrepasser la propriété privée
o Vol
o Désobéir à une ordonnance de la cour
o Méfait public (par exemple, vandaliser des autos ou autre propriété)
o Négligence criminelle (ne pas se préoccuper de la sécurité ou de la vie d’autrui)
La liste ci-haut n’inclut pas tout acte criminel. Tout acte criminel peut entraîner l’arrestation, la mise à l’amende ou l’emprisonnement de la personne responsable
La personne responsable d’un acte illégal peut se voir imposer un casier judiciaire.
Responsabilité de la Police
Les forces de l’ordre doivent rester neutres lors d’une grève ou un lock-out.
Ils ne peuvent empêcher le piquetage légal.
Ils peuvent intervenir seulement pour:
o Garder la paix (empêcher les actes criminels)
o Faire respecter la loi
o Protéger la vie et la propriété
o Enquêter sur les actes criminels et arrêter ceux qui enfreignent la loi
Entrer sur les lieux de travail
Toute personne est en droit d’entrer et sortir librement des lieux de travail. Les piqueteurs n’ont pas le droit d’en empêcher l’accès. Les piqueteurs peuvent intervenir pour un court laps de temps dans le but d’essayer de convaincre pacifiquement les gens de ne pas pénétrer sur les lieux de travail ou de ne pas faire affaire avec l’employeur.
| Translation - French
Picketing
Once a lawful strike or lockout is in progress, the Alberta Labour Relations Code allows persons to engage in picketing and to try, peacefully, to persuade others not to enter the employer’s place of business or do business with the employer.
The right to picket in connection with a labour dispute is subject to the following conditions:
o It must be peaceful
o It must take place only on public property, at entrances to the striking or locked out employees’ place of employment
o It must not involve acts that are otherwise unlawful.
[Above paraphrased from Alberta Labour Relations Board Bulletin #17]
Unlawful Behavior
The laws of Canada are in effect at all times, including during a strike. Some examples of unlawful behaviour are as follows:
o Assaulting (hitting, kicking, slapping, shoving, touching) anyone.
o Assaulting someone with a weapon (a weapon includes something which can be used as a weapon, even such things as a rock, pen, or a car)
o Threatening or intimidating someone
o Damaging property
o Stalking (persistently following) someone
o Carrying a weapon (which includes something which could be used as a weapon)
o Trespassing on private property
o Theft (stealing)
o Disobeying a court order
o Public mischief (for example, vandalizing cars or other property)
o Criminal negligence (being careless of the lives or safety of others)
This is obviously not a complete list of unlawful behaviour. Any unlawful behaviour can result in the person responsible being arrested and fined or jailed. Any unlawful behaviour can result in a criminal record.
Role of the Police
Police officers do not take sides in a labour dispute. They do not stop lawful picketing. They only become involved to:
o Keep the peace (prevent crime)
o Enforce the law
o Protect life and property
o Investigate unlawful behaviour and arrest those who break the law, where necessary.
Entering the Workplace
Persons are entitled to enter and leave the workplace. Picketers may not prevent them from doing so, except that picketers may stop persons for a short time to attempt to peacefully persuade them not to enter the workplace or not to do business with the employer.
| English to French: Elasticities of Chicken Demand - Maple Leaf Canada
General field: Bus/Financial
Detailed field: Food & Dairy | Source text - English
Annex I - Elasticities of Chicken Demand
This annex reviews the literature on chicken demand elasticities; a parameter shown in the main text of this report to influence many variables including equilibrium prices and premiums. Table I-1 presents various estimates of the Canadian chicken demand own-price elasticity. The presentation follows the chronological order of the studies as they appear in the literature. Own-price elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in consumption over the percentage change in the retail price. It is important to note that the elasticities in Table I-1 are uncompensated elasticities (in that they measure the change in quantity following a change in price holding consumers’ income fixed). They are generally computed at the sample mean and so hold at the average price and quantity. In the real world, elasticities are not constant and vary according to market conditions. In some instances, the researchers conducted a number of different experiments and chose to report various elasticity measures. In those cases, the average value of these estimates is reported in Table I-1.
There is a great deal of variability across the different studies. However, they all find point estimates lower than one; thus offering strong evidence that chicken demand is price inelastic. In the beginning of the 1990s, Reynolds and Goddard estimated the own-price elasticity of chicken demand to be -0.33. Eales (1996) and Xu and Veeman (1996) reported results in line with the previous estimate. Moschini and Vissa (1993) explicitly considered the role of supply management in their empirical demand system and estimated the chicken demand own-price elasticity to be -0.80. The estimates found in Chen and Veeman (1991), Chalfant et al. (1991) and Moschini (2001) are at the higher end of the spectrum in that chicken demand own-price elasticities are respectively -0.95, -0.91 and -0.92. While Moschini’s study is fairly recent and up-to-date (both in terms of the methodology and data available), it has the inconvenience to combine chicken and fish into one food category. Peng, McCann-Hiltz and Goddard (2004) recently estimated the chicken demand own-price elasticity to be -0.13. Their study is appealing for a number of reasons. First, their primary objective is to analyze the impacts of BSE on Canadian food consumption; as such their application includes recent trends in consumer meat purchasing behaviour. Moreover, they use AC Nielsen scanner data. Highly disaggregated data are often considered to produce more reliable estimates because they account for consumers’ heterogeneity in food preferences.
Table I-1 A Review of chicken demand own-price elasticities
Study Chicken own-price elasticities
Chalfant et al. (1991) -0.91
Reynolds and Goddard (1991) -0.33
Chen and Veeman (1991) -0.95
Moschini and Vissa (1993) -0.80
Eales (1996) -0.38
Xu and Veeman (1996) -0.37
Moschini (2001) -0.92
Peng, McCann-Hiltz and Goddard (2004) -0.13
References
Chalfant, J. A., R. S. Gray and K. J. White, “Evaluating Prior Beliefs in a Demand System: The Case of Meat Demand in Canada”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 1991(73): 476-490.
Chen, P. Y. and M. M. Veeman, “An Almost Ideal Demand System Analysis for Meats with Habit Formation and Structural Change”, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 1991(39): 223-235.
Eales, J., “A Symmetric Approach to Canadian Meat Demand Estimation”, Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 1996(21): 368-380.
Moschini, G., “A Flexible Multistage Demand System Based in Indirect Separability”, Southern Economic Journal 2001(68): 22-41.
Moschini, G., and A. Vissa, “Flexible Specification of Mixed Demand Systems”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75(1993): 1-9.
Peng, T., D. McCann-Hiltz and E. Goddard, “Consumer Demand for Meat in Alberta, Canada: Impact of BSE”, selected paper presented at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting in Denver, CO, August 1-4, 2004.
Reynolds, A. and E. Goddard, “Structural Change in Canadian Meat Demand”, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 1991(39): 211-222.
Xu, X. and M. Veeman, “Model Choice and Structural Specification for Canadian Meat Consumption”, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 1996(23): 301-315.
Annex II - Dairy Plant Supply Quota and Pricing
This annex describes processor competition and the resulting price discovery process for raw milk. Raw milk is marketed in Canada as either fluid or industrial milk. The fluid market accounts for 40% of the milk produced, while industrial milk accounts for 60%. Industrial milk is manufactured into dairy products such as butter, cheese, yogurt, and ice cream.
The dairy processing industry in Canada is highly concentrated in Ontario and Quebec (where the majority of milk production takes place). These two provinces account for 75% of total Canadian dairy production. In 2003, 171 plants could be found in Quebec of which 73 were registered with CFIA, while 128 plants (104 registered with CFIA) were based in Ontario (Canadian Dairy Commission, 2005).
Thirty-six percent of dairy processing plants are owned by three major processors: Parmalat, Saputo, and Agropur. These companies process 71% of Canadian milk (AAFC, 2004). The Italian based Parmalat moved into the Canadian market in 1997 when it purchased both Beatrice and Ault. It has since purchased other companies and divisions of companies.
Table II-1 Top 10 Players in the Canadian Dairy Processing Industry
Source: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC), 2004
In Ontario, dairy processors are supplied milk by the Dairy Farmers of Ontario (DFO) who purchase milk from Ontario producers and transport it to processors. Processors must pay the DFO, who in turn pay the producers. Processors that make fluid milk and cream are supplied their raw milk on demand (McMurchy, 1999). For these processors there are no supply constraints. There are also no supply constraints for processors of some other dairy products including ice cream, yogurt, and cottage cheese. The milk that is supplied to the processors of fluid milk and the above-mentioned dairy products is part of the province’s Market Sharing Quota (MSQ) (McMurchy, 2001). The other part of the MSQ is often referred to as the residual milk supply and is generally used for the production of other cheeses and butter. MSQ is the total amount of industrial milk and cream that Ontario has been allocated to produce by the Canadian Milk Supply Management Committee (McMurchy, 2001). Each province’s Market Share Quota is determined using its historical share of national industrial milk production.
Ice cream manufacturers also have a Milk Entitlement Quota (MEQ). MEQ, which is readily available from the DFO at no cost, requires processors to source half of their butterfat requirements from skim-off (McMurchy, 1999). Processors that obtain their milk from the residual supply must have a Plant Supply Quota (PSQ). Peter Gould, General Manager of the Dairy Farmers of Ontario, stated that processors that want to expand their holdings of a PSQ or new processors who want to obtain a PSQ must obtain it from another Ontario processor, either by transfer or when a processor leaves the industry. In Ontario, the PSQ is managed by the Dairy Farmers of Ontario but processors can transfer a PSQ to another processor once it has been approved by the DFO (Gould in conversation, 2005). Gould also noted that he thought that the DFO had never disapproved a transfer, but he did state that it would be appropriate if the PSQ was being transferred to a processor in which there was a history of trouble with milk deliveries and/or payments. However, this has not happened in the industry as of yet. The concept of a Plant Supply Quota is similar in the other provinces with a number of dairy processors, including Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia. However, most provinces with lesser milk production primarily process fluid milk, which does not require a PSQ.
Processors can also access raw milk under the Domestic Dairy Product Innovation Plan. Under this program, processors that want to produce new and innovative dairy products can obtain the milk supplies they require; thus creating an increased demand for raw milk. Supplies of milk provided under this program are limited to 1% of the Market Share Quota. The milk supplied to these processors does not take away any PSQ from other processors and is authorized for a period of 5 years only. Once the 5 years has passed, then the raw milk supply will be obtained from the regular provincial plant supply allocation system.
There is price discrimination with respect to Canadian milk because processors pay varying milk prices depending on the end-use of the milk. For example, processors will pay less for milk that will be manufactured into butter compared to fluid milk prices. The Canadian Dairy Commission sets the price for industrial milk with input from industry stakeholders, while provincial dairy authorities set fluid and industrial milk prices for their jurisdictions (McMurchy, 1999). However, the provincial authorities generally use the federal industrial milk target price as a guide for the provincial industrial milk price.
References:
Gould, Peter. In conversation March 12th, 2005. General Manager, Dairy Farmers of Ontario.
Le Roy, D.G. 2001. Trade Liberalization and the Canadian Dairy Sector. Advances in Dairy Technology. Vol. 13, p. 327.
McMurchy, J.C. 1999. Allocation of Ontario’s Supply-Managed Commodities to Processors. Available at: www.gov.on.ca/OMAFRA/english/farmproducts/factsheets/allocation.htm#dairy
Annex III - Competition in the Canadian Turkey Markets
This annex describes processor competition and the resulting price discovery process in the Canadian turkey industry. Unlike the Canadian hog and beef markets, the poultry market is not one large North American industry due to the supply managed structure, therefore price setting in Canada in the turkey market is slightly different than in the red meat markets.
With respect to turkey processing in Canada, Ontario has historically been the region with the most competition; however competition is starting to occur in British Columbia. In most other provinces there remains only one processor, Lilydale is the main turkey processor in British Columbia and Alberta, Grannies is the major processor in Manitoba, Nova Scotia has ACA Cooperative and Quebec houses one plant in which two processors share (AAFC, 2005) .
In Ontario, processors are supplied product from producers of their choice. Producers however, can only supply up to their maximum quota allowance. If a processor cannot obtain the amount of supply that they require, the Ontario Turkey Producers Marketing Board can intervene. Historically this has not been required.
The Ontario prices for broilers, hens and toms were historically negotiated between the Ontario Turkey Producers Marketing Board and the Ontario Poultry Processors’ Association’s Turkey Committee (the processors). The price set is based on information collected from the Canadian Turkey Marketing Agency on feed and poult costs, as well as current market conditions. If there is agreement between the Board and processors, then the Board will set that price. However, if there is disagreement, the Board has the authority to set the price that it sees fit. The processors can then appeal that price to the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal. This past winter the Board and the processors sat down and negotiated a new Board minimum price per kilogram for producers on a formula that included the same elements: feed, poult costs, and the market situation. If any of the factors that are involved in setting the price change, then the Board and processors can sit down and negotiate the price again. On average, this may occur up to four times per year.
The Ontario price usually sets the price for the rest of the provinces. When the Ontario price changes, the other provinces adjust their prices to reflect that change, although it is not required.
The price that is set by the Board is the minimum price that the processor must pay its suppliers. However, any processor that wants to attract production to their plant has the ability to provide premiums to the producers in payment, bundling discounts on inputs, or transportation. Industry personnel suggest that, although there is a lack of evidence, these premiums do exist. It was suggested that these premiums are offered at a lesser degree than the premiums that were paid to chicken producers in the 1980’s (see section 2.5). The difference here is that, chicken is a growing market with increasing demand and a slow production allocation system to catch up to demand, but the turkey market is fairly stable and therefore processors have not fought for market share the way chicken processors did in the 1980’s. There is also no sign that these premiums have caused a change in the market share of the processors in Ontario and there is no sign that turkey producers are moving from processor to processor.
Annex IV - Competition in the Canadian Egg Markets
This annex describes processor competition and the resulting price discovery process for processing eggs. The percentage of eggs purchased by egg processors (breakers) has been recently estimated at 25% . Thus, 75% of egg production is for the table market. There are three sources of supply for breaker eggs in the Canadian market. Eggs for processing are produced by farmers willing to produce eggs at a lower cost directly for the processing market under the Eggs for Processing (EFP) program. Secondly, eggs can also be obtained from graders if there is a surplus supply of table eggs during non-peak periods under the Industrial Product (IP) program. Finally, processors can import eggs, if the other two sources do not fill demand, under global and supplemental import permits. Generally, processors receive 10% of their supply through the EFP program, 70% through the IP Program and 20% as imports.
In Ontario, eggs that are surplus to the table market are bought back by the Canadian Egg Marketing Agency (CEMA) or the Ontario Egg Producers (OEP) through the IP program at a formulated price that has been set by the OEP . Once CEMA or OEP has bought back the surplus eggs, they sell them to processors at negotiated prices based on US breaking stock prices. The negotiated prices inherently include factors such as the exchange rate and import tariffs as well. The world egg price is frequently referred to as the Urner-Barry egg price quoted for the US. The negotiated price for breaker eggs is the Urner-Barry price, which is lower than the price paid for table eggs. Thus, the Canadian breaker egg price is usually close to the world price.
Figure IV-1 presents recent trends in the Canadian breaker egg price, as represented by the Ontario breaker egg price. Breaker egg prices have typically ranged between $0.40 and $0.60/dozen. Observations in the 2003-2004 period present an anomaly arising from the production disruption due to avian influenza in British Columbia. Because the surplus table eggs sell into the breaker market at discounted prices, producers must pay levies to fund the system that has been created to move these eggs to the breaker market. In reality however, it is the consumers who pay these levies in the price of table eggs. Figure IV-2 shows the actual price paid to producers for Grade A table eggs and the net price, which subtracts the levy, paid by producers to fund the transport to the breaker market.
Figure IV-2 Historical Ontario Breaker Egg Prices
Source: Canadian Egg Marketing Agency (CEMA)
Figure IV-2 Historical Ontario Table Egg Prices
Source: Canadian Egg Marketing Agency (CEMA)
Unlike the chicken market, the egg market does not calculate production quota allocation based on a bottom-up system. Instead, quota allocation is calculated on a national basis and is distributed to each province based on their historical market shares. Additional allocation that is distributed above the base allocation is distributed in two ways: 50% of the additional quota is distributed on a pro rata basis and the other 50% is distributed to those provinces where hen to population ratio is decreasing. In other words, those provinces that are growing will receive this allocation in order to satisfy the table market. Therefore, through this system the processors have no input in the amount of eggs that are produced in order to satisfy both the table market and the processing market.
Historically, the processing market was seen as a surplus market to serve a purpose for the surplus table eggs produced. However, the processing market in Ontario evolved into an important industry. This industry has created a demand for breaker eggs greater than the amount of surplus eggs and eggs for processing that are being produced. In order to alleviate a demand for more production, the CEMA allows the importation of breaker eggs (or yolks or whites that are already broken) through global and supplemental import permits in order to meet the processing demand. The supplemental import permits are used during those times of the year when table egg demand is high (Easter, Thanksgiving and Christmas) and therefore the amount of surplus eggs heading for the breaker market is lower.
Although, processors are not restricted in the amount of imports they bring in to supply their demands, processors will usually fill as much of their demand with domestic supply first because they can obtain it at a somewhat lower cost (avoiding freight costs from US locations). Therefore, there are no restrictions to growth in the egg processing industry in Canada. However the industry has matured apart from a little bit of new product development and little growth has occurred in the last few years.
One of the weaknesses of the national egg allocation system, as expressed through industry representatives is that it has lead to over-production in some provinces. With allocation based on historical market share criteria that are over thirty years old, some provinces are producing more than the current province demand for table eggs or breakers. This has put a financial strain on the industry because those oversupplies must then be shipped to other locations with greater demand; whereas transportation costs could be reduced if those provinces with greater demand produced those eggs.
References
McMurchy, J.C., Allocation of Ontario’s Supply-Managed Commodities to Processors, 1999. Available at: www.gov.on.ca/OMAFRA/english/farmproducts/factsheets/allocation.htm
Annex V – Processor Competition in the US Upper Midwest Dairy Industry
The annex provides a case study of procurement of raw agricultural commodities using the Upper Midwest dairy industry. It is relevant in the current context because it illustrates processor competition that occurred because of restrictions in the supply of the raw agricultural commodity. The Upper Midwest region of the US (Minnesota, Wisconsin, the Dakotas and Iowa) has long been an important milk and dairy product supply region in the US. It is also a region of relatively sparse consumer population relative to milk production capability. As such, the region evolved as a surplus producer of milk with the lowest milk price in the US, and facilities developed to manufacture dairy products (mainly cheese and butter/skim milk powder) that could then be transported to markets throughout the US. Indeed, dairy product sales made by processors effectively derive the budget for milk procurement in the Upper Midwest. For example, Figure V-1 plots the Minnesota All-Milk price against the US commodity cheddar cheese price. The figure shows a strong correlation between cheese prices received by processors and bid prices for milk.
Figure V-1 Minnesota Milk Procurement Prices and Commodity Cheddar Prices, 1999-2004
Starting in the early 1980’s, milk production in the Upper Midwest region levelled off and began to decline. This came about as many small dairy farms exited the industry, and others switched into other sectors of the economy. The situation persisted well into the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. It created a situation in which excess dairy processing capacity existed in the region. In order to retain volumes in processing facilities, processors began to aggressively compete with one another for the now scarce milk supply.
This situation created a new dynamic in the Upper Midwest dairy industry:
Competition between processors resulted in price premiums being paid for farmers’ milk. The best indicator of this was that Minnesota and Wisconsin went from being the low-price point for milk in the US to among the highest-priced milk markets
Minimum milk prices paid to farmers are regulated under Federal Milk Marketing Orders. However, actual prices paid were observed to be well over the regulated minimum
Local price cycles became evident. This occurred as competition for milk escalated prices to levels that were unsustainable for competing processors to pay. However, competition occurred at these price levels until eventually a processor (or individual plant) had to close. Following the closure, local prices would decline. The price cycle would resume as farm milk production further declined.
Within the scope of price premiums that resulted from processor competition, processors employed a number of specific pricing initiatives. These included the following:
Pervasive use of milk hauling subsidies. Processors would blend the cost of hauling into the base milk price, such that the full cost of hauling was not covered
Competitively driven quality premiums. Processors would fragment base prices into increased payment proportional to somatic cells and bacteria, with different quality premium programs used in different geographies according the needs of plants supplied
Pervasive use of volume premiums to attract and retain large high volume Grade A producers. Processors paid higher unit prices for higher volumes supplied according to a volume schedule
Forward pricing arrangements. Processors locked in prices for future delivery, or offered prices to cushion price volatility risk
Leasing of heifers and assistance in the design and financing of farm facilities
A specific case of both the use of the previous instruments and the general nature of aggressive competition among processors was evident in 2002 when Kraft Foods divested a number of milk processing facilities in the Upper Midwest. For example, the Kraft Foods plant located in Melrose, Minnesota had been an aggressive competitor in the regional market. As part of the divestiture, Land O’Lakes, Inc. and Dairy Farmers of America, two competing dairy marketing cooperatives, purchased the plant as a joint venture. Under the sale of the plant, the former Kraft producers were free to choose processors they wished to supply, and competition for this milk supply ensued. Many of the former Kraft producers agreed to supply Land O’Lakes or Dairy Farmers of America (the new operators of the plant). However, other processors came into the region to compete for milk supply. As a result of this competition, ultimately the former Kraft suppliers ended up supplying a number of different processors.
Annex VI – Canadian Hog and Cattle Pricing and Marketing Systems
This annex explains how the price of hogs and cattle are derived or discovered in Canada. It is relevant to the current situation in the chicken industry in that it illustrates how growth in the hog industry is allocated between packers. Interestingly, there is currently no single uniform mechanism across provinces but each has experimented with different sets of marketing rules. Before discussing hog and cattle pricing in Canada, it is important to describe general livestock pricing principles. The term price determination is typically used to illustrate how prices are derived from a macro perspective while price discovery is used to explain how prices are derived from a micro perspective. Prices for hogs and cattle are determined in Canada by prevailing North American supply and demand conditions for pork and beef. That is, the overall domestic and export demand for pork and beef, coupled with the total supply of hogs and cattle, determines the prevailing price level at any time. From that basic starting point, prices are discovered at any given time in Canada based on the prevailing North American price level as a starting point.
Given the relative size of markets, the major regions of the US are typically the price points of reference for the Canadian markets. The Canadian price will follow the US price because of the ability of hog and cattle producers to sell to US packers. This ability results in a price arbitrage, which keeps prices closely correlated. This price arbitrage is a fixture of the North American live hog and cattle pricing structure. For Canada, this arbitrage exists only if there is free and open trade in both directions.
Hog Price Discovery and Determination
Understanding the pricing mechanism for pork and hogs is an important starting point for evaluating the drivers of trade between Canada and the US.
Canadian pork and hog prices are determined through three basic components:
1. US Price Levels
2. Exchange Rate Values
3. Price Spread (Transport Cost and Local Supply/Demand factors)
The Canadian and US hog and pork industries are essentially one North American industry. The determinants of trade flows are relative supply and demand levels in the various regions of Canada and the United States. US hog slaughter is approximately 5 times greater than Canadian slaughter (Gervais and Schroeder, 2005). Given that fact, the overall price determination begins in the key production and slaughter regions of the US Corn Belt and Midwest. These markets are the alternative market points for Canadian producers, after their own local/provincial markets.
Price setting in Canada therefore begins with the possible prices that can be derived by a producer accepting bids from US packers. Alternatively, Canadian packers, aware of US hog price levels in the alternative destinations, must also keep local bids competitive with those alternatives.
From that basic starting point, the price that a packer will offer or that a producer will accept, will be at least the US alternative, adjusted for the exchange rate and the cost of transport to the alternative market. The transport cost and local supply-demand conditions in the province determine the differential between the US price in Canadian dollars and the local provincial price.
This overall price discovery mechanism in Canada has now been almost completely prescribed into Canadian hog prices through formula pricing and contracts. The George Morris Centre has estimated that about 80% of Canadian hogs in Ontario and the prairies are formula priced. Quebec hogs are also overwhelmingly formula priced. The formula price is basically the US price (National Cost, Iowa-S. Minn, etc), converted to Canadian dolalrs, less a spread factor. The spread factor is incorporated by dividing the price by an index divisor or by multiplying by a certain negotiated fraction.
The main point to note from this is that prices in the US determine prices in Canada. Quebec is the largest hog-marketing province in Canada and is an important market to understand due to its unique marketing system. The prairies are Canada’s fastest growing hog production region and are also an important market to understand because of the rapid growth and a marketing system that underwent material change during the past ten years. This section examines the Quebec and prairie marketing systems. The marketing mechanisms in the hog industry are relevant to the chicken industry in the sense that many mechanisms have been implemented and negotiated to deal with the growth in production.
Quebec Pricing
As a starting point, it is noted that the Quebec marketing board, the Fédération des producteurs de porcs du Québec, (FPPQ) operates a marketing monopoly. The board sells all hogs marketed in the province. Direct producer-packer contracting of Quebec hogs is not an option. The system is governed by a marketing plan referred to as the province’s Hog Marketing Agreement. The agreement specifies the conditions for the sale of slaughter pigs and is regularly renegotiated between the FPPQ and the slaughterhouses.
Producers in Quebec receive the same net price index 100 (called the prix de pool). This pool price is the average of prices in the three marketing channels:
1. Pre-attributions (which is formula based)
2. Contrats par soumission (or contracts, also formula based)
3. Encan (Auction)
From this average price, up to $2 is kept by the marketing board (FPPQ) to pay for transport and administrative charges and to fund a few specific programs (like genetics).
The proportion of hogs sold through each marketing mechanism is (approximately):
Pre-attributions Contracts par soumission Auction
Starting 2003 55 % 20 % 25 %
Starting 2004 50 % 25 % 25 %
Starting 2005 50% 25% 25%
1- Pre-attributions
Packers are awarded pre-attributions according to their historical share of the market. The level of pre-attributions of each packer will also vary through time according to how many hogs they buy through the auction and by contracts (basically, the more hogs bought at auction or by contract, the higher the pre-attributions will be the year after). Explicitly, the share of one packer in any given period is determined by two factors:
Last year’s market share in pre-attributed supplies multiplied by a factor of (1 – 0.35 – annual percentage growth in production)
Last year’s market share of purchased hogs through the auction and contracts multiplied by a factor of (0.35 annual percentage growth in production)
For illustrative purposes, consider that there has been no growth in production between 2004 and 2005. Suppose a packer had a 50% market share of pre-attributed supplies in 2004. Moreover it also had a market share of 75% of all hogs sold through auction and by contracts. Its market share of pre-attributed supplies in 2005 will be:
50% x 0.65 75% x 0.35 = 58.75%
The formula above determines what could be called the packer’s base allocation. A few things are interesting to note. First, all growth in the production is factored in through the auction and contracts market channels. Hence, processors have no entitlements to growth in the industry and they must actually purchase these hogs in competitive market channels before growth can be factored in their pre-attributed market share.
Although it is stated previously that the share of total pre-attributed supplies in the industry is about 50%, one must note that this share has been declining over the years. The 50% share of pre-attribution is adjusted at the industry level each year by a factor of 50% divided by (50% percentage of the auction).
There are also provisions made for new entrants in the marketing agreement between producers and packers. In summary, a new entrant must build market share by purchasing hogs through the auction and by contracts. While it can perhaps take some time to build significant market share, there is nothing that prevents a new entrant to purchase hogs in Quebec.
2- Contrats par soumission
These contracts are similar to a monthly auction held every 4 weeks. The FPPQ tells packers how many hogs will be sold by contracts through the month and sets a starting "bid" price (for example, US reference price 4 $). If, at the set price, there are not enough hogs to cover the packers' needs or, on the contrary, not all the hogs are sold, the FPPQ starts over with a new set price. This process will be repeated until the supply and demand are equivalent, at which point, the price modifier to the reference price will be set for the month (although the reference price will still vary daily).
3- Encan (auction)
This is a daily event and is like any auction. The selling price is fixed each week by packer bids.
Prairie Pricing
Manitoba and Alberta eliminated the mandatory marketing authorities of their provincial marketing boards in the mid-late 1990’s. Producers in both provinces as well as Saskatchewan, can still, however, market their hogs through a producer-controlled organization. The producer controlled marketing agencies on the prairies are Manitoba Pork Marketing Co-op, Saskatchewan Pork International (SPI) and the Western Hog Exchange (WHE) in Alberta. SPI and WHE are private companies. Manitoba Pork, SPI and WHE do not have regulatory marketing authorities. They exist based on their merits and the services they can deliver in a competitive market. Producers can also choose to market their hogs on their own or through private marketing firms. Essentially it is best to describe the prairie marketing systems as “open marketing.”
Pricing Mechanism
Prairie hog producers can sell to packers on a contract basis or through the spot (cash) market. Based on discussions with packers, it is estimated that about 80% or more of hogs on the prairies are sold on contract. In Manitoba there are two main packers: Maple Leaf Foods and Springhill Farms. Maple Leaf has slaughter plants located in Brandon and Winnipeg. Springhill’s plant is located in Neepawa. Maple Leaf and Olymel are the main packers in Alberta. Olymel is located in Red Deer while Maple Leaf has a small specialty plant in Lethbridge.
In Western Canada, Maple Leaf’s Signature Program prices hogs using a formula based on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange base price. For its part, Springhill’s contract bases its prices on the current USDA’s Iowa Southern Minnesota price. The contract prices fluctuate weekly based on the changes in the exchange rate and of course, based on changes in the US market.
Producers decide to contract with one packer or another based on the merits of the contract compared to their own production systems. They will also decide to contract with one packer over another based on logistics or transportation. Producers typically decide on a contract over the spot or cash market in order to assure that they have a market for their hogs. They may also prefer the pricing predictability of the packer’s formula.
Packers decide on the pricing structure of their contract formulas based on the following:
Their demand for hogs over the short and long term (packer capacity)
Competitive strategies
Available hog supply
When the competition is more intense or when supplies are shorter than requirements, packers will enrich their contract pricing through greater quality premiums or less of a discount off the US price. The reverse is true in periods of greater hog supply or less competition.
Producers that sell hogs on the cash market simply receive what the packer is offering on that particular day or week. With that said, the producer will decide on a sale based on expected prices in the future or on the need to move live inventory. Packers determine an offer price based on their need for hogs and the competitive offerings of other packers. The key reference will be the prevailing US prices. The main arithmetic of the cash offer price for hogs is as follows:
Revenue from pork and by-products - fixed and variable costs - profit target = Offer price
An additional point with regard to the prairies, however, is that it is the individual producer that makes the sale (or the producer’s chosen agent) either on the cash or contract method. The producer decides whom to sell to and on what terms while the packer decides on what suppliers to deal with. In Quebec, the board is the sole, mandatory seller and packers must buy through the board.
Cattle Price Discovery and Determination
Cattle prices are discovered and determined in the same way as prairie hogs . Other than a marketing board in Quebec (which sells very few beef cattle), cattle are marketed and procured in the same way as prairie hogs. The percentage of cattle sold on contract is typically much less than hogs (likely around 20%). Cash market cattle comprise the vast majority of producer offerings.
In the west, most cattle are sold on a live basis. That is, the packer buyer offers to buy the cattle based on a live weight bid. Cattle are sold as weighed at the feedlot. In the east, cattle are typically sold on a dressed weight or carcass basis at the plant. The pricing decisions and methods of producers and packers are similar to those of prairie hog producers.
The next section offers a short description of the impact of the Maple Leaf plant in Brandon when it was opened in 1999. There is evidence that the new plant increased the competitive situation and resulted in higher prices for producers. Conversely, during the past two years, the prairies have seen greater hog numbers relative to packer capacity. As a result, packers have reduced their contract price offerings.
Impact of New Entrants in the Red Meat Industry
Hornung and Ward recently published a paper in Current Agricultural, Food and Resource Issues (CAFRI, the electronic journal of the Canadian Agricultural Economics Society, CAES) entitled Positive Market Effects from a Meatpacking Plant Opening: Perceptions and Reality (CAFRI, 2005, number 6: p. 40-49). The paper examines the impact of the opening of the Maple Leaf Brandon plant in 1999. The objectives of the research were twofold. First, two models were used to estimate market price impacts from the plant opening. Second, a survey of Manitoba pork producers provided insight into the perceived market dynamics of the plant opening.
Empirical results from the two models indicated a significant price increase occurred in Manitoba following the opening of a new Maple Leaf Foods plant in Brandon. The price increase occurred in both relative and absolute terms. Prices and slaughter differed sharply in some cases before and after the plant opened. Both absolute and relative prices increased in Manitoba after the Brandon plant opened, as did hog slaughter. A key question is whether or not these changes were due to the plant opening per se. Estimating the effects of the plant opening with a price difference model indicated a significant price difference increase of $6.80 to $10.18 per $C/100 kg in two of the three market comparisons (Manitoba-Ontario and Manitoba-Iowa/southern Minnesota). The Manitoba-Saskatchewan price difference increase was not statistically significant.
Producer perceptions differed regarding impacts of the plant opening. Some perceptions were consistent with the empirical findings while others were not. However, producer perceptions were likely influenced by additional, more recent changes involving Maple Leaf Foods, rather than being simply limited to response to the plant opening in 1999. Producers who responded to the survey may not have limited their perception of the impacts to the months immediately following the plant opening. Other market changes subsequent to the plant opening could have affected their market impact perceptions. For example, since the Brandon plant opened, Maple Leaf Foods has acquired rival packers in Manitoba, including a major purchase just prior to when the survey was mailed. Second, in the time since the plant opened, the percentage of hogs owned by or contracted by Maple Leaf Foods has increased. These two factors may explain why some producers did not perceive the plant opening effects to be the same as those theoretically expected or found with secondary data estimates.
With current levels of concentration and consolidation in meatpacking, both in Canada and the United States, packing plant closings are often a concern. Conversely, plant openings theoretically should provide some market relief for producers. Research results indicated the market reacted to the plant opening, despite producers not necessarily agreeing on the ultimate effect it had on market competition and prices.
Annex VII - Model of Processor Procurement
In order to interpret the case studies of processor competition presented in this document, a model is required that can explain how processors behave in purchasing farm product. The current annex and the following one (Annex VIII) present two theoretical models that explain pricing patterns in procurement of raw agricultural commodities. The first model illustrates various strategies available to processors under different circumstances. It analyzes the ensuing impacts on different forms of processor behaviour. It develops a simple economic model of processor procurement as an extension of the economic theory of marketing cooperatives, and analyzes its essential components. While it does not establish the equilibrium conditions that are likely to prevail in a long-run situation, it offers a number of important insights.
VII.1.1 Conceptual Model of Processor Procurement of Farm Products
The theory of agricultural marketing cooperatives, which was pioneered by Peter Helmberger and Sidney Hoos , developed the understanding of how farmers’ marketing cooperatives determine output and pricing levels. This basic theory is adapted to consider the motivations and behaviour of a processing firm (which may or may not be a cooperative) in purchasing farm products and processing it into a food product.
Assume that a food processor purchases a farm product that it combines with other inputs given the technology of its plant to produce a food product. The processor is a price taker in the market for the processed product and in the market for non-farm inputs. In its processing operations, the processor realizes a margin per unit of farm product processed, which is revenue less the cost of non-farm product inputs. This margin is referred to as the average revenue product (ARP) that results from processing. The average revenue product varies relative to the volume of farm product processed (represented by M in Figure VII-1) based on the efficiency in utilization of plant capacity. At low levels of farm product processed, the ARP is low. The ARP increases with the farm product volume processed up to the point that plant scale efficiencies are attained; from this level the ARP decreases with farm product volume, as plant capacity becomes a constraint. In other words, the processing technology exhibits increasing returns to scale as production starts while decreasing returns to scale prevail past a certain level of output (the minimum efficient scale of production).
The processor must also account for fixed costs that are not included in the ARP. Fixed costs, by their very nature are a constant, so the ARP is adjusted by subtracting the (constant) fixed costs to obtain net average revenue product (NARP). Finally, the value of an extra unit of farm product processed is given by the value of marginal product (VMP). At low levels of farm product processed, the VMP is low. The VMP increases with the volume processed, up to the point that ARP levels off, beyond which VMP declines.
Figure VII-1 Processor Procurement Framework
Figure VII-1 illustrates the nature of these relationships. As discussed previously, the ARP increases with respect to the volume of farm product processed (Q), peaks, and then decreases. The NARP line follows a similar pattern but the ARP curve converges to the NARP curve because average fixed cost become insignificant as output increases. The VMP line passes through the peaks of the ARP and NARP lines. The analysis is a little different than the one presented in standard microeconomic textbooks because they tend to represent technology using average and marginal cost curves. The benefit of illustrating the processing technology using average and marginal revenue is that the price of the farm commodity can be solved for endogenously.
From figure VII-1, at any level of product processed, the most a processor could pay is the NARP, since the NARP is revenue less non-farm product input costs less fixed costs. In a perfectly competitive market for the farm commodity, the long-run equilibrium would entail an equilibrium price paid and volume processed are at the point where VMP=NARP (assuming that competing processors’ cost structures were identical).
In an imperfectly competitive framework, processors face a supply of the farm product, over which they have some influence in price. Figure VII-2 reproduces the analysis in Figure VII-1 but also includes a supply function for the farm product. For the time being, it is assumed that there is no supply management in place; thus the farm supply curve is not perfectly inelastic. Suppose that the processing firm has monopoly in the purchase of the farm product but faces competition in its output market. The processing firm maximizes profits by pricing the farm product at a level such that the VMP intersects the supply function. This results in a volume processed of M1 and a price paid at a level of P1. The processing firm collects some positive economic profits as the processor can pay up to NARP for the product (pay P2 and process a volume of Q2). Also, in the situation in which a processor pays P3 and process a volume Q3, fixed costs are not covered.
Figure VII-2 Pricing and Processing Volume Scenarios, Based on Procurement Framework
The positioning of the farm supply curve is also important in the context of figure VII-2. Consider the situation illustrated in Figure VII-3. If the processing firm faced supply schedule S1, it would not be viable business position, even on a short-term basis. This is because its profit-maximizing bid for the farm product (the intersection of S1 and VMP) exceeds average revenue product (ARP). In other words, its cash costs of procurement would exceed product sales revenue less other variable input costs. Instead, if the processor faced farm product supply curve S2, it could be viable on a temporary basis, but not on a long-term basis. This is because, by pricing the farm product at the intersection of VMP and S2, a cash margin is generated from processing, but it does not cover fixed costs. If the relevant supply were S3, the processor would be just viable, earning a zero profit by pricing the farm product at VMP=S3=NARP. Finally, if S4 were the relevant supply function, by pricing at VMP=S4 the processor earns an economic profit over and above variable and fixed costs.
Figure VII-3 Processor Returns and Viability Under Alternative Farm Product Supply Scenarios
VII.1.2 Inter-firm Competition for a Supply of Farm Product
The previous information in the annex provides a discussion of a single processing firm’s behaviour with regard to farm product procurement. To set the stage for the discussion of product allocation via competition vs. a plant quota system, we need to consider the impacts of interaction between two processing firms following the model developed above. First, it is assumed that the market is supply-managed, so that in effect the aggregate supply is fixed and can be represented as a vertical (perfectly inelastic) supply curve. The modeling strategy is to illustrate different bidding strategies of processors without explicitly deriving (long-run) equilibrium conditions. Market conditions are always evolving and thus conditions to analyze the characteristics of a long-run stable equilibrium may never materialize.
Figure VII-4 provides the basic set-up for competition between processors. The figure is composed of two sets of curves like the ones depicted in Figure VII-1, with one set of curves flipped to its mirror image to read from right to left. The horizontal axis in the figure measures the volume of farm products processed; the width of the horizontal axis is normalized to be the total quota of farm output available to processors.
Figure VII-4 Basic Model of Processor Competition
In this basic case, two processors (Processor 1 and Processor 2) compete with one another for the supply of the farm product that is fixed by a quota. In this context, assume that initial allocation of farm product between processors is determined by the intersection of the two processors’ VMP curves. As shown in the figure, the two firms’ VMP curves intersect at a price P*. At this price level, a quantity Q1 is processed by Processor 1 and a quantity Q*- Q1 is processed by Processor 2. The profit realized by the processors is the difference between the processor’s NARP and the price paid for the farm product, multiplied by the number of units processed. In the figure, the profit of Processor 1 is (NARP1 – P*)*Q1 and the profit of Processor 2 is (NARP2 – P*)*(Q*- Q1). The profit regions are illustrated using a shaded blue colour.
However, note that in a competitive environment in which processors attempt to increase processing volume at the expense of rivals (perhaps to gain market share advantage in the food product, or for some other reason) prices can potentially exceed the VMP level if firms have dynamic planning horizons. Consider the initial situation in Figure VII-4. Suppose that Processor 2 attempts to bid product volume away from Processor 1. Processor 2 could offer a price higher than P*. This situation is depicted in Figure VII-5. Processor 2 can pay up to NARP2; and suppose that it offers P1. Suppose also that Processor 1 follows suit and raises the price it offers producers to P1 as well. The value of marginal product that corresponds to that price is Q2 from Processor 1’s perspective. Such a price response would involve Processor 2 capturing market share away from Processor 1. The result of this process is that Processor 1’s volume decreases to Q2 from Q1 and that price increases from P* to P’. At this allocation of volume, Processor 2 breaks even; however, it inflicts a loss on Processor 1 because the procurement price exceeds NARP1. In a dynamic setting, this situation may lead to the disappearance of one processing firm as more aggressive bidding is sustained for long periods of time.
Figure VII-5 Aggressive Processor Competition for Product Volume
Finally, consider a supply managed market in which significant overcapacity in processing exists. This is illustrated in Figure VII-6. Again, the analysis starts by assuming that the initial price is set where both marginal revenue product curves intersect. The figure shows that insufficient product volume exists for both processors to be profitable. This can be confirmed by noting that the intersection of the VMP’s of the two firms occurs above their respective NARP’s. As a result, procurement prices for the farm product would result in both processors eventually leaving the industry. More likely, however, the processors will bid up prices to capture volume from rivals and in order to induce the rival to exit the industry. After a rival processor exits the industry, the surviving processor will reduce procurement prices back down to sustainable levels and try to recoup losses sustained from aggressive pricing behaviour.
Figure VII-6 Competition With Excess Processing Capacity
VII.2. Processor Allocation Under Chicken Supply Management
This section interprets the previous model of competition among processors in the context of chicken supply management. Section VII.2.1 extends the conceptual model introduced in Section VII.2.1 to evaluate price competition between chicken processors as a means to allocate chicken supplies. Section VII.2.2 considers a plant quota system of allocation. Section VII.2.3 develops criteria with which to interpret price competition vs. plant quotas as allocation mechanisms, and applies it in the chicken context.
VII.2.1 Chicken Processor Allocation Via Price Competition
The model of processor competition developed in the previous section embodies many of the elements of competition in supply management; in particular, by assuming the supply is entirely fixed the practical equivalent of a quota is imposed. The principal component missing from the above is price setting authority delegated to a marketing board, which manifests itself as a minimum procurement price paid by processors. This aspect is introduced in Figure VII-7. Initially, it is assumed that the minimum price is below the price that prevails in a competitive setting. The competitive price would exceed PMin to a level P* at which Processor 1 would purchase Q1 and Processor 2 would purchase (Q1 – Q*). As described previously, Processor 1 profit would be Q1(NARP1-P*) and Processor 2 profit would be (Q*- Q1)(NARP2-P*). Thus, if the minimum price is set below the competitive level, competition could result in a competitive premium (P* - PMin) being paid in chicken procurement.
As noted before, if other factors induced an aggressively competitive bidding dynamic between processors, the premium could exceed (P* - PMin) for a short period of time.
Another possibility is that the minimum price is set above the competitively established price. In the case where the minimum price exceeds the competitive pricing scenario (P*), this situation could not be sustained because processors would be unwilling to purchase the entire quota volume supplied. This is illustrated in Figure VII-8. In the figure, given the minimum price PMin, Processor 1 purchases Q1, Processor 2 purchases (Q* - Q2), which leaves (Q1 – Q2) unallocated. Given competitive price P* and quantity processed Q3, it can be confirmed that both processors process less and pay a higher price than under the competitive scenario.
If the minimum price is set precisely at the competitive price level, the competitive allocation among processors can be replicated, and unless there are external reasons for aggressive competition, there will be no premiums paid in the market. However, this leaves open the question of how the producer marketing agency would know precisely what price P* is in establishing PMin. In the Ontario chicken industry, PMin is established based on a formula of feed and chick prices.
Figure VII-7 Processor Competition With a Minimum Price
Figure VII-8 Processor Competition with Minimum Price Set Above Initial Price
VII.2.2 Chicken Processor Allocation Via Tradable Plant Supply
Under a system of chicken allocation using plant supply quota, volume is allocated to plants according to quota. The sum of the plant quotas is the aggregate production quota; the quotas are initially allocated to plants based on historic volumes processed; any additional volumes processed by a given plant must result from quota purchases from other processors.
The basic scenario is illustrated in Figure VII-9. Processor 1 has a plant supply quota given by PSQ, and Processor 2 has a plant supply quota of (Q*- PSQ). At this level, Processor 1 makes a profit of (NARP1 – PMin)PSQ, and Processor 2 has profit (NARP2 – PMin)(Q* - PSQ). The capitalized value of these profits becomes the quota values associated with holding PSQ. Thus, the static (uncapitalized) value of Processor 1’s procurement right at the price PMin is simply (NARP1 – PMin)PSQ, and Processor 2’s static quota value is (NARP2 – PMin)(Q* - PSQ).
The per-unit value can be seen more explicitly in Figure VII-10. The marginal value that Processor 1 places on an extra unit of quota is NARP1 – PMin. The minimum offer price at which Processor 2 would sell quota to Processor 1 is NARP2 – PMin. In Figure VII-4, in the range of the two processors’ quota holdings, it appears that (NARP1 – PMin) > NARP2 – PMin), so there is an incentive for Processor 2 to rent/sell some of its quota to Processor 1. This will continue until the valuation that each processor places on a unit of quota is just equal, so the quota level PSQ in the figure is not stable. Trade in quota will drive Processor 1 to purchase quota from Processor 2 until allocation PSQ’ is arrived at. Beyond this level, Processor 1’s quota bid price is lower than Processor 2’s offer price, so Processor 1 can grow no further.
VII.2.3 Observations on Price Competition vs. Plant Quota Allocation
The major observation that emerges from the previous example is that there is a fundamental trade-off between price competition and plant quotas. Under price competition, excess demand (VMP and NARP > minimum price) in the system generates price premiums for the product. Under a system of plant supply quotas, excess demand generates capitalization of plant supply quotas. In the first case, the excess demand becomes immediately realized as cash in the form of a higher procurement price. In the second, the excess demand creates an unrealized gain for processors in the form of a quota asset increasing in value.
Figure VII-9 Processor Allocation Under Plant Supply Quota
Figure VII-10 Pricing of Tradable Plant Quota
In order to interpret the differences between price competition and plant quota allocation, the following criteria are relevant:
Does the allocation system generate information about market conditions?
Does the allocation system contain a self-adjustment mechanism?
What split of benefits between producers and processors results?
How can alternative allocation mechanisms maintain alignment between processors, hatcheries, and hatching egg levels of the market?
Under price competition, a significant amount of information is generated on pricing and market conditions. First, an indicator of the level of the minimum price relative to the NARP and VMP of processors is generated under price competition, but not under a quota system. Under price competition, if the minimum price is set below the VMP of processors, it will result in premiums being generated that measure the extent to which the minimum price is below VMP. Stated differently, the premium measures excess demand that exists in the system at the (pre-determined) production quota and minimum price. The marketing authority could use this information as part of its allocation process. Under a plant quota system, the same indicator of excess demand does not exist, because the VMP is not a component of quota value. Premiums are not observed in a plant supply quota system; only quota values are. Even then, quota values will only ever be observed when transfers occur.
The mechanisms of adjustment differ between competitive allocation and plant quota. Changes in profitability conditions (and thus raw product demand) are readily transmitted into pricing through changes in premium levels under competition; under a quota system this is not observed. Related to this, increasing profitability on behalf of a given processor relative to rivals (which increases NARP and VMP) will lead to a greater volume processed at a higher price in the market. Under a quota system, this manifests itself as a higher bid price for quota on behalf of the given processor.
Under a competitive system, the profits (rents) generated in processing are paid out to the producer in the form of a price premium; under the quota system, the residual profit is bid into the value of plant supply quota. Thus, under one allocation mechanism, producers benefit, under the other, processors capture the benefit.
VII.3 Conclusions
The purpose of this annex was to develop a framework with which to interpret allocation of product among processors. The examples in other industries showed that a variety of allocation systems are used in other products. Most use price competition (US dairy, western Canadian hogs) but others use forms of a supply quota for at least part of the volume (Quebec hogs). Section VII.1 explored a model of product procurement in which the ranges of price a processor can pay are explored, and in which the implications of competition can be interpreted. In Section VII.2, the implications of processor competition in a supply-managed market were explored under alternative allocation mechanisms.
The observations that can be drawn are as follows:
Given a fixed quota and a pre-determined price, a premium over the price of chickens will emerge in the market if processors’ combined demands exceed the quota volume at the minimum price
In a dynamic setting, nothing prevents premiums from attaining levels in the short-run that are higher to net average revenue product (NARP) and (total) average revenue product (ARP)
Aggressive competition for supply leads to pricing above NARP. This is unsustainable, and will lead to a processor exiting the business. After a processor exits, in all likelihood the premiums will disappear from the market
Premiums in a supply-managed market emerge in a competitive allocation system in which excess demand exists at the minimum price, the aggregate quota creates overcapacity in processing, or both
Premiums are not observed in quota allocated markets. Instead, plant supply quota is capitalized into an asset
Many of the previous findings reflect the experiences documented in the case studies presented in previous annexes. For example, the model of aggressive competition follows the experience in the Upper Midwest dairy industry in which overcapacity in processing generated temporary price premiums that ultimately resulted in processing plant closures and reduction in the premiums. The Quebec hog marketing system, in which the system of pre-attributions of volume is used, does not result in price premiums being paid for hogs. Rather, the value is captured by a processor in terms of future entitlement to hog volume.
The results observed here suggest the following benefits of a competitive system of allocation to processors:
Through competition, information is generated that facilitates adjustment toward more efficient allocation. Processors with greater profitability and ability to pay will be successful in obtaining a greater volume of product. The level of competitive premiums generated in procurement provides an indication of processor profitability and consumer demand. This information is not generated under an allocation system, so while a competitive allocation of product could be maintained with a quota, it is unclear how the quota system would correctly identify this allocation in the first place
Through competition, the residual profit obtained by processors will tend to be paid out in competitive price premiums. Thus, producers share processors profitability, which should provide positive investment and productivity incentives at the farm level. Under a quota allocation system, residual profit is held as an unrealized gain by processors in the form of plant quota
Barriers to entry do not exist for new processor entrants under a competitive allocation system; all that is required is that they can price competitively with established processors. Under a quota system, new entrants would need to purchase quota from competitors to enter the market
However, some caution should be observed in reaching the conclusion that competition is a preferred method of allocation to plant quotas. In particular, the following is evident:
While price premiums are a positive to producers, in the case of aggressive competition in which premiums reach unsustainable levels, long-term negative consequences may result as a processor leaves the industry and surviving processors reduce or eliminate premiums
The above assumes that the aggregate quota is fixed and taken as given by processors. In reality, processors submit requests for allocation in establishing the aggregate quota. Thus, processors affect the fixed supply they ultimately compete over. However, at the same time, if processors must forward estimates of volume they will purchase at a price to be determined in the upcoming allocation period; then they must know the demand they face very well. That should enhance their ability to compete for raw product
The foregoing assumes producers and product are homogeneous. In fact, processors have specific producers and product they prefer to deal with. Rather than competition occurring over product volume, in many cases the true competition is over the better producers, rather than over aggregate volume
Finally, one of the benefits of competition described above is that it generates information on market conditions. However, this assumes that premiums paid in the market are transparent. In fact, depending on the competitive dynamic, premiums are apt to be less than transparent. There are a number of ways to offer premiums; some of which are not readily observable. This weakens the value of market information arising from the premiums
These concerns suggest that some parameters need to be placed around a system of competition for it to realize the benefits noted above. More importantly, it should be remembered that premiums are symptomatic of excess demand at the pre-determined supply management price. Adjusting the aggregate quota in the system could elimina | Translation - French
Annexe I - Élasticité de la demande du poulet
L’annexe suivant passe en revue la littérature qui traite de l’élasticité de la demande du poulet. Le texte principal démontre que l’élasticité de la demande est un paramètre qui influence plusieurs variables, incluant le prix d’équilibre et les primes. Le tableau I-1 comprend plusieurs estimés de l’élasticité de la demande du poulet canadien en fonction du prix. La présentation suit l’ordre chronologique des études telles qu’elles apparaissent dans la littérature. L’élasticité de la demande en fonction du prix est définie comme un changement du pourcentage de consommation divise par un changement du prix de détail (exprimé en pourcentage). Il est important de noter que les élasticités dans la table I.1 ne sont pas des élasticités compressées ; (elles mesurent un changement quantitatif à la suite d’un changement de prix en gardant fixe le revenu du consommateur). Les élasticités sont généralement compilées à partir d’une moyenne d’échantillon ; Par conséquent, le prix moyen et la quantité reste fixe. En pratique, les élasticités ne sont pas constantes ; Elles varient en réponse aux conditions du marché. Dans certains cas, les chercheurs ont effectué plusieurs expériences et donc, ont choisi de rapporter une variété de mesures d’élasticité. Dans ces cas, la valeur moyenne des estimés est celle que l’on trouve dans la table I.1.
Il y a une grande variabilité au niveau des études effectuées; Cependant, ils arrivent tous à une estimation ponctuelle en dessous de 1 (un). Cela nous donne une preuve significative que la demande du poulet n’est pas élastique au niveau du prix. Au début des années 1990, Reynolds et Goddard ont estimé l’élasticité de la demande du poulet en fonction du prix à -0.33. Eales (1996) ainsi que Xu et Veeman (1996) ont rapporté des résultats compatibles avec les estimés précédents. Moschini et Vissa (1993) se sont penchés spécifiquement sur la gestion planifiée de l’offre pour leur modèle empirique de demande et ont estimé l’élasticité de la demande du poulet en fonction du prix à -0.80. Les estimés générés par les études de Chen et Veeman (1991), Chalfant et cie. (1991) et Moschini (2001) se retrouvent dans le haut du spectre, l’élasticité de la demande du poulet en fonction du prix est respectivement de -0.95, -0.91 et -0.92.
L’étude de Moschini est assez récente et à jour (en terme de méthodologie et de données disponibles). Elle présente par contre l’inconvénient d’inclure le poulet et le poisson dans une seule catégorie. Peng, McCann-Hiltz et Goddard (2004) ont estimé récemment l’élasticité de la demande du poulet en fonction du prix à -0.13. Leur étude est intéressante pour plusieurs raisons. Premièrement, leur objectif principal est d’analyser les impacts de la maladie de la vache folle sur la consommation alimentaire des Canadiens. Deuxièmement, leur étude comporte des tendances récentes au niveau des habitudes de consommation de viande. De plus, ils utilisent des données de scanneur AC Nielsen.
On considère souvent que les données hautement désagrégées produisent des estimés plus fiables par ce qu’elles prennent en considération les préférences alimentaires hétérogènes des consommateurs.
Table I-1 Résumé de l’élasticité de la demande du poulet canadien en fonction du prix.
Étude Élasticité
Chalfant et al. (1991) -0.91
Reynolds et Goddard (1991) -0.33
Chen et Veeman (1991) -0.95
Moschini et Vissa (1993) -0.80
Eales (1996) -0.38
Xu et Veeman (1996) -0.37
Moschini (2001) -0.92
Peng, McCann-Hiltz et Goddard (2004) -0.13
Références
Chalfant, J. A., R. S. Gray et K. J. White, “Evaluating Prior Beliefs in a Demand System: The Case of Meat Demand in Canada”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 1991(73): 476-490.
Chen, P. Y. et M. M. Veeman, “An Almost Ideal Demand System Analysis for Meats with Habit Formation and Structural Change”, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 1991(39): 223-235.
Eales, J., “A Symmetric Approach to Canadian Meat Demand Estimation”, Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 1996(21): 368-380.
Moschini, G., “A Flexible Multistage Demand System Based in Indirect Separability”, Southern Economic Journal 2001(68): 22-41.
Moschini, G., et A. Vissa, “Flexible Specification of Mixed Demand Systems”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75(1993): 1-9.
Peng, T., D. McCann-Hiltz et E. Goddard, “Consumer Demand for Meat in Alberta, Canada: Impact of BSE”, étude choisie pour présentation à la réunion annuelle de « L’American Agricultural Economics Association » à Denver, CO, 1er au 4 août, 2004.
Reynolds, A. et E. Goddard, “Structural Change in Canadian Meat Demand”, Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 1991(39): 211-222.
Xu, X. et M. Veeman, “Model Choice and Structural Specification for Canadian Meat Consumption”, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 1996(23): 301-315.
Annexe II – Fermes laitières : Contingents de production et prix du lait.
L’annexe suivant traite de la concurrence entre les producteurs et le processus de recherche de prix du lait cru qui en résulte. Le lait cru est commercialisé au canada soit en tant que lait de transformation ou encore comme lait de consommation. Le marché de consommation compte 40% du lait produit contre 60% pour le lait de transformation. Le lait de transformation sert à la fabrication de produits laitiers tels le fromage, le beurre, le yogourt et la crème glacée.
L’industrie de transformation laitière au Canada est hautement concentrée en Ontario et au Québec (là où est la majorité de la production) Ces deux provinces fournissent 75% de la production laitière totale du Canada. En 2003, il y avait 171 fermes laitières au Québec, dont 73 enregistrés auprès de la CFIA. En Ontario on retrouvait 128 fermes laitières, dont 104 enregistrés auprès de la CFIA. (Canadian Dairy Commission, 2005).
Trente-six (36) pourcent des usines de transformation laitières sont propriété de trois compagnies : Parmalat, Saputo, et Agropur. Ces trois compagnies transforment 71% du lait Canadien. (AAFC, 2004). La compagnie Italienne Parmalat fit son entrée dans le marché canadien en 1997 en faisant l’achat de Béatrice et Ault. Depuis ce temps, Parmalat a acheté des divisions de certaines compagnies et quelques compagnies au complet.
Table II-1 Les 10 gros joueurs de l’industrie Canadienne de transformation laitière
Source: Agriculture et Agroalimentaire Canada (AAC) 2004
En Ontario, les usines de transformation laitières sont fournies par le « Dairy Farmers of Ontario » (DFO) qui achète le lait des fermes laitières pour la vendre aux usines de transformation. Les transformateurs de lait payent le DFO, qui à son tour paye les producteurs. Les usines de transformation qui produisent du lait de consommation et de la crème sont fournies en lait cru sur demande. (McMurchy, 1999). Il n’y a pas de contraintes d’achat pour ces transformateurs laitiers. Il n’y a également pas de contraintes d’achat pour les producteurs de certains produits laitiers incluant la crème glacée, le yaourt, et le fromage cottage. Le lait fourni au transformateurs de lait de consommation pour les produits laitiers mentionnés ci haut fait partie du Contingent de Cloisonnement du Marché. (Market Sharing Quota – MSQ) (McMurchy, 2001). La partie restante du MSQ est souvent appelée « approvisionnement en lait résiduel ». On l’utilise généralement pour la production de fromage et de beurre. Le MSQ représente la quantité totale de lait et de crème de transformation que l’Ontario peut produire selon le Comité Canadien de Gestion d’Approvisionnement Laitier (Canadian Milk Supply Management Committee) (McMurchy, 2001). Le Contingent de Cloisonnement du Marché (MSQ) de chaque province est déterminé selon sa part historique de la production laitière nationale.
Les producteurs de crème glacée ont également droit à un contingent additionnel « Milk Entitlement Quota » (MEQ). Le MEQ, qu’on peut obtenir du DFO sans coût additionnel, oblige les transformateurs à faire parvenir la moitié de leur contingent des graisses butyriques provenant du dégraissage (McMurchy, 1999). Les transformateurs qui obtiennent leur lait de l’approvisionnement résiduel doivent avoir un quota d’approvisionnement d’usine (Plant Supply Quota- PSQ). Selon Peter Gould, Directeur Général de la DFO « Dairy Farmers of Ontario », les transformateurs qui désirent accroître leur contingent d’usine (PSQ) et les nouveaux transformateurs qui veulent obtenir un PSQ doivent en faire la demande auprès d’un autre transformateur en Ontario. Ils peuvent l’obtenir soit par transfert ou bien quand un transformateur quitte le marché. En Ontario, le PSQ est géré par la DFO « Dairy Farmers of Ontario »; Cependant, les transformateurs peuvent transférer un PSQ à un autre transformateur une fois approuvé par la DFO (Gould en conversation, 2005). Gould a signalé que selon lui la DFO n’a jamais refusé un transfert, mais il aussi mentionné que ce serait approprié si le PSQ est transféré à un transformateur qui est réputé pour des problèmes de livraison de lait et/ou problèmes de paiements. Ce n’est pas quelque chose qui s’est produit dans l’industrie laitière jusqu'à maintenant. Le concept de PSQ (Plant Supply Quota) est similaire dans les autres provinces qui ont un nombre significatif de fermes laitières, incluant le Québec, l’Alberta et la Colombie Britannique. La plupart des provinces qui ont une production laitière moins élevée font principalement de la transformation de lait de consommation, ce qui ne requiert pas de PSQ.
Les transformateurs peuvent également s’approvisionner en lait cru en conjonction avec le Plan d’Innovation de Produits Laitiers Domestiques (Domestic Dairy Product Innovation Plan) Ce programme permet aux transformateurs laitiers qui désirent produire des produits laitiers nouveaux et innovateurs de se procurer le lait qu’ils ont besoin. Cela crée une demande plus importante pour le lait cru. L’approvisionnement en lait fourni en conjonction avec ce programme est limité à 1% du Contingent de Cloisonnement du Marché (MSQ). Le lait fourni à ces transformateurs ne diminue pas le PSQ (Plant Supply Quota) des autres transformateurs et est autorisé pour une période de cinq (5) ans seulement. Une fois les cinq (5) ans passés, l’approvisionnement en lait cru sera obtenu à partir du système provincial d’allocation des usines de transformation.
Il existe de la discrimination des prix au niveau du lait Canadien par ce que les transformateurs payent un prix variable qui dépend de l’utilisation du lait. Par exemple, les transformateurs payeront moins cher pour du lait qui sert à faire du beurre comparé aux prix du lait de consommation. La Commission Laitière Canadienne fixe le prix du lait de transformation à partir des recommandations des intervenants. Les autorités provinciales fixent les prix pour le lait de consommation et de transformation selon leurs compétences (McMurchy, 1999). Cependant, les autorités provinciales utilisent généralement le prix maximum garanti du gouvernement fédéral comme référence pour le prix du lait de transformation au niveau provincial.
Références :
Gould, Peter. En conversation le 12 mars 2005. Directeur Général, Dairy Farmers of Ontario. (DFO)
Le Roy, D.G. 2001. Trade Liberalization and the Canadian Dairy Sector. Advances in Dairy Technology. Vol. 13, p. 327.
McMurchy, J.C. 1999. Allocation of Ontario’s Supply-Managed Commodities to Processors.
Disponible au www.gov.on.ca/OMAFRA/english/farmproducts/factsheets/allocation.htm#dairy
Annexe III – Concurrence dans le marché de dinde Canadien
L’annexe suivant traite de la concurrence entre les producteurs et le processus de recherche de prix dans l’industrie Canadienne du dindon. Contrairement au marché Canadien de porc et de bœuf; Le marché avicole n’est pas un grand marché Nord-Américain unique. Cela est du à une structure qui est régie par l’offre. Le mécanisme de fixation des prix pour le marché du dindon au Canada est quelque peu différent de celui pour les marchés de viande rouge.
En ce qui a trait à la production de dindons au Canada, l’Ontario, historiquement, est la région ou il y a le plus de concurrence. Toutefois, on commence à retrouver plus de concurrence en Colombie Britannique. Dans la plupart des autres provinces, on retrouve seulement un transformateur. Lilydale est le transformateur principal en Colombie Britannique et en Alberta, Grannies est le transformateur majeur au Manitoba. En Nouvelle-Écosse il y a la co-opérative ACA. Au Québec il y a une usine de transformation que deux entreprises se partagent (AAFC, 2005) .
En Ontario, les usines de transformation sont approvisionnées à partit d’un producteur de leur choix. Les producteurs ne peuvent pas dépasser leur contingent maximum alloué. Si une usine de transformation est incapable d’obtenir l’approvisionnement nécessaire, Le Conseil de Mise en Marché des Producteurs de Dindon de l’Ontario peut intervenir. Historiquement, cela ne s’est jamais produit.
Les prix en Ontario pour les dindonneaux, les poulardes et les dindons à toujours été négocié entre le Conseil de Mise en Marché des Producteurs de Dindon de l’Ontario et le Comité de Dindon de l’Association de Producteurs Avicoles de l’Ontario (les producteurs). Le prix est fixé à partir d’informations sur le coût de la moulée, les coûts d’opération de dindonniers et les conditions actuelles du marché recueillies par l’agence Canadienne de Mise en Marché de Dindon. Si il y a entente entre le Conseil et les producteurs, le Conseil fixera le prix au niveau convenu. Cependant, si il n’y a pas entente, le Conseil possède l’autorité de fixer le prix. Les usines de transformation peuvent porter le prix fixé en appel auprès du tribunal de l’Agriculture Alimentation et Affaires Rurales. L’hiver dernier, le Conseil et les usines de transformation ont négocié un nouveau prix minimum par kilogramme basé sur une formule qui inclut les mêmes éléments : le coût de la moulée, les coûts d’opération des dindonniers et les conditions du marché. Si l’un des facteurs impliqué dans la détermination du prix change, le Conseil et les usines de transformation peuvent négocier le prix de nouveau. En moyenne, cela peut se produire jusqu’a quatre (4) fois par année.
Le prix en Ontario détermine généralement le prix pour le reste des provinces. Quand le prix de l’Ontario change, les autres provinces ajustent leurs prix en conséquence; Toutefois, ce n’est pas obligatoire.
Le prix déterminé par le Conseil est le prix minimum que les usines de transformation doivent payer aux fournisseurs. Cependant, toute usine de transformation qui désire accroître sa production possède l’habileté de fournir des primes aux producteurs, ou encore une facturation globale avantageuse pour l’approvisionnement ou le transport. Malgré un manque de preuves concrètes, le personnel de l’industrie nous indique que ces primes existent. Il a été indiqué que ces primes sont moins souvent offertes que les primes accordées aux producteurs de poulet dans les années 1980. (Voir section 2.5). La différence ici est que le poulet est un marché avec une demande croissante et un système d’allocation de production assez lente pour rattraper la demande. Le marché du dindon est relativement stable. Ce qui fait que les producteurs ne se livrent pas une concurrence aussi forte pour une part du marché, comme ce fut le cas pour les producteurs de poulet dans les années 1980. Il n’y a pas indication que ces primes ont produit un changement au niveau de la part de marché des usines de transformation en Ontario et aucune indication que les producteurs de dindon changent souvent d’usine de transformation.
Annexe IV – Concurrence dans le marché Canadien d’oeuf
L’annexe suivant traite de la concurrence entre les producteurs et le processus de recherche de prix dans l’industrie Canadienne de producteurs d’oeufs. Le pourcentage des œufs achetés par les transformateurs (breakers) a été estimé récemment à 25% . Donc, 75% de la production d’œufs est destinée au marché de consommation. Il existe trois (3) sources d’approvisionnement pour les transformateurs dans le marché Canadien. Les œufs destinés à la transformation sont produits par des fermiers qui acceptent de fournir des œufs à coût moindre au marché de transformation en conjonction avec le programme « Eggs for Processing » (EFP) Aussi, les œufs peuvent être achetés des producteurs classeurs en conjonction avec le programme « Industrial Product » (IP) si il y a un surplus d’œufs de consommation en dehors des périodes de pointe. Les transformateurs peuvent aussi importer des œufs à l’aide de certificats d’importation mondiaux et résiduels si les deux autres sources ne répondent pas à la demande. Généralement, les transformateurs reçoivent 10% de leur approvisionnement à travers le programme EFP, 70% à travers le programme IP et 20% à partir d’importations.
En Ontario, les œufs qui sont en surplus du marché de consommation sont rachetés par la « Canadian Egg Marketing Agency » (CEMA) ou encore « the Ontario Egg Producers » (OEP) à travers un programme IP selon un prix fixé par le « OEP » à l’aide d’une formule pré-établie . Une fois que la CEMA ou la OEP a racheté les œufs de surplus, ils les vendent aux transformateurs à un prix négocié selon le prix boursier des transformateurs Américains. Le prix négocié tient pour compte des facteurs tels le taux de change et les tarifs d’importation. Le prix mondial des œufs est communément appelé « prix des oeufs Urner-Barry coté pour les É-U ». Le prix négocié pour les œufs de transformation est le prix Urner-Barry, qui est moins élevé que le prix payé pour les œufs de consommation. Par conséquent, le prix des œufs de transformation au Canada est habituellement similaire au prix mondial.
Le tableau IV-1 indique les tendances récentes du prix des œufs de transformation au Canada tels que représentés par le prix des œufs de transformation en Ontario. Le prix des œufs de transformation varie généralement entre $0.40 et $0.60/douzaine. Les observations pour la période de 2003-2004 présentent une anomalie à cause d’une rupture de production en Colombie Britannique due à la grippe aviaire. Par ce que les surplus d’œufs de consommation se vendent à des prix moins élevés dans le marché de transformation, les producteurs doivent payer de cotisations afin de financer le système qui a été crée pour déplacer ces œufs vers le marché de transformation. En réalité, ce sont les consommateurs qui payent ces cotisations dans le prix des œufs de consommation. Le tableau IV-2 indique le prix réel payé aux producteurs pour les œufs de consommation catégorie A, ainsi que le prix net, (sans les cotisations) payé par les producteurs pour financer le transport vers le marché de transformation.
Tableau IV-2 Prix des œufs de transformation en Ontario
Source : « Canadian Egg Marketing Agency (CEMA) »
Figure IV-2 Prix des œufs de consommation en Ontario
Source : « Canadian Egg Marketing Agency (CEMA) »
Contrairement au marché du poulet, le marché des œufs ne calcule pas les allocations de contingents de production à partir d’un système ascendant. L’allocation de contingents est plutôt calculé sur une base nationale et distribué aux provinces selon leur part de marché historique. Les allocations additionnelles distribuées en plus de l’allocation de base sont distribués de deux façons : 50% des contingents additionnels sont distribués au pro rata et l’autre 50% est distribué aux provinces qui connaissent un déclin du ratio de poules couveuses par rapport à la population. En fait, les provinces avec une population croissante recevront cette allocation afin de satisfaire les besoins du marché de consommation. Ce système ne permet pas aux producteurs d’influencer le nombre d’œufs produits pour subvenir aux besoins des marchés de transformation et de consommation.
Historiquement, le marché de transformation a été considéré comme un marché d’accueil pour le surplus d’œufs du marché de consommation. Cependant, le marché de la transformation en Ontario a évolué; L’industrie de la transformation occupe maintenant une place importante. L’industrie a crée un besoin pour les œufs de transformation plus importante que la production d’œufs de transformation et le surplus d’œufs de consommation. Afin de satisfaire à un plus grand besoin au niveau de la production, la « CEMA » permet l’importation d’œufs de transformation (ou encore les jaunes et les blancs seulement) avec des certificats d’importation mondiaux et résiduels pour approvisionner les transformateurs Canadiens. Les certificats d’importation résiduels sont utilisés durant les périodes de l’année ou la demande est haute (Paques, Action de Grâces et Noël) ce qui cause une baise du nombre d’œufs de surplus destiné au marché de transformation.
Les transformateurs ne sont pas limités au niveau du montant d’importation qu’ils font pour satisfaire à leurs besoins. Cependant, ils préfèrent généralement remplir la demande avec des œufs domestiques le plus possible par ce qu’ils peuvent les obtenir à des prix moins élevés. Ils évitent ainsi les coûts de transport et de manutention associés aux importations provenant des É-U. Pour ces raisons, il n’y a pas de restrictions de croissance dans l’industrie de production d’œufs au Canada. L’industrie affiche une belle maturité mis appart le peu de développement de nouveaux produits et le peu de croissance observé les dernières années.
Une des faiblesses du système d’allocation national d’œufs, tel qu’exprimé par des représentants de l’industrie, est que le système a donné lieu à une surproduction dans certaines provinces. Le système d’allocation est basé sur des parts de marché historiques qui ont plus de trente (30) ans, certaines provinces produisent plus d’oeufs de consommation et de transformation qu’ils ont besoin. Cela cause des problèmes financiers pour l’industrie par ce que les surplus doivent êtres déplacés vers des marchés qui affichent plus de demande alors que les coûts de transport pourraient être réduits si les provinces avec une augmentation de la demande produisaient plus d’œufs.
Références : McMurchy, J.C., Allocation of Ontario’s Supply-Managed Commodities to Processors, 1999. Disponible au : www.gov.on.ca/OMAFRA/english/farmproducts/factsheets/allocation.htm
Annexe V – Concurrence de transformateurs dans l’industrie laitière du haut Midwest Américain.
L’annexe suivant fournit une étude de cas pour l’approvisionnement de marchandise primaire d’agriculture en se basant sur l’industrie laitière du haut Midwest Américain. Cette étude est pertinente dans le contexte actuel par ce qu’elle illustre la concurrence produite par des restrictions au niveau de l’approvisionnement de marchandises primaires d’agriculture. La région du haut Midwest Américain (Minnesota, Wisconsin, les Dakotas et l’Iowa) est depuis longtemps une région ressource importante de lait et produits laitiers aux É-U. C’est également une région qui a une faible densité de population relativement à sa capacité de production laitière. Par conséquent, la région est productrice de surplus laitiers. Elle possède les prix les plus bas pour le lait aux É-U et plusieurs usines qui produisent des produits laitiers (surtout le fromage, le beurre et le lait écrémé en poudre) qui sont disséminés dans divers marchés à travers les É-U. En fait, le budget pour l’approvisionnement laitier du haut Midwest dérive des ventes effectuées par les producteurs de produits laitiers. Par exemple, le tableau V-1 mesure le prix plancher du lait au Minnesota contre le prix de la bourse de marchandises des É-U pour le fromage cheddar. Le tableau démontre une forte corrélation entre le prix de vente pour les producteurs de produits laitiers et les prix offerts pour le lait.
Tableau V-1 Prix d’approvisionnement du lait au Minnesota et prix de la bourse de marchandise pour le fromage cheddar 1999-2004
Au début de années 1980, la production laitière dans la région du haut Midwest a connu une mise en palier et ensuite un déclin. Cela s’est produit en même temps que plusieurs petites fermes laitières quittèrent l’industrie pendant que d’autres changèrent de secteur d’activité. Cette situation a perduré à travers les années 1990 et le début des années 2000. Cela a donné lieu à un surplus de capacité de transformation laitière dans la région. Afin de maintenir le volume de transformation des usines, les producteurs de produits laitiers se sont livrés une concurrence féroce pour assurer leur approvisionnement en lait; Désormais devenue une denrée de plus en plus rare.
Cette situation a donné lieu à une nouvelle dynamique pour l’industrie laitière du haut Midwest Américain :
La concurrence entre les transformateurs a donné lieu à l’octroi de primes pour le lait des producteurs. Le meilleur indicateur de cela est que le Minnesota et le Wisconsin sont allés des régions avec les plus bas prix laitiers aux régions avec les prix les plus élevés.
Les prix planchers payés aux producteurs sont régis par les décrets fédéraux sur la mise en marché du lait. Cependant, en pratique, on a observé des prix payés a un taux bien au delà des prix planchers.
Les cycles de prix locaux étaient devenus évidents. Cela a eu lieu alors que la concurrence pour le lait disponible a fait monter les prix à un niveau que les transformateurs ne pouvaient soutenir. La concurrence avait lieu aux prix en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu’un transformateur (ou une usine en particulier) ferme ses portes. À la suite de fermetures, on assistait à un déclin des prix. Le cycle des prix reprenait avec le déclin supplémentaire de la production laitière.
En conjonction avec les primes sur les prix qui ont suivi la concurrence accrue entre les transformateurs; Ceux-ci ont employé diverses initiatives au niveau des prix :
Utilisation intense de subventions au transport laitier. Les transformateurs incluaient le prix du transport au prix de base du lait, de façon a ce que le plein prix du transport n’était pas couvert.
Primes à la qualité dictée par la concurrence; Les transformateurs fragmentaient les prix de base de façon à générer des prix plus élevés proportionnels aux cellules somatiques et les bactéries. On utilisait des programmes de primes à la qualité différents selon la région et les besoins de l’usine de transformation
Implémentation intense de primes au volume afin d’attirer et conserver les gros producteurs à haut volume de lait catégorie A. Les transformateurs payaient plus cher à l’unité pour des commandes à volume élevé selon un tableau de volumes.
Arrangements de prix à terme; Les transformateurs fixaient un prix verrouillé pour les livraisons à venir ou encore offraient des prix avantageux afin d’amortir les risques de volatilité des prix.
Location de génisses et assistance à la conception et le financement des installations laitières.
Un cas en particulier illustrant l’utilisation des stratégies mentionnés ci haut ainsi que la nature générale de la concurrence agressive entre les transformateurs fut observée en 2002 alors que Kraft Foods se départait d’un nombre d’usines de transformation dans le Haut Midwest. Par exemple, l’usine de Kraft Foods située à Melrose, au Minnesota était un concurrent agressif dans le marché régional. Une partie de la stratégie de retranchement impliquait l’achat de l’usine en tant que filiale commune par Land O’ Lakes Inc. et Dairy Farmers of America, deux coopératives laitières de mise en marché compétitrices. La vente de l’usine a permis aux anciens producteurs fournisseurs de Kraft de faire affaire avec les transformateurs de leur choix, ce qui a donné lieu à une concurrence accrue pour acheter leur lait. Plusieurs anciens producteurs fournisseurs de Kraft étaient d’accord pour fournir Land O’ Lakes et Dairy Framers of America (les nouveau propriétaires de l’usine). Cependant d’autres transformateurs sont apparus dans la région, offrant ainsi une concurrence pour l’approvisionnement en lait. Les anciens producteurs de Kraft ont fini par fournir plusieurs transformateurs différents à cause de cette concurrence accrue.
Annexe VI – Systèmes Canadiens de fixation de prix et mise en marché du Porc et du Bétail.
L’annexe suivant explique le mécanisme de prix dérivés et de recherche de prix de cochons et de bétail au Canada. Il est pertinent à la situation actuelle dans l’industrie avicole dans le sens qu’il démontre comment la croissance dans le marché porcin est repartie entre les usines de transformation de viandes. Ce qui est intéressant c’est qu’il n’y a pas de mécanisme uniforme à toutes les provinces; Chaque province a expérimenté des règlements de mise en marché différents. Avant de discuter de la fixation des prix pour le porc et le bétail au Canada, il est important de définir les principes généraux de fixation de prix pour les animaux d’élevage. Le terme « établissement des prix » est typiquement employé pour illustrer comment les prix sont dérivés d’une perspective macroéconomique alors que le terme « détermination des prix » est employé pour expliquer comment les prix sont dérivés à partir d’une perspective microéconomique.
Les prix du cochon et du bétail sont déterminés au Canada par les conditions prédominantes Nord-américaines de l’offre et de la demande pour le porc et le bœuf. La demande globale domestique et d’exportation en conjonction avec l’offre totale de cochons et de bétail détermine le niveau des prix pour une période donnée. À l’aide de ces principes de base, les prix peuvent être déterminés à tout moment au Canada à partir du prix Nord-Américain prédominant comme point de départ. Vu la taille relative des marchés, les régions importantes des É-U sont typiquement les points de référence pour les marchés Canadiens. Le prix Canadien suit nécessairement le prix Américain à cause de la capacité des producteurs Canadiens de vendre du bétail et des cochons aux établissements d’emballage Américains. Cette capacité donne lieu à un arbitrage des prix qui maintient les prix en étroite corrélation. L’arbitrage des prix est un accessoire fixe de la structure Nord-américaine de fixation des prix des animaux d’élevage. Pour le Canada, cet arbitrage peut exister seulement si il y a des échanges commerciaux libres et ouverts dans les deux directions.
Établissement et détermination des prix du cochon
La compréhension du mécanisme de fixation des prix pour le porc et les cochons est un point de départ important pour évaluer les moteurs des échanges commerciaux entre les É-U et le Canada. Les prix Canadiens du porc et du cochon sont déterminés à l’aide de trois éléments de base :
1. Le niveau des prix Américains
2. Le taux de change
3. Écart de prix (Coût de transport et facteurs locaux d’offre / demande)
Les industries du porc et du cochon au Canada et aux États-unis sont essentiellement une seule industrie Nord-américaine. Les facteurs qui déterminent le flux des échanges commerciaux sont les niveaux relatifs d’offre et de demande dans les diverses régions du Canada et des É-U. Le taux d’abatage de cochons aux É-U est approximativement 5 fois plus élevé que celui au Canada (Gervais and Schroeder, 2005). La détermination d’ensemble des prix commence donc dans les régions clés du « Corn Belt» et du Midwest Américain. Ces marchés représentent des alternatives aux marchés locaux et provinciaux pour les producteurs Canadiens.
L’établissement des prix au Canada commence donc avec les prix potentiels qui peuvent être dérivés d’offres d’achats fait par des usines de transformation de viande Américaines à des producteurs. Les usines de transformation de viande Canadiennes doivent par conséquent demeurer à l’affût des prix de cochon aux É-U et conserver leurs offres d’achat à un niveau compétitif aux marchés alternatifs. À partir de ces principes, le prix offert par une usine de transformation de viande ou encore le prix accepté par un producteur se maintient au niveau du prix alternatif Américain tout en tenant compte du taux de change et du coût de transport vers le marché alternatif. Le coût de transport et les conditions locales d’offre / demande dans la province déterminent l’écart de prix entre le prix des É-U en dollars Canadiens et le prix provincial local.
Le mécanisme global de détermination des prix au Canada a maintenant été complètement prescrit aux prix Canadiens du cochon à travers des contrats et la fixation des prix d’après une formule prédéterminée. D’après le «Goerge Morris Center» les prix de 80% des cochons Canadiens dans les prairies et en Ontario ont été déterminés selon une formule préétablie. Le prix des cochons au Québec est aussi en grand majorité déterminé par la même formule. Le prix déterminé par cette formule est en fait le prix Américain (National Cost, Iowa-S. Minn, etc), converti en dollars Canadiens moins un facteur d’écart de prix. Le facteur d’écart de prix est incorporé à la formule en divisant le prix par un diviseur d’index ou en multipliant par une certaine fraction négociée.
Le point le plus important à retenir est que le prix du marché Américain détermine le prix au Canada. Le Québec est la province qui produit le plus de cochon au Canada. Par conséquent, c’est un marché qu’on doit absolument comprendre à cause de son système unique de mise en marché. Les provinces des prairies connaissent la plus grande croissance de production porcine. C’est aussi un marché important à comprendre à cause d’une croissance rapide et d’un système de mise en marché qui a connu un changement important durant les dix (10) dernières années. La section suivante examine les systèmes de mise en marché du Québec et des provinces des prairies. Les mécanismes de mise en marché dans l’industrie porcine sont reliés à l’industrie avicole dans le sens que plusieurs mécanismes ont été implémentés et négociés pour faire front à la croissance au niveau de la production.
Mécanismes de détermination des prix au Québec
Pour commencer, on doit noter que le conseil de commercialisation au Québec, la Fédération des producteurs de porcs du Québec, (FPPQ) à un monopole sur la commercialisation. Le conseil vend tous les cochons mis en marché dans la province. Les contrats directs entre les usines de transformation de viande et les producteurs ne sont pas une option. Le système est régi par un plan de commercialisation connu sous le nom de « Entente de Commercialisation du Porc » Cette entente spécifie les conditions pour la vente du porc de boucherie et comme tel est régulièrement re-négocié entre le FFPQ et les abattoirs.
Les producteurs au Québec reçoivent le même index de prix net 100 (prix de pool). Ce prix de pool représente la moyenne des prix des trois secteurs de commercialisation :
1. Pre-attributions (à partir d’une formule prédéterminée)
2. Contrats par soumission (à partir d’une formule prédéterminée)
3. Encan
4. À partir de ce prix moyen, jusqu'à 2$ est conservé par l’office de commercialisation (FPPQ) afin de payer le transport, les frais administratifs et pour financer de nouveaux programmes spécifiques (la génétique, par exemple).
La proportion de porcs vendu à travers chaque mécanisme de commercialisation est : (approximativement)
Pré-attributions Contrats par soumission Enchère
Début 2003 55 % 20 % 25 %
Début 2004 50 % 25 % 25 %
Début 2005 50% 25% 25%
1- Pré-attributions
On accorde des pré-attributions aux établissements d’emballage selon leur part de marché historique. Le niveau de pré-attributions pour chaque établissement d’emballage varie à travers le temps selon le nombre de porcs achetés à l’encan et par contrat (Plus on achète de porcs à l’encan ou par contrat, plus les pré-attributions sont élevés l’année suivante) Plus précisément, la part d’un établissement d’emballage pour une période donnée est déterminée par deux facteurs :
La part de marché de pré-attributions de l’année précédente multipliée par un facteur de (1 – 0.35 – pourcentage de croissance de production annuelle)
La part de marché du porc acheté aux enchères et par contrat multiplié par un facteur de (0.35 pourcentage de croissance de production annuelle)
A titre d’exemple, considérons un moment qu’il n’y a pas eu de croissance de production entre 2004 et 2005. Supposons qu’un établissement d’emballage avait une part de marché de 50% des pré-attributions en 2004, en plus d’avoir une part de marché de 75% de tous les porcs vendus aux enchères et par contrat. Sa part de marché de pré-attributions en 2005 serait de :
50% x 0.65 75% x 0.35 = 58.75%
La formule ci haute détermine ce qu’on pourrait appeler l’allocation de base de l’établissement d’emballage. Il y a quelques points intéressants à observer; Premièrement, la croissance de production est pondérée selon les mécanismes d’enchères et de contrats. Les transformateurs n’ont donc aucun droit de croissance dans l’industrie. Ils doivent acheter les porcs auprès d’un marché compétitif avant que leur croissance puisse être considéré envers leur part de marché de Pré-attributions.
Même si il est indiqué plus haut que la part des pré-attributions dans l’industrie est approximativement 50%, on doit noter que cette part connaît un déclin depuis un nombre d’années. La part de 50% de pré-attributions est ajustée au niveau de l’industrie chaque année par un facteur de 50% divisé par (50% le pourcentage de l’encan)
Il n’y a pas d’édits faits pour les nouveaux signataires de l’entente de commercialisation entre les producteurs et les établissements d’emballage. En résumé, un nouveau signataire doit bâtir s part de marché en achetant du porc à l’encan et par contrats. Quoiqu’il soit possible que cela prenne du temps pour bâtir une part de marché significative, il n’y a rien qui empêche un nouveau signataire d’acheter des porcs au Québec.
2- Contrats par soumission
Ces contrats sont similaires à un encan mensuel tenu à toutes les quatre (4) semaines. La FPPQ indique aux établissements d’emballage combien de porcs seront vendus par contrat à travers le mois et détermine un prix d’achat minimum (par exemple, prix de rérérence des É-U 4 $). Si il n’y a pas assez de porcs pour satisfaire aux besoins de l’établissement d’emballage au prix déterminé, ou encore au contraire, tous les porcs ne sont pas vendus, la FPPQ recommence le processus avec un nouveau prix. Ce processus, sera répété jusqu'à ce que la demande et l’offre soient équivalentes, à ce point, le facteur de modification du prix de référence sera établi pour le mois (quoique le prix de référence varie quand même de jour en jour)
3- Encan
Ceci est un événement quotidien, et demeure pareil à tout les autres encans. Le prix de vente est fixé hebdomadairement par les offres des établissements d’emballage.
Établissement des prix pour les Prairies
Le Manitoba et l’Alberta ont éliminé les programmes obligatoires de gestion de la commercialisation de leurs conseils de commercialisation provinciaux vers la fin des années 1990. Les producteurs des deux provinces ainsi que ceux de Saskatchewan, peuvent encore commercialiser leurs porcs à travers une organisation qu’ils contrôlent. Les offices de commercialisation des prairies sont les suivantes : la « Manitoba Pork Marketing Co-op », « Saskatchewan Pork International (SPI) » et le « Western Hog Exchange (WHE) » en Alberta. SPI et WHE sont des compagnies privées. Manitoba Pork, SPI et WHE n’ont pas d’autorités régulatrices de commercialisation. Ils existent par le bien fondé de leur actions et les services qu’ils fournissent dans un marché compétitif. Les producteurs peuvent aussi choisir de commercialiser leur porc indépendamment ou à travers des firmes de commercialisation privées. La « commercialisation libre »est la meilleure façon de décrire le système de commercialisation des Prairies.
Mécanisme d’établissement des prix
Les producteurs de porc des Prairies peuvent vendre aux établissements d’emballage à contrat ou à travers le marché au comptant. Suite à des discussions avec des établissements d’emballage, on a estimé que 805 ou plus de porcs des Prairies sont vendus à contrat. Au Manitoba il y a deux établissements principaux d’emballage : Maple Leaf Foods et Springhill Farms. Maple Leaf a des abattoirs à Brandon et Winnipeg. L’usine de Springhill est située à Neepawa. Maple Leaf et Olymel sont les transformateurs principaux en Alberta. L’usine de Olymel est située à Red Deer et Maple Leaf à une petite usine spécialisée à Lethbridge.
Dans l’ouest Canadien, Le programme « Maple Leaf Signature » établit les prix du porc à l’aide d’une formule basée sur prix de base de la « Chicago Mercantile Exchange ». Pour ce qui est de Springhill, leur prix contractuel est basé sur le prix de la USDA; Sud du Minnesota. Le prix contractuel fluctue de semaine en semaine selon la variation du taux de change et l’activité du marché Américain. Le producteur peut décider de signer un contrat avec un abattoir ou un autre selon le bien fonder du contrat versus leurs systèmes de production. Il peut aussi décider de choisir un certain abattoir au lieu d’un autre pour des raisons de logistique ou de transport. Les producteurs choisissent souvent le contrat plutôt que le marché au comptant afin d’assurer un marché pour leur porcs. Ils prefèrent parfois aussi les prix prévisibles de la formule des abattoirs.
La structure de prix des formules contractuelles est déterminée par les abattoirs à partir des facteurs suivants :
La demande de porc à court et à long terme (la capacité des abattoirs)
Stratégies de concurrence
Offre de porc disponible
Quand la concurrence est plus vive ou encore l’offre est plus basse que la demande des abattoirs, ceux-ci offrent une structure de contrat enrichie à l’aide de primes plus élevés ou bien une moins grande escompte sur le prix des É-U. Dans les périodes moins concurrentielles et de plus grande offre, l’inverse est vrai. Le producteur qui vend ses porcs sur le marché au comptant reçoit tout simplement le prix que l’abattoir offre pour la journée ou la semaine en question. Cela étant dit, le producteur décidera d’une vente selon les prix attendus à l’avenir ou encore le besoin de se départir d’inventaire vivant. Les abattoirs déterminent un prix d’achat selon les offres concurrentiels des producteurs et selon leurs besoins de porc. La référence clé demeure le prix courrant du marché Américain. La formule du prix en comptant pour un cochon est la suivante :
Revenue provenant des sous produits du porc - coûts fixes et variables – objectif de profit = Prix d’achat
Un point additionnel à retenir sur les prairies est que le producteur individuel effectue la vente (sinon, l’agent désigné du producteur) soit par le marché au comptant soit par contrat. Le producteur décide à qui il veut vendre, et sous quelles conditions et l’abattoir décide des producteurs à qui il veut acheter. Au Québec, l’office de commercialisation est obligatoirement le seul et unique vendeur, les abattoirs n’ont d’autre choix que d’acheter de l’office.
Cattle Price Discovery and Determination
Les prix du bétail est établi et déterminé de la même façon que le porc provenant des prairies . À part un office de commercialisation au Québec (qui vend très peu de bétail), le bétail est commercialisé et vendu de la même façon que le proc provenant des prairies. Le pourcentage de bétail vendu à contrat est typiquement moindre que celui des porcs (probablement autour de 20%) Le bétail destiné pour le marché au comptant représente la vaste majorité des ventes des producteurs. Dans l’ouest du pays, la plupart du bétail est vendu alors qu’il est encore vivant. C'est-à-dire que l’abattoir acheteur offre un prix d’achat selon le poids vivant. Le bétail est vendu tel que pesé au parc d’engraissement. Dans l’est du pays, le bétail est typiquement vendu selon le poids apprêté ou le poids en carcasse à l’usine. La politique sur les prix et les méthodes des abattoirs et des producteurs sont similaire à ceux des producteurs de porc des prairies.
La section suivante offre une brève description de l’impact de l’ouverture de l’usine Maple Leaf à Brandon en 1999. Il y a des éléments de preuve qui démontrent que la nouvelle usine à augmenté la concurrence, ce qui a donné lieu à des prix plus élevés pour les producteurs; Réciproquement, les deux dernières années ont vu un plus grand nombre de cochons relativement à la capacité des abattoirs. Ce qui a donné lieu à une baisse des prix de contrat de la part des abattoirs.
L’impact de nouveaux venus sur l’industrie de la viande rouge
Hornung et Ward ont récemment publié un article intitulé « Positive Market Effects from a Meatpacking Plant Opening : Perceptions and Reality »; « Effets positifs sur le marché d’une ouverture d’abattoir : perception et réalité » (CAFRI, 2005, numéro 6 : p. 40-49) dans le journal électronique de la Société Canadienne d’Économie Agriculturelle (Canadian Agricultural Economics Society – CAES) : « Current Agricultural Food and Resource Issues » (CAFRI).
L’article examine l’impact de l’ouverture de l’usine Maple Leaf à Brandon en 1999. La recherche qu’on a effectuée avait deux objectifs. Premièrement, on a utilisé deux modèles pour estimer l’impact de la nouvelle ouverture sur les prix du marché. Deuxièmement, un sondage effectué auprès des producteurs de porc du Manitoba a révélé leurs impressions des effets de la nouvelle ouverture sur la dynamique de marché. Les résultats empiriques des deux modèles ont démontré une augmentation significative des prix au Manitoba suite à l’ouverture de la nouvelle usine Maple Leaf à Brandon. L’augmentation des prix est survenue termes absolues et en termes relatifs. Les prix et l’abattage ont connu une variation marquée dans certains cas relativement à la situation avant l’ouverture de la nouvelle usine. Les prix absolus et relatifs ont augmenté au Manitoba suit à l’ouverture de l’usine de Brandon, tout comme le taux d’abattage. La question importante est la suivante : Est-ce que les changements observés sont directement attribuables à l’ouverture de la nouvelle usine Maple Leaf ?
L’estimé des effets de l’ouverture de l’usine Maple Leaf à l’aide d’un modèle d’écart de prix à démontré un écart positif significatif de $6.80 à $10.18 par $C/100 kg dans deux des trois comparaisons effectués (Manitoba-Ontario et Manitoba-Iowa/southern Minnesota). L’écart de prix Manitoba-Saskatchewan n’était pas statistiquement significatif. Les impressions des producteurs de l’impact de la nouvelle usine étaient très différentes. Certaines impressions étaient compatibles avec les résultats empiriques alors que d’autres ne l’étaient pas. Cependant, les impressions des producteurs étaient probablement influencées par d’autres changements plus récents aux pratiques de Maple Leaf, plutôt que seulement limitées aux réactions face à l’ouverture en 1999. Les producteurs qui ont participé au sondage n’ont peut être pas limité leurs impressions à la période des quelques mois suivant l’ouverture de l’usine. D’autres changements suivant l’ouverture de l’usine pourraient avoir affecté leurs impressions de l’impact sur le marché. Par exemple, depuis l’ouverture de l’usine de Brandon, Maple Leaf Foods a acheté des abattoirs compétiteurs au Manitoba, incluant un achat majeur immédiatement précédant l’envoi du sondage. Deuxièmement, dans la période suivant l’ouverture de la nouvelle usine, le pourcentage de porcs propriété de Maple Leaf ou à contrat a augmenté. Ces deux facteurs, peuvent expliquer pourquoi certains producteurs n’ont pas eu les mêmes impressions de l’ouverture de la nouvelle usine que ceux escomptés ou ceux révélés par les estimés de données secondaires. Les niveaux actuels de concentration et de consolidation du marché au Canada et aux É-U font en sorte que la fermeture d’abattoirs est souvent une source d’inquiétude.
Réciproquement, l’ouverture de nouvelles usines devrait en théorie donner lieu à une amélioration de l’état du marché pour les producteurs. Les résultats de l’étude démontrent que le marché a réagi à l’ouverture de la nouvelle usine, bien que les producteurs n’étaient pas toujours d’accord au sujet de l’effet ultime sur les prix et la concurrence dans le marché.
Annexe VII – Modèle d’approvisionnement des producteurs
Afin d’interpréter les études de cas sur la concurrence des transformateurs présentés dans ce document, on a besoin d’un modèle qui est en mesure d’expliquer le comportement des transformateurs quand ils achètent des produits agricultures. Cet annexe et l’annexe suivant (Annexe VIII) présentent deux modèles théoriques qui expliquent le parcours des prix d’approvisionnement de marchandise agricole. Le premier modèle illustre diverses stratégies que les transformateurs peuvent emprunter selon les circonstances. Le modèle analyse les impacts des différents comportements des transformateurs et développe un modèle économique simple d’approvisionnement, qui est une continuation de la théorie des coopératives de commercialisation, tout en analysant ses composantes essentielles. Bien que le modèle n’affiche pas les conditions d’équilibre susceptibles de prospèrera à long terme, il apporte un nombre de points importants.
VII.1.1 Modèle conceptuel d’approvisionnement de transformateurs en produits agricoles
La théorie des coopératives de commercialisation agricoles, une innovation de Peter Helmberger et Sidney Hoos , nous a donné une meilleure compréhension de la manière que les coopératives de commercialisation agricoles déterminent le niveau des prix et de la production. Cette théorie est adaptée pour tenir compte des motivations et du comportement d’un transformateur (qu’il soit une coopérative ou non) concernant l’achat de produits agricoles pour la transformation alimentaire. Disons qu’un transformateur achète un produit agricole qu’il combine avec un autre produit à l’aide de technologie pour produire un nouveau produit alimentaire. Le transformateur devient alors preneur de prix auprès du marché des produits transformés et auprès du marché des produits non agricoles. Le transformateur réalise un profit à l’unité du produit agricole transformé, ce qui devient un revenu moins les coûts des produits non agricoles.
Cette marge de profit est nommée la recette de revenu moyen (average revenue product - ARP) qui est le résultat de la transformation. La recette de revenu moyen varie selon le volume de produit agricole transformé (représenté par M dans le tableau VII-1) et l’efficacité de la capacité de transformation de l’usine. La recette de revenu moyen demeure basse si le volume de produit agricole transformé est peu élevé. Le « ARP » augmente proportionnellement au volume de produit agricole transformé jusqu’au point ou le rendement d’échelle (scale efficiency) est atteint; à partir de ce point, la recette de revenu moyen (ARP) est inversement proportionnelle au volume de produit agricole transformé, la capacité de production de l’usine devient alors une contrainte. Autrement dit, la technologie de transformation produit des profits d’échelle au début du processus de transformation tout en diminuant une fois un certain volume de production atteint (le rendement d’échelle minimum de production). Le transformateur doit aussi tenir compte des coûts fixes qui ne sont pas compris dans la recette de revenu moyen (ARP). Les coûts fixes, sont de nature constante le ARP est donc ajustés en soustrayant les coûts fixes pour obtenir le revenu moyen de produit net (Net Average Revenu Product - NARP). Finalement, la valeur d’une unité supplémentaire de produit agricole transformée est déterminée par la valeur du produit marginal (VMP). À des niveaux peu élevés de produits agricoles transformés, le VMP est bas. Le VMP augmente avec le volume transformé, jusqu'au point ou le ARP plafonne, après quoi le VMP descend.
Tableau VII-1 Balises d’allocation des transformateurs
Le tableau VII-1 démontre la nature de ces fonctions. Tel que mentionné plus haut, le ARP augmente par rapport au volume du produit agricole transformé (Q) plafonne et ensuite redescend. La ligne NARP suit un tracé similaire mais la courbe ARP converge avec la courbe NARP parce que le prix fixe moyen devient insignifiant avec l’augmentation de la production. Le tracé du VMP passe a travers les crêtes des tracés ARP et NARP. L’analyse est quelque peu différente de celle présentée dans les manuels types de macroéconomique parce qu’ils ont tendance à présenter l’utilisation de courbes des coûts moyens et courbes de coûts marginaux pour représenter la technologie. L’avantage de présenter la technologie de transformation à l’aide de revenus moyens et marginaux est que le prix pour la marchandise agricole peut être déterminée de façon endogène.
En se fiant au tableau VII-1, indépendamment du volume transformé, le maximum qu’un transformateur peut payer est le NARP, parce que le NARP représente le revenu moins le coût des facteurs de production (input cost ) des produits non agricoles, moins les coûts fixes. Dans un marché de produits agricoles parfaitement concurrentiel, l’équilibre à long terme implique que le prix d’équilibre payé et le volume transformé sont au point ou le VMP=NARP (considérant que les structures des coûts des transformateurs concurrents sont identiques)
Dans un cadre concurrentiel imparfait, les transformateurs travaillent avec un niveau d’offre qui leur donne une certaine influence sur les prix. Le tableau VII-2 reprend l’analyse du tableau VII-1, bien qu’il inclut également une fonction de l’offre du produit agricole. Pour le moment, on considère qu’il n’y a pas de mécanisme de gérance de l’offre en place, la courbe d’offre est donc inélastique.
Supposons que le transformateur a le monopole d’achat sur le produit agricole, bien qu’il subisse de la concurrence dans le marché de production. Le transformateur maximise les profits en fixant le prix du produit agricole à un niveau qui fait que le VMP intresecte la fonction d’offre. Cela donne lieu à un volume transformé de M1 et un prix payé au niveau de P1. Le transformateur réalise des profits économiques positifs car le transformateur peut payer jusqu'au niveau du NARP pour le produit agricole (paye P2 et transforme un volume de Q2). De plus, dans la situation ou le transformateur paye P3 et transforme un volume de Q3, les coûts fixes ne sont pas couverts.
Tableau VII-2 Scénarios de fixation de prix et de volume basés sur le cadre d’approvisionnement
Le positionnement de la courbe d’offre agricole est aussi important dans le contexte du tableau VII-2. Examinons la situation illustrée dans le tableau VII-3. Si le transformateur fonctionne avec la courbe de barème d’offre S1, ce ne serait pas une option d’opération viable, même à coût terme. La raison est que l’offre d’achat pour maximiser les profits pour le produit agricole (l’intersection de S1 et de VMP) excède la recette de revenu moyen. (ARP).
Autrement dit, le prix comptant d’approvisionnement serait plus haut que les revenus de vente du produit moins le prix variable des facteurs de production. Si le transformateur fonctionne avec la courbe de barème d’offre S2, ce serait viable sur une base temporaire, mais pas à long terme. En fixant le prix du produit agricole à l’intersection du VMP et de S2, la transformation génère une marge de profit, bien que le profit ne couvre pas les coûts fixes. Si la courbe de barème d’offre était S3, le transformateur fonctionnerait à un niveau de rentabilité minimale, c'est-à-dire aucun profit, en fixant les prix du produit agricole au niveau VMP=S3=NARP. Finalement, si S4 est la fonction choisie, en fixant le prix à VMP=S4, le transformateur réalise un profit économique qui excède les coûts variables et fixes.
Tableau VII-3 Profits et viabilité des transformateurs selon des scénarios alternatifs d’approvisionnement en produits agricoles.
VII.1.2 Concurrence inter firme pour l’apprivoisement d’un produit agricole.
Les informations fournies ci haut illustre le comportement d’un seul transformateur en ce qui a trait à l’approvisionnement de produits agricoles. Afin d’examiner l’approvisionnement en produits agricoles dans un marché d’allocation concurrentiel versus un système de d’allocation de contingent, il est nécessaire de considérer les impacts de l’interaction entre deux firmes de transformation suivant le modèle développé ci haut. Considérant que le marché est géré par l’offre, ce qui fait que l’offre globale est fixe, représentée par un barème d’offre verticale (parfaitement inélastique). La stratégie de modélisation consiste à illustrer les différentes stratégies d’offres d’achats des transformateurs sans expressément dériver les conditions d’équilibre du marché (long terme). La conjoncture du marché est en constante évolution, les conditions propices à l’analyse des caractéristiques d’un équilibre stable à long terme peuvent ne jamais se présenter .
Le tableau VII-4 illustre les conditions de base de la concurrence entre les transformateurs. Le tableau comprend deux (2) courbes semblables a celles du tableau VII-1, avec une série de courbes tournée à l’envers, lisible de droite à gauche. L’axe horizontal du tableau mesure le volume des produits agricoles transformés; la largeur de l’axe horizontal est normalisé pour représenter le contingent total de production agricole disponible aux transformateurs.
Tableau VII-4 Modèle de base de concurrence de transformateurs.
Pour cet exemple de base, deux transformateurs (Transformateur 1 et Transformateur 2) se font concurrence pour l’approvisionnement de produits agricoles déterminés par une allocation de contingent. Dans ce contexte, on considère que l’allocation initiale de marchandise agricole est déterminée par l’intersection des courbes de VMP des deux transformateurs. Tel qu’illustré dans le tableau, les courbes VMP des deux firmes s’intersectent à un prix P*. A ce niveau de prix, une quantité Q1 est transformée par le transformateur 1 et une quantité Q*- Q1 est transformée par le transformateur 2. Le profit réalisé par les transformateurs est représenté par la différence entre le NARP des transformateurs et le prix payé pour le produit agricole, multiplié par le nombre d’unités transformés. Dans le tableau, les profits du transformateur 1 représentent (NARP1 – P*)*Q1 et les profits du transformateur 2 représentent (NARP2 – P*)*(Q*- Q1). Les régions représentant les profits dans le tableau sont illustrés à l’aide d’un ombrage bleu.
Il faut cependant noter que dans un environnement concurrentiel dans lequel les transformateurs veulent augmenter leur volume de transformation au détriment de leurs compétiteurs, (probablement pour profiter d’un avantage au niveau de la part du marché, ou encore pour une autre raison) les prix peuvent potentiellement excéder le niveau du VMP si les firmes en question ont des plans dynamiques.
Considérons la situation initiale dans le tableau VII-4. Supposons que le transformateur 2 essaye de faire une offre d’achat agressive pour diminuer le volume de marchandise agricole du transformateur 1. Le transformateur 2 peut offrir un prix plus élevé que P*. Cette situation est illustrée dans le tableau VII-5. Le transformateur peut payer jusqu’au niveau NARP2; en supposant qu’il offre P1. Supposons aussi que le transformateur 1 suit et augmente le prix offert aux producteurs à P1 également. Le transformateur 1 voit alors la valeur du produit marginal qui correspond à ce prix comme étant de Q2.
Un comportement comme celui la implique que le transformateur 2 gagne en part de marché sur le transformateur 1. Le résultat de ce processus est que le volume du transformateur 1 descend maintenant à Q2 en partant de Q1 et le prix augmente de P* à P’. À cette allocation de volume, le transformateur 2 est au seuil de la rentabilité; Cependant, le transformateur 1 subit une perte par ce que le prix d’approvisionnement excède NARP1. Dans un contexte dynamique, cette situation peut mener à la fermeture d’une des firmes de transformation avec des offres d’achats plus agressifs maintenues à long terme.
Tableau VII-5 Concurrence agressive des transformateurs pour le volume de marchandise agricole
Considérons un marché géré par l’offre ou il y a une surcapacité significative de transformation. Cette situation est illustrée dans le tableau VII-6. Encore une fois, on entame l’analyse en considérant que le prix initial est fixé la ou les courbes de revenus marginaux s’intresectent. Le tableau démontre qu’il y a un volume de marchandise insuffisant à la profitabilité des deux transformateurs. Cela peut être confirmé en notant que l’intersection des VMP des deux firmes est au dessus de leurs NARP respectifs. Dans cette situation, les prix d’approvisionnement feraient en sorte que les deux transformateurs soient éventuellement obligés de quitter l’industrie. Bien qu’il soit plus probable que les transformateurs fassent monter le niveau des offres d’achats pour saisir le volume de leurs compétiteurs afin de les obliger de quitter l’industrie. Une fois qu’un compétiteur quitte l’industrie, le transformateur restant fera redescendre les prix d’achat à un niveau soutenable pour essayer de récupérer les pertes dues à une stratégie d’achat agressive.
Tableau VII-6 Concurrence avec une capacité de transformation accrue
VII.2. Contingent des transformateurs selon la gérance de l’approvisionnement de poulet
Cette section interprète le modèle précédant de concurrence entre les transformateurs dans un contexte de gérance d’approvisionnement de poulet. La section VII.2.1 approfondit le modèle conceptuel qui sert à évaluer la concurrence de prix entre les transformateurs comme moyen d’attribuer l’offre de poulet.
La section VII.2.2 illustre un système de d’allocation de contingent d’usine. La section VII.2.3 développe des critères selon lesquelles on peut interpréter la concurrence des prix versus les allocations de contingents d’usine pour appliquer ces critères au contexte du poulet.
VII.2.1 Approvisionnement des transformateurs de poulet via la concurrence des prix
Le modèle de concurrence des transformateurs illustré dans la section précédente comprend plusieurs éléments de la concurrence dans la gérance de l’approvisionnement; Plus particulièrement, en considérant que l’offre est entièrement établie, l’équivalent en pratique d’un système d’allocation de contingent est imposé. L’élément principal qui manque au contexte ci haut est une autorité de détermination de prix, alloué a un office de commercialisation, qui se manifeste en un prix minimum d’approvisionnement payé par les transformateurs.
Cet élément est présenté dans le tableau VII-7. Initialement, on considère que le prix minimum est en dessous du prix qu | English to French: Alberta Government Ombudsman
General field: Social Sciences
Detailed field: Government / Politics | Source text - English
Focused on Fairness
Do you have a complaint about how you were treated by an Alberta government authority, designated professional organization or the patient concerns resolution process of Alberta Health Services?
The Alberta Ombudsman office may be able to help.
Vision: The Alberta Ombudsman is the recognized leader for independent investigation, promotion and support of administrative fairness.
Mission: We independently and impartially promote high standards of administrative fairness through investigations, recommendations for change and education.
We Value: fairness, competency, respect, integrity, equity and confidentiality.
WHAT does the Ombudsman do?
The Alberta Ombudsman determines administrative fairness. We respond to complaints of unfair treatment by provincial government jurisdictional authorities and designated professional organizations.
The Ombudsman
• Is independent from government;
• Is impartial: we are focused on fairness;
• Is approachable and responsive;
• Provides services free of charge; and
• Is not an advocacy service.
WHO can the Ombudsman investigate?
The Ombudsman investigates the actions and decisions of:
• Alberta government departments, agencies, boards and commissions;
• Designated professional organizations, including health professions, accounting professions, foresters and veterinarians; and
• The patient concerns resolution process of Alberta Health Services.
Organizations we DO NOT investigate include federal or municipal governments, MLAs, police, universities, schools, matters handled by the courts and private matters. We will likely be able to direct you to the proper office to make your complaint.
WHEN should I complain to the Ombudsman?
Before the Ombudsman can review your complaint you should try to resolve it directly with the authority you are complaining about. That means you should complete their appeal process and if they don't have one, then take your complaint directly to a supervisor within the authority.
If you have completed this process and you still feel you were treated unfairly, then contact us.
If you require assistance or advice, our oral intake process provides information about the Alberta Ombudsman office and referrals. Please call us for more information.
HOW do I make a complaint?
Your complaint must be in writing, in English and you must sign it. If you have difficulty writing in English, please find a family member or friend to assist you. An online complaint form is available on our website. Your complaint should include:
• Your name, address and phone number;
• The name of the department, authority or professional body you are complaining about;
• Details about your complaint;
• An explanation of what you have done to resolve the problem;
• Information about why you feel you were treated unfairly; and
• Copies of any relevant documents.
WHAT happens after I complain?
Your complaint will be reviewed and the Ombudsman will determine if we can investigate. You will receive a letter explaining his decision.
If an investigation is launched, the Ombudsman will thoroughly examine all relevant information. You will be contacted throughout the process and you will receive a letter explaining the final outcome of the investigation.
If the Ombudsman cannot investigate your complaint, you may be referred to another office for advice or help.
Contacts
Edmonton
Suite 2800, 10303 Jasper Avenue NW
Edmonton, AB T5J 5C3
Phone 780-427-2756
Fax 780-427-2759
Calgary
Suite 2560, 801 – 6 Avenue SW
Calgary, AB T2P 3W2
Phone 403-297-6185
Fax 403-297-5121
Call toll free 310-0000 and dial either office
E-mail (for general information)
info@ombudsman.ab.ca
website (online complaint form)
www.ombudsman.ab.ca
| Translation - French
Orienté sur l’Équité
Avez-vous une plainte à formuler sur le traitement reçu par un département du Gouvernement de l’Alberta, un organisme professionnel désigné ou le processus de résolution de préoccupations des patients du Service de Santé Alberta (Alberta Health Services) ?
Le Bureau du Protecteur du Citoyen de l’Alberta peut peut-être vous aider.
Vision: Le Bureau du Protecteur du Citoyen de l’Alberta est le chef de file reconnu au niveau d’enquêtes indépendantes et la promotion et l’appui de l’équité administrative.
Mission: Nous faisons la promotion indépendante et impartiale de normes administratives équitables à l’aide d’enquêtes, de recommandations de changement et d’éducation.
Nos Valeurs: équité, compétence, respect, intégrité, impartialité et confidentialité.
QUE FAIT le Protecteur du Citoyen ?
Le Protecteur du Citoyen de l’Alberta évalue l’équité administrative. Nous répondons aux plaintes de traitement injuste par les autorités juridictionnelles provinciales et les organismes professionnels désignés.
Le Protecteur du Citoyen :
• Est indépendant du gouvernement;
• Est impartial: orienté sur l’équité;
• Est facile d’approche et à l’écoute;
• Dispense des services gratuits; et
• N’est pas un groupe de pression.
Sur QUI peut enquêter le Protecteur du Citoyen?
Le Protecteur du Citoyen peut faire enquête sur les actions et décisions de :
• Départements, agences, conseils et commissions du Gouvernement de l’Alberta
• Organismes professionnels désignés, incluant les professionnels de soins de santé, comptables, foresterie, vétérinaires; et
• Le processus de résolution de préoccupations des patients du Service de Santé Alberta (Alberta Health Services)
Les Organismes sur lesquelles on ne peut pas faire enquête incluent les gouvernements fédéraux et municipaux, les membres de l’assemblée législative, le service de police, les universités, les écoles, et les cause légales et privées. On est en mesure cependant, de vous diriger vers le bureau approprié pour formuler votre plainte.
QUAND devrais-je formuler une plainte au Protecteur du Citoyen ?
Il faut essayer de résoudre votre différent directement avec l’organisme en question avant de d’adresser au Protecteur du Citoyen. Cela implique que vous devrez compléter leur processus d’appel et sil il n’y en a pas, il faut alors formuler sa plainte directement à un gestionnaire de l’organisme en question.
Si vous avez complété ce processus et vous croyez encore que vous avez été traité injustement, il faut alors nous contacter.
Si vous nécessitez de l’assistance ou des conseils, notre service d’information personnalisé fournit de l’information sur le Bureau du Protecteur du Citoyen et des références. Veuillez nous contacter pour de plus amples renseignements.
COMMENT dois-je formuler une plainte ?
Votre plainte doit être faite par écrit, en anglais et vous devez la signer. Si vous avez de la difficulté à écrire en anglais, veuillez trouver un membre de votre famille ou un ami pour vous aider. Un formulaire de plainte électronique est disponible sur notre site web. Votre plainte doit inclure :
• Votre nom, adresse et numéro de téléphone;
• Le nom du département, autorité ou organisme professionnel sur lequel vous portez plainte;
• Les détails de votre plainte;
• Une explication de ce que vous avez fait pour résoudre le problème;
• De l’information sur la raison pour laquelle vous croyez avoir été traité injustement ; et
• Des copies de tout document relatif à votre plainte.
QUE se passe-t-il suite à une plainte ?
Votre plainte sera évaluée et le Protecteur du Citoyen déterminera si on peut faire enquête. Vous recevrez une lettre expliquant sa décision.
Si une enquête est lancée, le Protecteur du Citoyen examinera soigneusement toutes les informations pertinentes. Vous serez contactés pendant le processus et vous recevrez une lettre expliquant le résultat final de l’enquête.
Si le Protecteur du Citoyen ne peut pas faire enquête suite à votre plainte, il est possible que vous soyez référé à un autre organisme pour des conseils ou de l’assistance.
Contacts
Edmonton
Suite 2800, 10303 Jasper Avenue NW
Edmonton, AB T5J 5C3
Téléphone: 780-427-2756
Télécopieur : 780-427-2759
Calgary
Suite 2560, 801 – 6 Avenue SW
Calgary, AB T2P 3W2
Téléphone: 403-297-6185
Télécopieur : 403-297-5121
Numéro sans frais : 310-0000 (sélectionnez le bureau approprié)
Courriel : (renseignements généraux)
info@ombudsman.ab.ca
Site web (formulaire de plainte électronique)
www.ombudsman.ab.ca
| English to French: PTI Inc. - Script for corporate video
General field: Bus/Financial
Detailed field: Marketing / Market Research | Source text - English
ORIGINAL : Performance. Timing. Integrity. Three reasons why PTI is one of North America’s largest and most respected suppliers of remote site services providing temporary and permanent workforce housing, food services, camp management, and other value-add services to resource industries worldwide.
Based in Canada with operations worldwide, PTI offers end-to-end solutions for customers working in remote regions of the world. Our services are as diverse as our talented and skilled people. It all starts with facility design, modular manufacturing and installation. We plan it, we build it and we set it up and operate it --- and in some of the most challenging environments you can imagine
Some facilities are permanent, accommodating as many as 5,000 workers.
Some of our customers require smaller facilities that are more portable. Our fleet of temporary camps are designed to be set up on site at a moment’s notice, and easily relocated as required, a task handled by our transportation and logistical services experts.
Providing workforce accommodations is just one element of what PTI can offer our customers. As a fully integrated supplier or remote site services, there are a host of other needs that we fulfill for our customers to make their isolated environments more hospitable.
We feed the equivalent of a small city everyday, a task that requires a highly organized grocery supply and catering operation. Our facility management and support services include camp management, power generation, mobile communications, and housekeeping. PTI even provides waste and wastewater treatment services.
Our ability to integrate our services and work seamlessly with our customers has been instrumental in our successful growth since we began operations in 1979. It’s the reason we have become a preferred supplier around the world.
Whether it’s a temporary camp or a permanent base of operations, we can design, manufacture, transport, install and operate any size of facility to meet your needs. No matter how remote the location, we can make it happen, because our job is to turn your remote possibility into a reality
Anything’s possible at PTI. There are many job positions you can end up in, and there are many countries in which you may end up doing that job. But the only way you’re going to get anywhere is if you play it safe.
: Safety at PTI is critical. It’s one of the reasons our military was confident enough in PTI to ask us to help them with their needs around the world.
: From the peace-keeping troops in Europe to the oilsands and diamond mines of the Canadian north, to our manufacturing facilities in Edmonton, PTI is ready to go to work.
: And we want you, like each and every one of our employees, to go to work and be safe, so that you can go home at the end of your shift to enjoy your life, healthy and happy, with your family and friends
HOST: PTI’s safety program doesn’t happen by accident. It begins with a safety team with representatives in different divisions.
SHIELA BROWN: Management sets the Health and Safety policies. It’s their job to communicate these policies to all personnel and take an active role in promoting the program. They set the example for everyone else.
JOHN TILLNER: Supervisors also promote safety in the workplace. They do that with regular, formal, safety meetings, worksite inspections and thoroughly investigating accidents.
JOHN TILLNER: The communication of health and safety issues between supervisors and managers is critical because the information helps us identify potential and existing hazards. It also encourages safe work practices and procedures.
JIM HALL: The employees are the front line of our safety program. It’s working when they wear their personal protective equipment as directed. It’s working when they identify and report safety hazards. It’s working when they report all accidents, incidents or near misses to a supervisor and it’s also working when they seek first aid.
JIM HALL: So there’s two sides to your involvement. First: following the guidelines, safe work procedures and instructions; and second: saying something to somebody when something happens. And that kind of communication happens at PTI.
BOYD SELLAR: The PTI safety program works because there is active participation and cooperation between our employees, supervisors and managers. That can only happen if our managers and supervisors are showing active leadership, leadership that leads to effective training and better supervision of our employees.
BOYD SELLAR: Evaluation and communication is also a key. How do we know if we’re meeting safety goals? By monitoring the performance statistics, we can find out how our program is working. That’s the difference between talking about having a safe and healthy workplace and actually working on a safe and healthy workplace.
VARIOUS EMPLOYEES:
1: warehouse worker: no longer with company
2. Travco worker
3. Travco worker
4. Travco worker
5. Driver
6. Camp staff: kitchen
HOST: PTI’s safety program also extends to sub contractors & visitors.
HOST VO (PTI HO): Every sub-contractor directly hired by PTI and/or under PTI’s supervision is responsible to understand and comply with PTI’s Health and Safety Program. They must ensure that all staff on site is aware of the job site standards in place. And they are required to report any hazards, near misses, incidents and accidents.
HOST VO (PTI HO): All visitors to PTI must receive authorization and an orientation from a PTI representative to be in the shop or yard. They must comply with the P.P.E regulation in place at PTI and comply with PTI’s Health and Safety program
HOST: PTI’s approach to the enforcement and discipline of health and safety responsibilities is quite straightforward. Employees who violate safety rules will be subject to the discipline program in effect at the company’s worksite.
MR. GREEN: PTI is committed to planning and providing a safe work environment for the employees, customers, and the general public present at our work sites.
MR. GREEN: Safety is part of every job and is a responsibility for everyone working in the PTI family. This includes personal safety and the protection of property on the job in accordance and compliance with company practice, industry standards, and government regulations.
MR. GREEN: PTI’s safety program really comes down to four things: our managers monitoring and refining the program; managers & supervisors leading by example; employees accepting the principles and participating; and finally, everyone communicating; making sure you report what happens or making suggestions that can improve a situation. Those are the things that lead to a healthy injury-free work place.
HOST: In Canada, there is legislation that protects all employees from being forced to work in dangerous situations. The Right to Refuse Dangerous Work is part of the Federal Canada Labour Code. It says that you may refuse to work where you have reasonable cause to believe that a condition in the workplace constitutes a danger to you or another employee.
HOST: You’ll also find it in the Alberta Occupational Health and Safety Act which states that a worker may refuse to work where he or she believes, on reasonable & probable grounds, that there exists or will exist conditions of imminent danger for him or her or another worker at the work site.
HOST VO (PB): When you are working or operating any equipment and you have a reason to believe that an undue hazard exists to the health and safety of any person, whether it’s you or anyone else, you must immediately inform the appropriate personnel.
HOST: Supervisors and management will then do a formal hazard assessment and incident investigation in an attempt to find an alternative solution.
MR. GREEN: We don’t go to work to take risks. PTI will never force an employee to perform a work process or operate any equipment without the necessary training. If you ever feel uncomfortable about something, then speak to a supervisor or a manager immediately. We all have families and we all have lives to go home to. Noone wants to risk everything for the sake of the job. That’s not how we do things at PTI.
HOST: The management of PTI Group Inc. and our group of companies recognize the hazard of working alone and the potential for violent threats, acts, harassment and physical action that may be directed against staff by persons other than PTI employees.
HOST: Every effort has been made to identify potential sources of such actions. Procedures have been developed to reduce and eliminate the risks to our employees.
HOST VO (SG): In this segment, we’ll cover the hazards an employee may face and show the appropriate action to take for personal protection from threats and acts of violence.
HOST: Many ordinary, everyday things can be used as effective defensive weapons. A whistle’s loud blast will frighten off most assailants or robbers. Other effective items include pens or pencils, letter openers and even keys. Make it a habit to carry any of these items with you. Have them accessible in your vehicle and at home.
VICTIM VOICEOVER: I was scared. The first thing that came to my mind was what we learned in the safety program….
I tried to talk him down….
I reported it to my supervisor like you’re supposed to do.
HOST (SG): Sometimes, supervisors have to do unpleasant things, but they have to be done, like issuing an employee a written warning. You can expect some kind of emotional reaction. The first step is to diffuse the situation.
SUPERVISOR VO: I gave him a written warning…. He just went ballistic. Like it was personal to him. I just bit my lip, cause I’m the supervisor and I have to remember … it’s not personal …. I told him he had to work by the same rules as everybody else. We let it go at that
HOST: It doesn’t matter what company you’re working for, sooner or later, you’re going to meet this customer.
STAFF VO (SG): The guy was ticked off. …I tried to remain calm… If he hadn’t backed off, I would have had to get my supervisor involved.
HOST (SG): The next step is to write out a report. These reports really help us in learning how to deal with customers who have very squeaky wheels. Just remember what it’s like to be an upset customer. We’ve all been there.
WOMAN VO: This guy came up to me and looked a bit suspicious at first. I asked him where he worked and he said he was with the government. So I asked for I.D. like you’re supposed to. It checked out and so I gave him the directions he was looking for and he left. 27
HOST: In the event you are assaulted, tell your supervisor immediately. Your supervisor will know what to do. For more information, you can ask for a copy of the Violence In The Workplace Manual. 28
MR. GREEN: Employees who commit violence or harassment at any one of our company worksites will be subject to the discipline as laid out in the safety program and may also be subject to sanction under the criminal code. It is in everyone’s best interests to follow procedures, take part in the training, and immediately report all incidents of violence. 29
HOST: Work places contain hazards and it is essential that all employees and contractors maintain the highest possible state of alertness. 30
BOYD SELLAR: PTI’s policies in drug and alcohol are very clear. PTI’s policies and guidelines for the presence and use of drugs and alcohol and other illegal substances in the workplace are very clear.
BOYD SELLAR: As a PTI employee, you may not use, possess, or offer for sale alcohol or drugs while on company property or the workplace.
HOST: PTI requires employees submit to pre access alcohol or drug testing as well as post accident/ incident testing for cause.
HOST: REVOICE: Some of PTI’s oil and service company clients conduct Alcohol & Drug Testing in the field. PTI staff may be required to participate in the testing program. Drug & Alcohol testing may be conducted for the following reasons by our clients; pre-access, post accident/incident testing for cause, safety sensitive position testing or random testing.
HOST VO (SG): While on company property or a company workplace, you are permitted to be in possession of a prescription drug prescribed to you OR a non-prescription drug as long as you are using it for its intended purpose and in the manner directed by the pharmacist or the manufacturer’s directions.
HOST VO (SG): The use of the prescription or non-prescription drug cannot adversely affect your ability to safely perform your duties and, before starting work, you must notify your manager or supervisor of any unsafe side effects with the use of the drug.
HOST: Any employee suspected of substance abuse on reasonable grounds shall be reported to their Supervisor. The supervisor will issue a stop work order and investigate the matter.
HOST VO (SG): Reasonable grounds include: smell of alcohol on the breath at work, credible eyewitness accounts from one or more witnesses about possession or consumption of alcohol or drugs on the job, discovery of alcohol or drugs which can be associated with a particular employee, and extreme or unusual behavior resulting in but not limited to such things as fights, harassment, incoherent responses, and abuse.
HOST: PTI understands that an alcohol or drug dependency is a preventable and treatable condition. To that end, we will assist any of our employees who request help with alcohol and drug dependency problems through referral to the Employee Assistance Program or EAP. An employee’s decision to seek assistance will not be used as a basis for disciplinary actions. EAP is also available for individuals dealing with other types of problems.
MR. GREEN: PTI employees are expected to know and follow the Drug and Alcohol Policy. Ignorance is no excuse.
MR. GREEN: It’s not just about violations. It’s about the safety and welfare of every individual on site. All it takes is one second for an impaired judgment to change or even end a person’s life. Don’t hesitate to let someone know if there is a problem. You might be saving somebody’s life. Maybe even yours.
HOST: Grease in a frying pan. Toxic materials in the garbage. Large vehicles and equipment. These are just some of the hazards PTI employees face on the job. By definition, a hazard is a condition or practice with the potential to cause an injury or property damage.
HOST: Thanks to our experience in the remote north, the resource sector, in the manufacturing sector, and under military conditions overseas, we’ve dealt with many hazards. And that makes our program one of the best in the world.
JIM HALL: The reasons for any downgrading situation, including injury and property damage --- is the result of a safe work practice or procedure not being followed ---or it was not adequate --- or there simply wasn’t one.
JIM HALL: That’s why we use hazard assessments and hazard analysis. They help us to identify the cause or risk to you, to help us implement methods of control, to develop and update safe work practices and procedures, to assist us in accident investigation and equipment evaluation. And to help us monitor safe work behaviors.
16:09 JIM HALL: We work in places with some pretty big equipment and pretty big processes going on. And we have to stay on top of it. That’s why all personnel --- everyone --- is responsible for the identification of hazards.
HOST: Critical hazards, like carbon dioxide and hanta virus, are difficult to control and identify. These issues are addressed at your orientation.
HOST: Once a hazard is identified, you should correct it if you can do so safely and then report it to a supervisor or manager immediately.
HOST VO (SG): Identified hazards are discussed in the safety meeting minutes and recorded on the Hazard Identification/Assessment form.
HOST VO (SG): It’s the responsibility of managers and supervisors to conduct a formal hazard assessment in order to document any corrective actions and methods of control.
HOST VO (SG): Hazard controls vary. For example: buying the right equipment or developing safe work procedures and practices. The requirements may seem as simple as wearing personal protective equipment or as in-depth as certified training.
HOST: For every task that is seen as critical or for any piece of equipment that involves risk, PTI has assessed and developed a method of control to reduce and/or eliminate these risks.
HOST: PTI uses three basic methods of Hazard Control. The first is equipment controls, which include things like changing equipment design to eliminate the hazard. VO: For example, in order to reduce the potential of back injuries, PTI promotes the use of forklifts to move heavy equipment.
HOST VO (PB): Second is administrative controls are process and procedure related. Changing the way the job is managed reduces the risk of injury. Safe work procedures, safe work permits and safe work practices are administrative tools that provide safe work guidance.
HOST: And third: Personal Protective Equipment. P-P-E, as it is commonly known, is used to provide the individual with a protective barrier that limits the extent of exposure in the workplace.
HOST VO (PB): Basic personal protective equipment may include, but is not limited to: CSA approved headgear, which includes hard hats.
HOST VO (PB): Eye and Face Protection. C.S.A. approved safety glasses or prescription glasses with side shields will be worn at all times. Face shields are required when using cut-off saws, grinders, or any situation where there is flying debris.
HOST VO (PB): Footwear. C.S.A. approved footwear must be worn at all times in designated areas.
HOST VO (PB): Hand Protection. Appropriate gloves must be worn when handling cleaners, caustics, acids, solvents, or chemicals. If you are a kitchen worker, you must wear Kevlar PPE gloves when using knives or using sharp equipment like meat slicers.
HOST VO (PB): Hearing Protection. C.S.A. approved hearing protection must be worn when the sound level in the work area exceeds the permissible occupational exposure limit.
HOST VO (PB): REVOICE: Specialized PPE includes fall arrest equipment, confined space rescue equipment, fire resistant coveralls, and respirators. These may be required in some circumstances and would require specialized training.
HOST: All employees receive appropriate training for the PPE they are required to use to safely perform their job. Failure to wear required PPE will result in appropriate discipline. See your Supervisor for the job site specific PPE you need to use while on the job.
MR. GREEN: Safe work practices and procedures have been developed for many jobs and tasks where there is a specific method of doing the job. For any job that is high risk, clear step-by-step instructions have been developed. These instructions include rules, guidelines and PPE requirements. If you’re not sure about something, especially if it involves a potential hazard, then talk to your Supervisor. Remember, when you avoid reporting a hazard, you become one.
HOST: Accidents happen. Period. PTI’s safety communication program relies on a strong reporting system. This consists of employee safety orientations, incident/accident reports, safety meetings, safety memorandums, quarterly reports and safety training seminars.
HOST: We need to ensure 3 things; that the claims management process starts immediately, that property damage is repaired and that we comply with legislative requirements.
HOST: To do this, PTI must make absolutely sure that employees report all injuries, incidents, and property damage right away to their supervisor. This means that it is critical that you report all these things -- and near misses as well -- to your immediate supervisor. These incidents must be recorded.
HOST VO (SG): All medical aids, time loss accidents and modified work placements must be reported to the Safety Manager to ensure Worker’s Compensation receives the proper information. A copy of the investigation is attached to the WCB reports and forwarded to the safety department.
MR. GREEN: We’d rather prevent accidents. That’s why our safety communication system is there to open the lines of communication between employees and management. The exchange of information helps to prevent accidents.
HOST: To ensure that all Worker’s Compensation Claims are managed effectively and successfully, PTI has taken a pro-active approach to claims management. This allows us to assist our employees in the management of injuries and to facilitate a safe and successful return to work.
SHIELA BROWN: PTI supports a modified work program, which is available to employees with work related injuries.
The program is intended to help injured employees at work by providing the opportunity to continue to contribute actively to the company. This program also promotes a prompt return to regular duties through transitional work.
HOST VO (PB): An injured employee may be asked to see the company physician for any of the following services: pre-employment medical, injury confirmation, physical restrictions as related to the individual’s injury, assistance in developing modified work programs, and confirmation of fitness to return to work.
HOST: Should an emergency occur, you have a responsibility, as does everyone around you, to know your role. Copies of the Emergency Response Plan and a list of employees assigned to specific roles are posted throughout the worksite for review. Read it regularly. When it comes time to follow emergency evacuation procedures, you’ll want it to be second nature.
HOST VO (PB): PTI’s emergency response plan is a comprehensive program shared by supervisors and employees. It is the supervisor’s responsibility to ensure the availability of warning systems and communications, define key responsibilities, and allocate needed resources.
HOST VO (PB): Practice will make perfect. PTI tests the plans with drills for accuracy. And all employees must attend these drills, carefully following instructions.
HOST: One of the most dangerous emergencies we respond to involves fire. Whether it starts in a frying pan, a garbage can, or because of a forgotten cigarette --- it starts quickly. There can never be enough said about knowing where the fire extinguisher is located and how to operate it.
HOST: Fire equipment and alarm systems are inspected by competent inspectors on a regular, scheduled basis to ensure the equipment is working right in the event it is needed.
HOST VO (SG): We are also responsible to know the emergency response procedures with the client representative on site. PTI employees will take action to prevent emergencies from occurring, and follow all emergency response plans in place. Camp and field emergencies will be recorded on an Incident Report form and forwarded to the nearest safety team member.
MR. GREEN: Ultimately, it falls on all of us to know what to do when something happens. And all employees can show leadership. For example, by helping to address unrecognized hazards immediately.
MR. GREEN: Improving our standards and our emergency response plans is a collective opportunity to make the worksite a safer place. If you see something, say something. Leadership starts with you.
HOST: REVOICE: from 26:33: Thorough maintenance inspection of all tools, equipment and work sites protects the health and safety of all of our workers. Workplace Safety Inspections are performed and corrective action is implemented on a scheduled basis, as required by the type of worksite.
HOST VO REVOICE: There are two kinds of inspection: formal, which are documented; and informal, which are done on an ongoing basis prior to all work activities.
HOST VO REVOICE: Formal inspections are conducted at predetermined intervals and documented. Management is responsible for the overall operation of the program by directing formal inspections on job sites that they control. They are also responsible for involving workers in such inspections.
HOST VO REVOICE: Copies of the completed inspections are posted and distributed to each department head for review and discussion at the safety meetings.
HOST VO REVOICE: Supervisors are responsible for conducting ongoing FORMAL and informal inspections of the areas where their crews are working. As a worker, you are responsible for participating in and contributing to the inspection program, both formal and informal.
HOST VO REVOICE: Through regular inspections, PTI can effectively monitor worksite conditions. Inspections will enable everyone to identify hazards before they become problems by revealing improvements to equipment, work procedures, worker training, and worksite conditions.
HOST VO REVOICE: Like anything, machinery, tools and equipment need to be maintained. Three things direct our approach to maintenance: manufacturers’ instructions, good industry standards and applicable regulations.
HOST VO REVOICE: Defective equipment is tagged and removed from service until it is either repaired by a qualified worker or replaced with proper equipment. All workers and supervisors are responsible for identifying, tagging and removing defective equipment from service.
HOST VO REVOICE: Managers, and supervisors will ensure that all preventative maintenance is carried out by qualified workers according to established schedules and that the appropriate records are kept. But preventative maintenance is a responsibility that every worker can contribute to.
HOST VO (TRV): REVOICE: You can do that by regularly checking all tools, vehicles, and kitchen equipment that you are working with. If any tools, vehicles, or equipment pose a hazard due to a need for repair, they are to be tagged and taken out of service. Workers who use out of service tags are to notify their supervisor and give them a complete description of the problem.
HOST VO REVOICE: Operators of forklifts, cranes, and vehicles are required to complete an inspection report prior to each shift.
HOST: Each of these modules serves as a reasonable introduction to the many aspects of PTI’s safety program. But each module says one thing very clearly. Good communication leads to a reduction of accidents, which, in turn, leads to an increase in productivity, quality, and efficiency.
MR. GREEN: And when we say “quality”, we mean the quality of life you experience in the workplace. It’s my job to make sure that every employee in this company can be productive, efficient and safe.
MR. GREEN: In fact, you and I are partners in this goal. You need to tell me what’s working and what needs to be improved. You can do that by communicating with your fellow workers, supervisors and managers. You might say that what PTI really stands for is: People Taking Initiatives.
MR. GREEN: And with that kind of initiative, you have the opportunity to enjoy your career, safely, every day with PTI. We’re glad to have you on our team.
| Translation - French
: Performance. Timing. Integrity. Three reasons why PTI is one of North America’s largest and most respected suppliers of remote site services providing temporary and permanent workforce housing, food services, camp management, and other value-add services to resource industries worldwide.
Based in Canada with operations worldwide, PTI offers end-to-end solutions for customers working in remote regions of the world. Our services are as diverse as our talented and skilled people. It all starts with facility design, modular manufacturing and installation. We plan it, we build it and we set it up and operate it --- and in some of the most challenging environments you can imagine
Some facilities are permanent, accommodating as many as 5,000 workers.
Some of our customers require smaller facilities that are more portable. Our fleet of temporary camps are designed to be set up on site at a moment’s notice, and easily relocated as required, a task handled by our transportation and logistical services experts.
Providing workforce accommodations is just one element of what PTI can offer our customers. As a fully integrated supplier or remote site services, there are a host of other needs that we fulfill for our customers to make their isolated environments more hospitable.
We feed the equivalent of a small city everyday, a task that requires a highly organized grocery supply and catering operation. Our facility management and support services include camp management, power generation, mobile communications, and housekeeping. PTI even provides waste and wastewater treatment services.
Our ability to integrate our services and work seamlessly with our customers has been instrumental in our successful growth since we began operations in 1979. It’s the reason we have become a preferred supplier around the world.
Whether it’s a temporary camp or a permanent base of operations, we can design, manufacture, transport, install and operate any size of facility to meet your needs. No matter how remote the location, we can make it happen, because our job is to turn your remote possibility into a reality
Anything’s possible at PTI. There are many job positions you can end up in, and there are many countries in which you may end up doing that job. But the only way you’re going to get anywhere is if you play it safe.
: Safety at PTI is critical. It’s one of the reasons our military was confident enough in PTI to ask us to help them with their needs around the world.
: From the peace-keeping troops in Europe to the oilsands and diamond mines of the Canadian north, to our manufacturing facilities in Edmonton, PTI is ready to go to work.
: And we want you, like each and every one of our employees, to go to work and be safe, so that you can go home at the end of your shift to enjoy your life, healthy and happy, with your family and friends
HOST: PTI’s safety program doesn’t happen by accident. It begins with a safety team with representatives in different divisions.
SHIELA BROWN: Management sets the Health and Safety policies. It’s their job to communicate these policies to all personnel and take an active role in promoting the program. They set the example for everyone else.
JOHN TILLNER: Supervisors also promote safety in the workplace. They do that with regular, formal, safety meetings, worksite inspections and thoroughly investigating accidents.
JOHN TILLNER: The communication of health and safety issues between supervisors and managers is critical because the information helps us identify potential and existing hazards. It also encourages safe work practices and procedures.
JIM HALL: The employees are the front line of our safety program. It’s working when they wear their personal protective equipment as directed. It’s working when they identify and report safety hazards. It’s working when they report all accidents, incidents or near misses to a supervisor and it’s also working when they seek first aid.
JIM HALL: So there’s two sides to your involvement. First: following the guidelines, safe work procedures and instructions; and second: saying something to somebody when something happens. And that kind of communication happens at PTI.
BOYD SELLAR: The PTI safety program works because there is active participation and cooperation between our employees, supervisors and managers. That can only happen if our managers and supervisors are showing active leadership, leadership that leads to effective training and better supervision of our employees.
BOYD SELLAR: Evaluation and communication is also a key. How do we know if we’re meeting safety goals? By monitoring the performance statistics, we can find out how our program is working. That’s the difference between talking about having a safe and healthy workplace and actually working on a safe and healthy workplace.
VARIOUS EMPLOYEES:
1: warehouse worker: no longer with company
2. Travco worker
3. Travco worker
4. Travco worker
5. Driver
6. Camp staff: kitchen
HOST: PTI’s safety program also extends to sub contractors & visitors.
HOST VO (PTI HO): Every sub-contractor directly hired by PTI and/or under PTI’s supervision is responsible to understand and comply with PTI’s Health and Safety Program. They must ensure that all staff on site is aware of the job site standards in place. And they are required to report any hazards, near misses, incidents and accidents.
HOST VO (PTI HO): All visitors to PTI must receive authorization and an orientation from a PTI representative to be in the shop or yard. They must comply with the P.P.E regulation in place at PTI and comply with PTI’s Health and Safety program
HOST: PTI’s approach to the enforcement and discipline of health and safety responsibilities is quite straightforward. Employees who violate safety rules will be subject to the discipline program in effect at the company’s worksite.
MR. GREEN: PTI is committed to planning and providing a safe work environment for the employees, customers, and the general public present at our work sites.
MR. GREEN: Safety is part of every job and is a responsibility for everyone working in the PTI family. This includes personal safety and the protection of property on the job in accordance and compliance with company practice, industry standards, and government regulations.
MR. GREEN: PTI’s safety program really comes down to four things: our managers monitoring and refining the program; managers & supervisors leading by example; employees accepting the principles and participating; and finally, everyone communicating; making sure you report what happens or making suggestions that can improve a situation. Those are the things that lead to a healthy injury-free work place.
HOST: In Canada, there is legislation that protects all employees from being forced to work in dangerous situations. The Right to Refuse Dangerous Work is part of the Federal Canada Labour Code. It says that you may refuse to work where you have reasonable cause to believe that a condition in the workplace constitutes a danger to you or another employee.
HOST: You’ll also find it in the Alberta Occupational Health and Safety Act which states that a worker may refuse to work where he or she believes, on reasonable & probable grounds, that there exists or will exist conditions of imminent danger for him or her or another worker at the work site.
HOST VO (PB): When you are working or operating any equipment and you have a reason to believe that an undue hazard exists to the health and safety of any person, whether it’s you or anyone else, you must immediately inform the appropriate personnel.
HOST: Supervisors and management will then do a formal hazard assessment and incident investigation in an attempt to find an alternative solution.
MR. GREEN: We don’t go to work to take risks. PTI will never force an employee to perform a work process or operate any equipment without the necessary training. If you ever feel uncomfortable about something, then speak to a supervisor or a manager immediately. We all have families and we all have lives to go home to. Noone wants to risk everything for the sake of the job. That’s not how we do things at PTI.
HOST: The management of PTI Group Inc. and our group of companies recognize the hazard of working alone and the potential for violent threats, acts, harassment and physical action that may be directed against staff by persons other than PTI employees.
HOST: Every effort has been made to identify potential sources of such actions. Procedures have been developed to reduce and eliminate the risks to our employees.
HOST VO (SG): In this segment, we’ll cover the hazards an employee may face and show the appropriate action to take for personal protection from threats and acts of violence.
HOST: Many ordinary, everyday things can be used as effective defensive weapons. A whistle’s loud blast will frighten off most assailants or robbers. Other effective items include pens or pencils, letter openers and even keys. Make it a habit to carry any of these items with you. Have them accessible in your vehicle and at home.
VICTIM VOICEOVER: I was scared. The first thing that came to my mind was what we learned in the safety program….
I tried to talk him down….
I reported it to my supervisor like you’re supposed to do.
HOST (SG): Sometimes, supervisors have to do unpleasant things, but they have to be done, like issuing an employee a written warning. You can expect some kind of emotional reaction. The first step is to diffuse the situation.
SUPERVISOR VO: I gave him a written warning…. He just went ballistic. Like it was personal to him. I just bit my lip, cause I’m the supervisor and I have to remember … it’s not personal …. I told him he had to work by the same rules as everybody else. We let it go at that
HOST: It doesn’t matter what company you’re working for, sooner or later, you’re going to meet this customer.
STAFF VO (SG): The guy was ticked off. …I tried to remain calm… If he hadn’t backed off, I would have had to get my supervisor involved.
HOST (SG): The next step is to write out a report. These reports really help us in learning how to deal with customers who have very squeaky wheels. Just remember what it’s like to be an upset customer. We’ve all been there.
WOMAN VO: This guy came up to me and looked a bit suspicious at first. I asked him where he worked and he said he was with the government. So I asked for I.D. like you’re supposed to. It checked out and so I gave him the directions he was looking for and he left. 27
HOST: In the event you are assaulted, tell your supervisor immediately. Your supervisor will know what to do. For more information, you can ask for a copy of the Violence In The Workplace Manual. 28
MR. GREEN: Employees who commit violence or harassment at any one of our company worksites will be subject to the discipline as laid out in the safety program and may also be subject to sanction under the criminal code. It is in everyone’s best interests to follow procedures, take part in the training, and immediately report all incidents of violence. 29
HOST: Work places contain hazards and it is essential that all employees and contractors maintain the highest possible state of alertness. 30
BOYD SELLAR: PTI’s policies in drug and alcohol are very clear. PTI’s policies and guidelines for the presence and use of drugs and alcohol and other illegal substances in the workplace are very clear.
BOYD SELLAR: As a PTI employee, you may not use, possess, or offer for sale alcohol or drugs while on company property or the workplace.
HOST: PTI requires employees submit to pre access alcohol or drug testing as well as post accident/ incident testing for cause.
HOST: REVOICE: Some of PTI’s oil and service company clients conduct Alcohol & Drug Testing in the field. PTI staff may be required to participate in the testing program. Drug & Alcohol testing may be conducted for the following reasons by our clients; pre-access, post accident/incident testing for cause, safety sensitive position testing or random testing.
HOST VO (SG): While on company property or a company workplace, you are permitted to be in possession of a prescription drug prescribed to you OR a non-prescription drug as long as you are using it for its intended purpose and in the manner directed by the pharmacist or the manufacturer’s directions.
HOST VO (SG): The use of the prescription or non-prescription drug cannot adversely affect your ability to safely perform your duties and, before starting work, you must notify your manager or supervisor of any unsafe side effects with the use of the drug.
HOST: Any employee suspected of substance abuse on reasonable grounds shall be reported to their Supervisor. The supervisor will issue a stop work order and investigate the matter.
HOST VO (SG): Reasonable grounds include: smell of alcohol on the breath at work, credible eyewitness accounts from one or more witnesses about possession or consumption of alcohol or drugs on the job, discovery of alcohol or drugs which can be associated with a particular employee, and extreme or unusual behavior resulting in but not limited to such things as fights, harassment, incoherent responses, and abuse.
HOST: PTI understands that an alcohol or drug dependency is a preventable and treatable condition. To that end, we will assist any of our employees who request help with alcohol and drug dependency problems through referral to the Employee Assistance Program or EAP. An employee’s decision to seek assistance will not be used as a basis for disciplinary actions. EAP is also available for individuals dealing with other types of problems.
MR. GREEN: PTI employees are expected to know and follow the Drug and Alcohol Policy. Ignorance is no excuse.
MR. GREEN: It’s not just about violations. It’s about the safety and welfare of every individual on site. All it takes is one second for an impaired judgment to change or even end a person’s life. Don’t hesitate to let someone know if there is a problem. You might be saving somebody’s life. Maybe even yours.
HOST: Grease in a frying pan. Toxic materials in the garbage. Large vehicles and equipment. These are just some of the hazards PTI employees face on the job. By definition, a hazard is a condition or practice with the potential to cause an injury or property damage.
HOST: Thanks to our experience in the remote north, the resource sector, in the manufacturing sector, and under military conditions overseas, we’ve dealt with many hazards. And that makes our program one of the best in the world.
JIM HALL: The reasons for any downgrading situation, including injury and property damage --- is the result of a safe work practice or procedure not being followed ---or it was not adequate --- or there simply wasn’t one.
JIM HALL: That’s why we use hazard assessments and hazard analysis. They help us to identify the cause or risk to you, to help us implement methods of control, to develop and update safe work practices and procedures, to assist us in accident investigation and equipment evaluation. And to help us monitor safe work behaviors.
16:09 JIM HALL: We work in places with some pretty big equipment and pretty big processes going on. And we have to stay on top of it. That’s why all personnel --- everyone --- is responsible for the identification of hazards.
HOST: Critical hazards, like carbon dioxide and hanta virus, are difficult to control and identify. These issues are addressed at your orientation.
HOST: Once a hazard is identified, you should correct it if you can do so safely and then report it to a supervisor or manager immediately.
HOST VO (SG): Identified hazards are discussed in the safety meeting minutes and recorded on the Hazard Identification/Assessment form.
HOST VO (SG): It’s the responsibility of managers and supervisors to conduct a formal hazard assessment in order to document any corrective actions and methods of control.
HOST VO (SG): Hazard controls vary. For example: buying the right equipment or developing safe work procedures and practices. The requirements may seem as simple as wearing personal protective equipment or as in-depth as certified training.
HOST: For every task that is seen as critical or for any piece of equipment that involves risk, PTI has assessed and developed a method of control to reduce and/or eliminate these risks.
HOST: PTI uses three basic methods of Hazard Control. The first is equipment controls, which include things like changing equipment design to eliminate the hazard. VO: For example, in order to reduce the potential of back injuries, PTI promotes the use of forklifts to move heavy equipment.
HOST VO (PB): Second is administrative controls are process and procedure related. Changing the way the job is managed reduces the risk of injury. Safe work procedures, safe work permits and safe work practices are administrative tools that provide safe work guidance.
HOST: And third: Personal Protective Equipment. P-P-E, as it is commonly known, is used to provide the individual with a protective barrier that limits the extent of exposure in the workplace.
HOST VO (PB): Basic personal protective equipment may include, but is not limited to: CSA approved headgear, which includes hard hats.
HOST VO (PB): Eye and Face Protection. C.S.A. approved safety glasses or prescription glasses with side shields will be worn at all times. Face shields are required when using cut-off saws, grinders, or any situation where there is flying debris.
HOST VO (PB): Footwear. C.S.A. approved footwear must be worn at all times in designated areas.
HOST VO (PB): Hand Protection. Appropriate gloves must be worn when handling cleaners, caustics, acids, solvents, or chemicals. If you are a kitchen worker, you must wear Kevlar PPE gloves when using knives or using sharp equipment like meat slicers.
HOST VO (PB): Hearing Protection. C.S.A. approved hearing protection must be worn when the sound level in the work area exceeds the permissible occupational exposure limit.
HOST VO (PB): REVOICE: Specialized PPE includes fall arrest equipment, confined space rescue equipment, fire resistant coveralls, and respirators. These may be required in some circumstances and would require specialized training.
HOST: All employees receive appropriate training for the PPE they are required to use to safely perform their job. Failure to wear required PPE will result in appropriate discipline. See your Supervisor for the job site specific PPE you need to use while on the job.
MR. GREEN: Safe work practices and procedures have been developed for many jobs and tasks where there is a specific method of doing the job. For any job that is high risk, clear step-by-step instructions have been developed. These instructions include rules, guidelines and PPE requirements. If you’re not sure about something, especially if it involves a potential hazard, then talk to your Supervisor. Remember, when you avoid reporting a hazard, you become one.
HOST: Accidents happen. Period. PTI’s safety communication program relies on a strong reporting system. This consists of employee safety orientations, incident/accident reports, safety meetings, safety memorandums, quarterly reports and safety training seminars.
HOST: We need to ensure 3 things; that the claims management process starts immediately, that property damage is repaired and that we comply with legislative requirements.
HOST: To do this, PTI must make absolutely sure that employees report all injuries, incidents, and property damage right away to their supervisor. This means that it is critical that you report all these things -- and near misses as well -- to your immediate supervisor. These incidents must be recorded.
HOST VO (SG): All medical aids, time loss accidents and modified work placements must be reported to the Safety Manager to ensure Worker’s Compensation receives the proper information. A copy of the investigation is attached to the WCB reports and forwarded to the safety department.
MR. GREEN: We’d rather prevent accidents. That’s why our safety communication system is there to open the lines of communication between employees and management. The exchange of information helps to prevent accidents.
HOST: To ensure that all Worker’s Compensation Claims are managed effectively and successfully, PTI has taken a pro-active approach to claims management. This allows us to assist our employees in the management of injuries and to facilitate a safe and successful return to work.
SHIELA BROWN: PTI supports a modified work program, which is available to employees with work related injuries.
The program is intended to help injured employees at work by providing the opportunity to continue to contribute actively to the company. This program also promotes a prompt return to regular duties through transitional work.
HOST VO (PB): An injured employee may be asked to see the company physician for any of the following services: pre-employment medical, injury confirmation, physical restrictions as related to the individual’s injury, assistance in developing modified work programs, and confirmation of fitness to return to work.
HOST: Should an emergency occur, you have a responsibility, as does everyone around you, to know your role. Copies of the Emergency Response Plan and a list of employees assigned to specific roles are posted throughout the worksite for review. Read it regularly. When it comes time to follow emergency evacuation procedures, you’ll want it to be second nature.
HOST VO (PB): PTI’s emergency response plan is a comprehensive program shared by supervisors and employees. It is the supervisor’s responsibility to ensure the availability of warning systems and communications, define key responsibilities, and allocate needed resources.
HOST VO (PB): Practice will make perfect. PTI tests the plans with drills for accuracy. And all employees must attend these drills, carefully following instructions.
HOST: One of the most dangerous emergencies we respond to involves fire. Whether it starts in a frying pan, a garbage can, or because of a forgotten cigarette --- it starts quickly. There can never be enough said about knowing where the fire extinguisher is located and how to operate it.
HOST: Fire equipment and alarm systems are inspected by competent inspectors on a regular, scheduled basis to ensure the equipment is working right in the event it is needed.
HOST VO (SG): We are also responsible to know the emergency response procedures with the client representative on site. PTI employees will take action to prevent emergencies from occurring, and follow all emergency response plans in place. Camp and field emergencies will be recorded on an Incident Report form and forwarded to the nearest safety team member.
MR. GREEN: Ultimately, it falls on all of us to know what to do when something happens. And all employees can show leadership. For example, by helping to address unrecognized hazards immediately.
MR. GREEN: Improving our standards and our emergency response plans is a collective opportunity to make the worksite a safer place. If you see something, say something. Leadership starts with you.
HOST: REVOICE: from 26:33: Thorough maintenance inspection of all tools, equipment and work sites protects the health and safety of all of our workers. Workplace Safety Inspections are performed and corrective action is implemented on a scheduled basis, as required by the type of worksite.
HOST VO REVOICE: There are two kinds of inspection: formal, which are documented; and informal, which are done on an ongoing basis prior to all work activities.
HOST VO REVOICE: Formal inspections are conducted at predetermined intervals and documented. Management is responsible for the overall operation of the program by directing formal inspections on job sites that they control. They are also responsible for involving workers in such inspections.
HOST VO REVOICE: Copies of the completed inspections are posted and distributed to each department head for review and discussion at the safety meetings.
HOST VO REVOICE: Supervisors are responsible for conducting ongoing FORMAL and informal inspections of the areas where their crews are working. As a worker, you are responsible for participating in and contributing to the inspection program, both formal and informal.
HOST VO REVOICE: Through regular inspections, PTI can effectively monitor worksite conditions. Inspections will enable everyone to identify hazards before they become problems by revealing improvements to equipment, work procedures, worker training, and worksite conditions.
HOST VO REVOICE: Like anything, machinery, tools and equipment need to be maintained. Three things direct our approach to maintenance: manufacturers’ instructions, good industry standards and applicable regulations.
HOST VO REVOICE: Defective equipment is tagged and removed from service until it is either repaired by a qualified worker or replaced with proper equipment. All workers and supervisors are responsible for identifying, tagging and removing defective equipment from service.
HOST VO REVOICE: Managers, and supervisors will ensure that all preventative maintenance is carried out by qualified workers according to established schedules and that the appropriate records are kept. But preventative maintenance is a responsibility that every worker can contribute to.
HOST VO (TRV): REVOICE: You can do that by regularly checking all tools, vehicles, and kitchen equipment that you are working with. If any tools, vehicles, or equipment pose a hazard due to a need for repair, they are to be tagged and taken out of service. Workers who use out of service tags are to notify their supervisor and give them a complete description of the problem.
HOST VO REVOICE: Operators of forklifts, cranes, and vehicles are required to complete an inspection report prior to each shift.
HOST: Each of these modules serves as a reasonable introduction to the many aspects of PTI’s safety program. But each module says one thing very clearly. Good communication leads to a reduction of accidents, which, in turn, leads to an increase in productivity, quality, and efficiency.
MR. GREEN: And when we say “quality”, we mean the quality of life you experience in the workplace. It’s my job to make sure that every employee in this company can be productive, efficient and safe.
MR. GREEN: In fact, you and I are partners in this goal. You need to tell me what’s working and what needs to be improved. You can do that by communicating with your fellow workers, supervisors and managers. You might say that what PTI really stands for is: People Taking Initiatives.
MR. GREEN: And with that kind of initiative, you have the opportunity to enjoy your career, safely, every day with PTI. We’re glad to have you on our team.
|
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French to English (Professional journalist)
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Dear Sir or Madam;
I would like to offer your company my services as a translator.
I have been doing translation from home now for 5 years and I thoroughly enjoy it. I also worked as a construction project manager, also from my home office but I have decided to do translation full time since I enjoy it so much more.
My experience is mainly in writing copy for radio stations and I have been educated as a radio journalist and announcer. I have 8 years experience in the local media in various positions. I also have 2 years of experience in construction management (water infrastructure).
If you require references I would be glad to provide them. You will find that I am reliable, honest and easy to deal with, always ready to perform, and I turn in quality work.
I have been bilingual from a very young age and honestly can not say if my mother tongue is English or French. I would have to say that it is both simultaneously. I think in both languages, I dream in both languages and I would like to work for you….in both languages!
Thanks for your time;
Please do not hesitate to contact me should you require further information;
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Keywords: Translation, Simultaneous Interpreter, French Canadian, English, Politics, Economics, Business, Marketing, Sociology, Geography, Engineering, Construction, History
Profile last updated
Nov 21 |
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