Working languages: Afrikaans to EnglishEnglish to AfrikaansEnglish (monolingual)
| Eugene Seegers
Attention to detail
Bloemfontein, Free State, South Africa Local time: 06:26 SAST (GMT+2)
Native in: English  , Afrikaans | |
| Freelancer | | Translation, Editing/proofreading, Website localization, Software localization | | Specializes in: | | Finance (general) | History | | Photography/Imaging (& Graphic Arts) | Religion | | Telecom(munications) |
| Also works in: | | Cooking / Culinary | Education / Pedagogy | | Fisheries | Food & Dairy | | General / Conversation / Greetings / Letters | Law (general) | | IT (Information Technology) | Philosophy | | Printing & Publishing |
More Less | Afrikaans to English - Rates: 0.45 - 0.80 ZAR per word / 75 - 100 ZAR per hour
English to Afrikaans - Rates: 0.45 - 0.80 ZAR per word / 75 - 100 ZAR per hour
| | Check, Money order | Sample translations submitted: 4 English to Afrikaans: ICASA Consumer Guide on Emergency Number
General field: Other
Detailed field: Telecom(munications) | Source text - English
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa
112 EMERGENCY CONSUMER GUIDE
What are 112 emergency services?
• It means the services provided by the emergency organisations.
What are the emergency numbers?
• The emergency numbers include: 112, 10111, 10177, 107 any other numbers as determined by the Authority. According to the Regulations, after 18 months of the establishment of the emergency communication centre, the 112 number will become the exclusive national public emergency number.
What type of emergency services should one ask for?
• Members of the public will make requests for emergency services at the following emergency organisations:
o Police services
o Ambulance
o Traffic authority
o Fire
o Coast guard
o Any other similar organisation that is providing assistance the public in case of emergencies.
Can I access the emergency services with a disconnected phone?
• The licensees must, whenever members of the public make electronic communications request using emergency numbers 112, requesting 112 emergency centre, ensure that such electronic communications are carried to 112 emergency centre, and from the emergency centre to the emergency organisation.
• Simlocked and softlocked phones must not prevent the subscriber, end-user or members of the public when accessing the 112 emergency services.
Are the 112 emergency numbers for free?
• Yes, the subscriber or end user must not pay any costs to the licensee when accessing the 112 emergency centres.
• Where an emergency communication request originates from a public payphone, any other phone where the public has access to emergency services, community services telephones, and universal service obligations related services, the costs thereof must be free to the public.
Where do I complain?
• The public, subscribers and end-users may lodge a complaint to the Authority. (Icasa)
For more information, contact Consumer Affairs officials at:
Head Office: 011 566 3000/1
Addresses: 164 Katherine Street, Sandton.
Private Bag X 10002, Sandton, 2146
Free State: 051 411 5900
Eastern Cape: 041 394 1600
Western Cape: 021 595 7300
Kwa Zulu Natal: 031 275 6400
| Translation - Afrikaans
Onafhanklike Kommunikasie-owerheid van Suid-Afrika
VERBRUIKERSGIDS VIR 112-NOODDIENSTE
Wat is die 112-nooddienste?
• Dit is dienste wat deur die noodorganisasies voorsien word.
Wat is die noodnommers?
• Die noodnommers sluit in: 112, 10111, 10177, 107 en enige ander nommers soos vasgestel deur die Owerheid. Volgens die Regulasies sal die 112-nommer die uitsluitlike nasionale noodnommer vir die publiek word, 18 maande nadat die nood- kommunikasiesentrum in werking gestel is.
Watter soort nooddienste moet ’n mens voor vra?
• Lede van die publiek sal nooddienste by die volgende noodorganisasies aanvra:
o Polisiedienste
o Ambulans
o Verkeersowerheid
o Brandweer
o Kuswag
o Enige ander soortgelyke organisasie wat die publiek bystaan tydens noodgevalle.
Kan ek toegang tot die nooddienste met ’n ontkoppelde foon verkry?
• Die lisensiehouer moet, wanneer ook al lede van die publiek deur middel van elektroniese kommunikasiemiddels nooddienste aanvra deur die 112-nommer en versoek om na die 112-noodsentrum deurgesit te word, verseker dat sulke elektroniese kommunikasie na die 112-noodsentrum oorgedra word, en van die noodsentrum na die noodorganisasie.
• Fone waarvan die SIM gesluit of wat elektronies geblok is, moenie keer dat die huurder, eindgebruiker of lede van die publiek die 112-nooddienste gebruik nie.
Is die 112-noodnommers gratis?
• Ja, die huurder of eindgebruiker moet geen koste aan die lisensiehouer verskuldig wees vir toegang tot die 112-noodsentrums nie.
• Hetsy ’n nooddiensversoek van ’n openbare telefoon, enige ander foon waartoe die publiek toegang het, gemeenskapsdiens-telefone of universele diensverpligtings-verwante (USO) dienste afkomstig is, die publiek moet hierdie dienste gratis ontvang.
Waar kan ek kla?
• Die publiek, huurders en eindgebruikers kan ’n klag by die Owerheid indien. (Okosa)
Vir meer inligting, kontak beamptes by Verbruikersaangeleenthede:
Hoofkantoor: 011 566 3000/1
Adresse: Katherine-straat 164, Sandton.
Privaat Sak X 10002, Sandton, 2146
Vrystaat: 051 411 5900
Oos-Kaap: 041 394 1600
Wes-Kaap: 021 595 7300
Kwa-Zulu Natal: 031 275 6400
| English to Afrikaans: Regulations Governing Boat-based Whale Watching in South Africa
General field: Other
Detailed field: Fisheries | Source text - English
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS AND TOURISM
No.
_._2008
MARINE LIVING RESOURCES ACT, 1998 (ACT NO. 18 OF 1998)
POLICY ON BOAT-BASED WHALE AND DOLPHIN WATCHING
I, Marthinus van Schalkwyk., Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism,
hereby publish the Policy on Boat-Based Whale and Dolphin Watching in the
Schedule hereto for general information.
MARTHINUS VAN SCHALKWYK
MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS AND TOURISM
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS AND TOURISM
BRANCH MARINE AND COASTAL MANAGEMENT
POLICY ON BOAT-BASED WHALE AND DOLPHIN WATCHING
April 2008
This Policy is also available at www.mcm-deat.gov.za
2
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 5
2. Background to the development of the industry 5
3. Previous management efforts to regulate whale watching 6
4. Policy objectives 6
5. Policy implementation 7
6. Permits 7
7. Optimal socio-economic benefits 8
8. Vessels 8
9. Responsibilities 9
10. Ongoing Applications for Permits 9
11. Experimental permits in the Plettenberg Bay area 9
12. Observer programme 9
13. Transfer of Permits 9
14. Annexure A: Criteria for the allocation of BBWW permits
15. Annexure B: Number of Operational Areas
16. Annexure C: Application Process
3
Glossary of Terms
Department The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.
Minister The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.
Fishery Control Officer Any incumbent of a post of Fishery Control Officer
designated by the Minister in terms of section 9 of the
Marine Living Resources Act, 1998 (Act No. 18 of 1998).
Boat-Based Whale Watching The observing of whales and dolphins from
Sea-going vessels.
Delegated Authority A person to whom power has been delegated in terms of
section 79 of the Marine Living Resources Act, 1998 (Act
No. 18 of 1998).
Suitable BBWW vessel A vessel that is registered by SAMSA as being suitable
for BBWW.
BBWW Boat-Based Whale and Dolphin Watching
DEAT Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
HDIs Historically Disadvantaged Individuals
MCM Marine and Coastal Management branch of the Department
MLRA Marine Living Resources Act, 1998 (Act No. 18 of 1998)
SAMSA South African Maritime Safety Authority, statutory body
established in terms of the South African Maritime Safety
Authority Act , 1998 (Act No. 5 of 1998)
4
BBWW Policy Policy on Boat-based Whale and Dolphin Watching
VMS Vessel Monitoring System
1. Introduction
This policy on Boat-based Whale and Dolphin Watching (_BBWW Policy_) is issued by the
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism in terms of the Marine Living Resources Act,
1998 (Act No.18 of 1998) (_the MLRA_). The MLRA, a statute for the conservation of the
marine ecosystem and the long-term sustainable utilisation of marine living resources,
provides the legislative framework for the exercise of control over the exploitation of marine
living resources so as to ensure their sustainable use and exploitation in a fair and equitable
manner. This policy is issued together with a set of Regulations for Boat-based Whale and
Dolphin Watching (_the BBWW Regulations_).
2. Background to the development of the Industry
Boat-based Whale Watching (BBWW), the observing of whales and dolphins from sea-going
vessels, is a fast-growing activity across the world. This activity generates considerable
economic benefits for coastal communities and provides educational benefits for those with
an interest in the cetacean family (both for recreational and research purposes). Starting as a
commercial activity in 1955, in North America, it has become the most acceptable
sustainable use of the cetacean resource compatible with Agenda 21. This commercial
activity has grown significantly in the 1990s into a distinct industry within the tourism sector.
Between 1991 and 1992 there were about 50 countries that practised BBWW, 65 in 1998
and 87 in 2002, benefiting more than 500 coastal communities through the creation of job
opportunities.
BBWW currently contributes more than US$1billion annually to the economies of coastal
states around the world. Japan began whale watching in 1998 and now has more than
100,000 mostly Japanese whale watchers a year. In Norway whale watching is now a
significant tourist attraction with whale watchers spending more than US$12 million in 1998
(Berrow, 2003).
5
3. Previous Management Efforts to Regulate Whale Watching
In South Africa, BBWW was regulated for the first time in 1998 when three year
experimental permits were issued. In 1998/9 20 areas of operation were demarcated,
increasing to 25 in 2001/2. Dolphin-watching had not been regulated in the past, except
to a very limited extent and indirectly through the regulation of BBWW vessels. In the
past, few requirements had been prescribed for the issuing of BBWW permits. Permits
were issued to natural as well as legal persons who complied with citizenship
requirements (e.g. applicants had to be South African). In 2001 additional requirements
such as the endorsement of nominated vessels by SAMSA and the qualifications for
skippers and guides were prescribed. The permits/exemptions of the current operators
will expire when new allocations are made. These operators are referred to as the
_current permit holders_ in this policy document.
4. Policy Objectives
The objectives of this policy are:
§ To provide a regulatory framework for the protection of whales and dolphins.
§ To grow the South African BBWW industry through the allocation of a greater number of
permits;
§ To transform the BBWW industry.
5. Policy Implementation
5.1. Regulation of the BBWW industry
Responsible whale and dolphin watching is a key objective of this policy. The Department
shall, through its BBWW regulations or other appropriate means, prohibit whale and
dolphin watching operations (and the advertising of such operations) without a permit. The
Department will set the requirements for qualification (See Annexure _A_) which shall
include:
i. Accreditation of a vessel and its skipper;
ii. Safety precautions for the customers;
6
iii. Tourism standards to be observed by operators;
iv. Conduct of customers relating to cetaceans.
5.2. Transformation of the BBWW industry
In promoting transformation, the Department shall prescribe actions or conditions that should
advance this objective. Factors to be considered include placing restrictions on changing of
shareholding or controlling interest in Companies or Close Corporations that have been
allocated permits. If the majority of shares are sold and/or the controlling interest of a
company or close corporation is changed, to an extent that the equity considerations on the
basis of which the permit was issued no longer exist, this will be regarded as a change in
ownership and therefore a transfer of a permit must comply with the provisions of paragraph
14 below. Transfer of a permit without the authority of the Department may result in the
cancellation of the permit. This requirement will form part of the permit conditions. When
considering competing permit applications, preference will be given to the applicant whose
operation will have the biggest impact in terms of transformation and Black Economic
Empowerment.
5.3. Growth of the BBWW industry
The Department will facilitate growth of the industry. It will also seek to encourage the
development of this activity in those areas where it has not yet been taken up.
6. Permits
Permits will be issued for designated areas. The designation of areas of operation and the
number of permits will be informed by a precautionary management plan that is flexible to
allow for feedback from scientific studies. The designation of areas and number of permits to
be allocated will be reviewed and adjusted from time to time, based on scientific grounds.
Permits will be allocated only under section 13 of the MLRA for a maximum period of one (1)
year. Successful permit holders will be re-allocated their permits each year for five (5) years
from the date of the first allocations, provided that they fully complied with permit conditions.
There will be a review of the number of BBWW operators in each of the designated areas
7
five (5) years from the date of the first allocations. A fresh invitation for applications will
therefore occur every five years (see paragraph 10).
Each BBWW permit shall be issued subject to such conditions considered necessary to
satisfy the objectives of this policy. Any permit conditions may be amended from time to time.
7. Optimal Socio-economic Benefits
When considering competing permit applications, the Minister or delegated authority will give
preference to the applicant whose operations will have the biggest impact in terms of socio-
economic benefits.
8. Vessels
A suitable BBWW vessel is a vessel that:
o is registered by SAMSA as being suitable for BBWW; and
o has a functioning vessel monitoring system.
It is important that properly adapted vessels are used for whale and dolphin watching tours.
Operators will be required to provide proof that they have and intend to use such vessels,
and will be expected to provide a detailed description of the nominated vessel.
Vessels that cause the least amount of disturbance to the resource are more desirable
from a management viewpoint and the replacement of ageing vessels with modern, cost-
effective vessels that provide better facilities to paying clients will therefore be encouraged.
Each successful applicant will be restricted to two vessels per permit and specifically the
use of the vessels specified in the application form. The permit conditions will, however,
prohibit the simultaneous use of the vessels for the purposes of BBWW. Should the permit
holder subsequently wish to change the specified vessel/s, the permit holder shall advise
the Department of the change and provide proof that the vessel is certified by SAMSA as
suitable for BBWW.
8
Should the vessel change occur without SAMSA_s certification, the permit holder will not be
allowed to operate until SAMSA has formally certified the replacement vessel as being safe
for BBWW.
9. Responsibilities
The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism is the sole authority for issuing
permits for BBWW. The recognised Industrial Body will be consulted on management
issues.
10. Ongoing Applications for Permits
Should there be a vacant area; a permit may be allocated to any other person who, in
response to an invitation placed in the Government Gazette, satisfies the criteria set out in
this policy and the BBWW regulations.
11. Experimental Permits in Plettenberg Bay Area
Three experimental dolphin watching permits will be issued within the next five years in the
Plettenberg Bay area. For the duration of the experiment, additional restrictions may be
placed on the BBWW operators in the area. A different, open and transparent process will
be followed for the allocation of these permits. A BBWW operator that already has a permit
may apply for an experimental permit as well.
12. Observer Programme
All permit holders will be required to carry observers upon written instruction by the
Department. The costs of accommodating the observer on board will be for the permit holder.
13. Transfer of Permits
9
Transformation and black economic empowerment are some of the factors that will be taken
into account when permits are issued. The Delegated Authority, in transferring a permit, must
be satisfied that the application for a transfer of a permit will not result in the undermining of
the transformation objectives of the Department in the BBWW industry, especially by
allocating the transferred permit to applicants who do not satisfy the transformation criteria.
There will be a one year moratorium on the transfer of permits, during which time the
Department will develop a regulatory framework to manage the transfer of permits.
10
| Translation - Afrikaans
DEPARTEMENT VAN OMGEWINGSAKE EN TOERISME
No. _._2008
WET OP MARIENE LEWENDE HULPBRONNE, 1998 (WET NR. 18 VAN 1998)
BELEID OP WALVIS- EN DOLFYNKYKERY VANAF ’N BOOT
Ek, Marthinus van Schalkwyk., Minister van Omgewingsake en Toerisme, publiseer hiervolgens die Beleid op Walvis- en Dolfynkykery vanaf ’n Boot in die Rooster vir algemene inligting.
MARTHINUS VAN SCHALKWYK
MINISTER VAN OMGEWINGSAKE EN TOERISME
DEPARTEMENT VAN OMGEWINGSAKE EN TOERISME
TAK: MARIENE EN KUSBESTUUR
BELEID OP WALVIS- EN DOLFYNKYKERY VANAF BOTE
April 2008
Hierdie beleid is ook op www.mcm-deat.gov.za beskikbaar.
Inhoudsopgawe
1. Inleiding 5
2. Agtergrond van die ontwikkeling van die bedryf 5
3. Vorige bestuurspogings om walviskykery te reguleer 6
4. Beleidsoogmerke 6
5. Implementasie van die beleid 7
6. Permitte 7
7. Optimale sosio-ekonomiese voordele 8
8. Vaartuie 8
9. Verantwoordelikhede 9
10. Voortdurende aansoeke om permitte 9
11. Eksperimentele permitte in die Plettenbergbaai-omgewing 9
12. Waarnemer-program 9
13. Oordrag van Permitte 9
14. Aanhangsel A: Maatstawwe vir die toekenning van BBWW-permitte
15. Aanhangsel B: Aantal bedryfsgebiede
16. Aanhangsel C: Aansoekproses
Woordelys
Departement Die Departement van Omgewingsake en Toerisme.
Minister Die Minister van Omgewingsake en Toerisme.
Visserybeheerbeampte Enige bekleër van die pos Visserybeheerbeampte wat deur die Minister in terme van die Wet op Mariene Lewende Hulpbronne, 1998 (Wet Nr. 18 van 1998) aangewys is.
Walviskykery vanaf ’n boot Die waarneming van walvisse en dolfyne vanaf (BBWW) seevaartuie
Gedelegeerde gesag ’n Persoon aan wie gesag gedelegeer is in terme van deel 79 van die Wet op Mariene Lewende Hulpbronne, 1998 (Wet Nr. 18 van 1998).
Gepaste BBWW-vaartuig ’n Vaartuig wat deur SAMVO geregistreer is as gepas vir BBWW.
BBWW Walvis- en dolfynkykery vanaf ’n boot
DEAT Departement van Omgewingsake en Toerisme
HMBs Histories minderbevoorregtes
MKB Departementele Tak: Mariene en Kusbeheer
WMLH Wet op Mariene Lewende Hulpbronne, 1998 (Wet Nr. 18 van 1998)
SAMVO Suid-Afrikaanse Maritieme Veiligheidsowerheid, wetlike liggaam wat gestig is in terme van die Wet op Suid-Afrikaanse Maritieme Veiligheidsowerheid, 1998, (Wet Nr. 5 van 1998)
BBWW-beleid Beleid op Walvis- en Dolfynkykery vanaf ’n Boot
VMS Vaartuig-moniteringstelsel
1. Inleiding
Hierdie beleid op Walvis- en Dolfynkykery vanaf ’n Boot (BBWW-beleid) word uitgereik deur die Minister van Omgewingsake en Toerisme in terme van die Wet op Mariene Lewende Hulpbronne, 1998 (Wet Nr. 18 van 1998) (die WMLH). Die WMLH, ’n wet vir die bewaring van die mariene ekosisteem en die langtermyn volhoubare benutting van mariene lewende hulpbronne, voorsien die wetgewende raamwerk vir die beheer van die ontginning van mariene lewende hulpbronne om te verseker dat die volhoubare gebruik en ontginning daarvan op ’n regverdige en billike manier geskied. Hierdie beleid word saam met ‘n stel Regulasies vir Walvis- en Dolfynkykery vanaf ’n Boot (die BBWW-regulasies) uitgereik.
2. Agtergrond tot die ontwikkeling van die bedryf
Walviskykery vanaf ’n boot (BBWW), die waarneming van walvisse vanaf seevaartuie, is ’n bedrywigheid wat regoor die wêreld vinnig groei. Hierdie bedrywigheid genereer aansienlike ekonomiese voordele vir kusgemeenskappe en voorsien opvoedkundige voordele vir diegene met ’n belangstelling in die walvisagtiges (vir ontspannings- sowel as navorsingsdoeleindes). Dit het in 1955 as ’n kommersiële bedrywigheid in Noord-Amerika begin, en het die mees aanvaarbare volhoubare gebruik geword van die walvisagtiges-hulpbron wat met Agenda 21 versoenbaar is. Hierdie kommersiële bedrywigheid het in die 1990s aansienlik gegroei totdat dit ’n afsonderlike bedryf in die ekotoerisme-sektor geword het. Tussen 1991 en 1992was daar ongeveer 50 lande wat BBWW beoefen het, 65 in 1998 en 87 in 2002, wat meer as 500 kusgemeenskappe tot voordeel deur die skepping van werksgeleenthede gestrek het.
BBWW dra tans meer as eenmiljard Amerikaanse dollar tot die ekonomieë van kuslande regoor die wêreld by. Japan het in 1998 met walviskykery begin en het nou jaarliks meer as 100 000 walviskykers, waarvan die meeste Japannees is. In Noorweë is walviskykery ’n noemenswaardige toeristeaantreklikheid, en walviskykers het in 1998 meer as 12 miljoen Amerikaanse dollar daaraan gespandeer (Berrow, 2003).
3. Vorige bestuurspogings om walviskykery te reguleer
In Suid-Afrika is BBWW vir die eerste keer gereguleer in 1998 toe driejaar-eksperimentele permitte uitgereik is. In 1998/9 is 20 bedryfsgebiede opsygesit, wat toegeneem het tot 25 in 2001/2. Dolfynkykery is nie in die verlede gereguleer nie, behalwe tot ‘n baie beperkte mate en indirek deur die regulasies van BBWW-vaartuie. In die verlede is min vereistes voorgeskryf vir die uitreiking van BBWW-permitte. Permitte is uitgereik aan natuurlike sowel as regspersone wat die burgerskap-vereistes nagekom het (d.w.s. applikante moes Suid-Afrikaners wees). In 2001 is bykomende vereistes, soos die goedkeuring van genomineerde vaartuie deur SAMVO en die kwalifikasies vir kapteins en gidse, voorgeskryf. Die permitte/vrystellings van die huidige operateurs sal verstryk wanneer nuwe toekennings gemaak word. Hierdie operateurs word in hierdie beleidsdokument huidige permithouers genoem.
4. Beleidsoogmerke
Die oogmerke van hierdie beleid is:
• Om ’n regulerende raamwerk te voorsien vir die beskerming van walvisse en dolfyne.
• Om die Suid-Afrikaanse BBWW-bedryf uit te brei deur die toekenning van ’n groter aantal permitte;
• Om die BBWW-bedryf te omskep.
5. Implementasie van die beleid
5.1. Regulering van die BBWW-bedryf
Verantwoordelike walvis- en dolfynkykery is ‘n belangrike oogmerk van hierdie beleid. Die Departement sal, deur middel van sy BBWWregulasies of ander geskikte maniere, walvis- en dolfynkyk-ondernemings sonder ’n permit (en die advertering van sulke ondernemings) verbied. Die Departement sal die vereistes vir kwalifikasie uiteensit (Sien Aanhangsel A) wat die volgende sal insluit:
i. Akkreditasie van ’n vaartuig en die kaptein daarvan;
ii. Veiligheidsmaatreëls vir die kliënte;
iii. Toerismestandaarde wat deur operateurs nagekom moet word;
iv. Gedrag van kliënte ten opsigte van walvisagtiges.
5.2. Transformasie van die BBWW-bedryf
Om transformasie te bevorder, sal die Departement aksies of toestande voorskryf wat hierdie oogmerk sal aanmoedig. Faktore wat oorweeg sal word, sluit in die instelling van beperkings op aandeelbelang of beherende belang in Maatskappye of Beslote Korporasies wat permitte toegeken is. As die meerderheid aandele verkoop en/of die beherende belang van ’n maatskappy of beslote korporasie verander word, tot so ’n mate dat die ekwiteit op grond waarvan die permit uitgereik is, nie meer bestaan nie, sal dit beskou word as ’n verandering van eienaarskap beskou word, en ’n oordrag van ’n permit moet dus aan die voorwaardes in paragraaf 14 hieronder voldoen. Oordrag van ’n permit sonder die gesag van die Departement sal dalk daartoe lei dat die permit gekanselleer word. Hierdie vereiste sal deel vorm van die permitvoorwaardes. Wanneer permitaansoeke oorweeg word, sal voorkeur gegee word aan die applikant wie se onderneming die grootste impak in terme van transformasie en swart ekonomiese bemagtiging het.
5.3. Groei van die BBWW industry
Die Departement sal groei van die bedryf bevorder. Dit sal ook daarna streef om die ontwikkeling van hierdie bedrywigheid aan te spoor waar dit nog nie aan die gang gekom het nie.
6. Permitte
Permitte sal vir aangewese gebiede uitgereik word. Die aanwysing van bedryfsgebiede en die aantal daarvan sal bekend gemaak word deur ’n voorlopige bestuursplan wat aanpasbaar is en toelaat vir terugvoering van wetenskaplike studies. Die aanwysing van gebiede en die aantal permitte wat toegeken sal word, sal van tyd tot tyd hersien en aangepas word, na gelang van wetenskaplike grondslae. Permitte sal slegs onder deel 13 van die WMLH toegeken word vir ’n maksimum tydperk van een (1) jaar. Suksesvolle permithouers sal elke jaar vir ’n tydperk van vyf (5) jaar vandat dit aanvanklik toegeken is, hulle permitte weer ontvang, mits hulle die permitvoorwaardes ten volle nagekom het.
Vyf (5) jaar ná die datum van die eerste toekennings sal die aantal BBWW-operateurs nagegaan word. ’n Nuwe uitnodiging tot aansoeke sal gevolglik elke vyf jaar plaasvind (sien paragraaf 10).
Elke BBWW-permit sal uitgereik word onderworpe aan voorwaardes wat nodig geag word om die oogmerke van hierdie beleid te bereik. Enige permitvoorwaardes kan van tyd tot tyd gewysig word.
7. Optimale sosio-ekonomiese voordele
Wanneer permitaansoeke oorweeg word, sal die Minister of gedelegeerde gesag voorkeur gee aan die applikant wie se onderneming die grootste impak in terme van sosio-ekonomiese voordele sal hê.
8. Vaartuie
’n Geskikte BBWW-vaartuig is een wat:
o deur SAMVO geregistreer is as geskik vir BBWW; en
toegerus is met ’n werkende vaartuig-moniteringstelsel.
Dit is belangrik dat vaartuie wat behoorlik omskep is, vir walvis- en dolfynkyk-reise gebruik word.
Daar sal van operateurs vereis word om bewys te lewer dat hulle sulke vaartuie het en van plan is om dit te gebruik, en daar sal van hulle verwag word om ’n breedvoerige beskrywing van die genomineerde vaartuig te voorsien.
Vaartuie wat die hulpbron die minste versteur, is wensliker uit ’n bestuursoogpunt, en die vervanging van ouer vaartuie met moderne, koste-effektiewe vaartuie wat beter fasiliteite aan betalende kliënte bied, sal dus aangemoedig word.
Elke suksesvolle applikant sal beperk word tot twee vaartuie per permit, spesifiek die vaartuie wat op die aansoekvorm gemeld word. Die permitvoorwaardes sal egter die gelyktydige gebruik van die vaartuie vir BBWW-doelwitte verbied. Indien die permithouer later die gespesifiseerde vaartuig/tuie wil verander, sal die permithouer die Departement van die verandering in kennis moet stel en bewys moet lewer dat die vaartuig deur SAMVO gesertifiseer is as geskik vir BBWW.
Indien die verandering van vaartuig plaasvind sonder SAMVO se sertifisering, sal die permithouer nie toegelaat word om sake te bedryf totdat SAMVO die vervangende vaartuig formeel sertifiseer as veilig vir BBWW-doeleindes.
9. Verantwoordelikhede
Die Departement van Omgewingsake en Toerisme is die enigste gesag vir die uitreik van permitte vir BBWW. Die erkende bedryfsliggaam sal oor bestuurskwessies geraadpleeg word.
10. Voortdurende aansoeke om permitte
Indien daar ’n vakante gebied is, sal ‘n permit dalk toegeken word aan enige ander persoon wat, in antwoord op ‘n uitnodiging wat in die Staatskoerant geplaas is, voldoen aan die maatstawwe wat uiteengesit is in hierdie beleid en die BBWW-regulasies.
11. Eksperimentele permitte in Plettenbergbaai-omgewing
Drie eksperimentele dolfynkyk-permitte sal binne die volgende vyf jaar in die Plettenbergbaai-omgewing uitgereik word. Vir die duur van die eksperiment sal bykomende beperkings moontlik op BBWW-operateurs in die gebied geplaas word. ’n Ander, oop en deursigtige proses sal gevolg word vir die toekenning van hierdie permitte. ’n BBWW-operateur wat reeds ‘n permit het, kan ook vir ‘n eksperimentele permit aansoek doen.
12. Waarnemer-program
Alle permithouers moet op geskrewe versoek van die Departement waarnemers dra. Die onkoste om die waarnemer aan boord te akkommodeer, sal vir die permithouer se rekening wees.
13. Oordrag van permitte
Transformasie en swart ekonomiese bemagtiging is ’n paar van die faktore wat in ag geneem sal word wanneer permitte uitgereik word. Die Delegerende Gesag, moet, wanneer dit ’n permit oordra, tevrede wees dat die aansoek om ’n oordrag van ’n permit nie sal lei tot die ondermyning van die transformasie-oogmerke van die Departement in die BBWW-bedryf nie, veral nie deur die oorgedraagde permit toe te ken aan applikante wat nie aan die transformasie-maatstawwe voldoen nie.
Daar sal ’n moratorium van een jaar wees op die oordrag van permitte, waartydens die Departement ‘n regulerende raamwerk sal ontwikkel om die oordrag van permitte te beheer.
| English to Afrikaans: SATI Counsel Briefs
General field: Other
Detailed field: Business/Commerce (general) | Source text - English
Council Briefs
The SATI Executive held its latest meeting on 4 June 2009. Below is a summary of the major items of discussion.
2009 elections
The results of the electronic voting that had taken place in preparation for the AGM were discussed. The ballot had been sent to 205 members (accredited, paid-up members) and 90 responses were received (a 43,9% return rate). The constitution requires that a minimum of 20 per cent of the voting members must participate for the results of the election to be valid.
The results for the various motions were as follows:
1. Fees 2010
Motion: It is proposed that the various fees for 2010 be set as follows:
That the entrance fee for 2010 be increased from R75 to R80 (a 6,7% increase)
= 90% agreement
That the subscription for individual members for 2010 be increased from R470 to R500 (a 6,5% increase)
= 71,1% agreement
That the subscription for student members for 2010 be increased from R140 to R150 (a 7,1% increase)
= 80% agreement
That the fee for inclusion in the Internet register in 2010 be increased from R90 to R95 (a 5,5% increase)
= 86,7% agreement
That the accreditation examination fee for 2010 be increased from R610 to R650 (a 6,57% increase)
= 78,9% agreement
That the practice test fee for 2010 be increased from R255 to R270 (a 5,9% increase)
= 78,9% agreement
2. New constitution
Motion: It is proposed that the new constitution proposed by the SATI Executive be accepted and that the Institute operate in terms of it from the 2009 AGM
= 95,5% agreement
3. Changes to chapter regulations and disciplinary procedure related to the constitutional changes
Motion: It is proposed that if the new constitution is accepted the following global changes be made to the SATI Chapter Regulations and the SATI Disciplinary Procedure to bring them into line with the new constitution
That references to the SATI Executive be changed to the SATI Council
That the term of office of chapter committee members (currently two years) be changed to three years in line with the term of office of Council members
That references to the SATI Treasurer be changed to the Executive Director of SATI
That references to the SATI Registrar be changed to the Executive Director of SATI
That the SATI Disciplinary Procedure be changed so that complaints are investigated by the standing Committee on Ethics rather than an ad hoc Disciplinary Committee
= 89,8% agreement
4. Ratification of new council
Motion: It is proposed that if the new constitution is accepted the newly elected council members be declared duly elected and authorized to operate in terms of the new dispensation
= 94,3% agreement
The Executive was delighted that the overwhelming majority had voted in favour of the proposed new constitution and the changes to the SATI structure.
SATI structure
In terms of the constitution, the new Council was elected. As the number of nominations received for the Council had been the same as the number of positions, members had not been required to vote on the matter. Anne-Marie Beukes was elected chairperson by the Council members and Johan Blaauw was elected vice-chair. The other Council members are Manzo Khulu, Michelle Rabie and Beverley Boland. Members will find out a little about all the Council members in the next issue of the Bulletin.
Marion Boers accepted the appointment of Executive Director. As Executive Director, Marion remains an ex officio member of the Council. A contract will be drawn up between Marion and SATI, in terms of which she will run the SATI office, incorporating the functions of the previous portfolios of registrar, treasurer and secretary. The intention is eventually to set up a permanent SATI office. Irene Dippenaar will continue to assist the office with functions relating to membership and Beverley Boland will continue to assist with administrative tasks.
The outgoing Executive members, Irene Dippenaar (in absentia), Wilna Liebenberg and Marion Boers, were thanked for their contribution and the new Council members warmly welcomed.
Over the coming months the Council will deliberate on which ad hoc committees should be set up to improve services to members. Members are encouraged to suggest the types of committees they would like to see formed. The Ethics and Accreditation committees are the only two standing committees in terms of the constitution; the Council will appoint these committees in due course.
SATI Prize for Outstanding Translation
Much of the discussion at the meeting revolved around the 2009 SATI Prize. The Council agreed that all the nominations that had been received met the requirements of the rules of the Prize. Thirteen entries were received in the Literary category, five entries in the Non-Fiction category, four entries in the Children’s Literature category, one entry in the Service Translation category, and eleven entries in the Dictionaries category. The Council decided who to approach to sit on each of the judging panels and the judging criteria were finalised.
SATI has received a generous sponsorship for the prize money of R50 000 from the Nasou-Via Afrika Group.
The prize-giving ceremony will take place on 2 October 2009 at the University of Johannesburg. The event will include a prominent guest speaker and a light lunch – diarise the event and spread the word!
Training needs
Representatives from the Training Committee (Jackie Naudé and Kobus Marais) had been invited to join the meeting in the afternoon to discuss the survey that they had conducted earlier in the year with regard to members’ needs for training. The results of the survey are being analysed and will be made available to members in due course, along with the conclusions reached on how SATI can go about meeting members’ needs. | Translation - Afrikaans
Raadsbrokkies
Die SAVI-Bestuur het sy laaste vergadering op 4 Junie 2009 gehou. Hieronder is ’n opsomming van die hoofbesprekingspunte.
Verkiesing vir 2009
Die resultate van die elektroniese verkiesing wat ter voorbereiding vir die AJV gehou is, is bespreek. Die stembrief is na 205 lede (geakkrediteerde en opbetaalde lede) gestuur, en 90 antwoorde is ontvang (’n antwoordkoers van 43,9%). Volgens die grondwet moet ’n minumum van 20 persent van die stemlede deelneem sodat die resultate van die verkiesing geldig kan wees.
Die resultate van die verskillende mosies is soos volg:
1. Gelde 2010
Mosie: Daar word voorgestel dat die gelde vir 2010 soos volg vasgestel word:
Dat die toetreegeld vir 2010 vanaf R75 tot R80 verhoog word (’n verhoging van 6,7%)
= 90% eenparigheid
Dat ledegeld vir individuele lede vir 2010 van R470 na R500 verhoog word (’n verhoging van 6,5%)
= 71,1% eenparigheid
Dat ledegeld vir studentelede vir 2010 van R140 na R150 verhoog word (’n verhoging van 7,1%)
= 80% eenparigheid
Dat die gelde vir insluiting op die Internet-register in 2010 vanaf R90 tot R95 verhoog word (’n verhoging van 5,5%)
= 86,7% eenparigheid
Dat die akkrediteringsgelde vir eksamens vir 2010 van R610 na R650 verhoog word (’n verhoging van 6,57%)
= 78,9% eenparigheid
Dat die akkrediteringsgelde vir oefentoetse vir 2010 van R255 na R270 verhoog word (’n verhoging van 5,9%)
= 78,9% eenparigheid
2. Nuwe grondwet
Mosie: Daar word voorgestel dat die nuwe grondwet wat deur die SAVI-bestuur voorgestel is, aanvaar word en dat die Instituut vanaf die 2009 AJV daarvolgens bedryf word
= 95,5% eenparigheid
3. Veranderinge aan afdelingsregulasies en dissiplinêre prosedure as gevolg van die grondwetwysigings
Mosie: Daar word voorgestel dat indien die nuwe grondwet aanvaar word, die volgende globale veranderinge aan SAVI se Afdelingsregulasies en Dissiplinêre Prosedure aanvaar word om dit in ooreenstemming met die nuwe grondwet te bring
Dat verwysings na die SAVI-Bestuur verander word na die SAVI-Raad
Dat die ampstermyn van afdelingskomiteelede (tans twee jaar) verander word na drie jaar in ooreenstemming met die ampstermyn van Raadslede
Dat verwysings na die SAVI-Tesourier verander word na die Uitvoerende Direkteur van SAVI
Dat verwysings na die SAVI-Registrateur verander word na die Uitvoerende Direkteur van SAVI
Dat SAVI se Dissiplinêre Prosedure verander word sodat klagtes deur die staande Etiekkomitee ondersoek word en nie deur ’n ad hoc- Dissiplinêre Komitee nie
= 89,8% eenparigheid
4. Bekragtiging van nuwe raad
Mosie: Daar word voorgestel dat indien die nuwe grondwet aanvaar word, die nuutverkose raadslede as behoorlik verkose verklaar word en gemagtig word om ingevolge die nuwe bestel te handel
= 94,3% eenparigheid
Die Bestuur was baie bly dat die oorgrote meerderheid vir die voorgestelde nuwe grondwet en die veranderinge aan die SAVI-struktuur gestem het
SAVI-struktuur
Die Raad is in terme van die nuwe grondwet verkies. Aangesien die aantal nominasies dieselfde was as die aantal posisies, was dit vir lede nie nodig om hieroor te stem nie. Anne-Marie Beukes is as voorsitter deur die Raadslede gekies, met Johan Blaauw as visevoorsitter. Die ander Raadslede is Manzo Khulu, Michelle Rabie en Beverley Boland. Lede sal ’n bietjie meer oor al die Raadslede leer in die volgende uitgawe van die Bulletin.
Marion Boers het die aanstelling as Uitvoerende Direkteur aanvaar. As Uitvoerende Direkteur, bly Marion ’n ex officio-lid van die Raad. ’n Kontrak sal tussen Marion en SAVI opgetrek word, in terme waarvan sy die SAVI-kantoor sal bestuur en die funksies van die voormalige portefeuljes registrateur, tesourier en sekretaris sal verrig. Die oogmerk is om uiteindelik ’n permanente SAVI-kantoor op die been te bring. Irene Dippenaar sal nog steeds die kantoor help met funksies in verband met lidmaatskap, en Beverley Boland sal aanhou om bystand te bied met administratiewe take.
Die uittredende Bestuurslede, Irene Dippenaar (in absentia), Wilna Liebenberg en Marion Boers, is bedank vir hulle bydrae, en die nuwe Raadslede is hartlik verwelkom.
Oor die komende maande sal die Raad beraadslaag oor watter ad hoc- komitees van stapel gestuur moet word om dienste aan lede te verbeter. Lede word aangemoedig om voorstelle te maak aangaande watter soort komitees hulle graag gevorm wil hê. Die Etiek- en Akkreditasiekomitee is die enigste twee staande komitees in terme van die grondwet; die Raad sal mettertyd hierdie komitees aanstel.
SAVI-prys vir Voortreflike Vertaling
’n Groot deel van die bespreking by die vergadering het gedraai om die 2009 SAVI-prys. Die Raad het saamgestem dat al die nominasies wat ontvang is, aan die vereistes voldoen in verband met die reëls van die Prys. Dertien inskrywings is in die Letterkunde-kategorie ontvang, vyf inskrywings in die Niefiksie-kategorie, vier inskrywings in die Kinderliteratuur-kategorie, een inskrywing in die Diensvertaling-kategorie en elf inskrywings in die Woordeboeke-kategorie. Die Raad het besluit wie genader moet word om op elkeen van die beoordelingspanele te dien, en die beoordelingskriteria is gefinaliseer.
SAVI het ’n ruimhartige borgskap van die Nasou Via Afrika-groep ontvang vir die prysgeld van R50 000.
Die prysuitdelingseremonie sal op 2 Oktober 2009 by die Universiteit van Johannesburg gehou word. Daars sal ’n vooraanstaande gasspreker wees, en die geleentheid sal ’n ligte middagete insluit – teken dit in jou dagboek aan en laat almal weet!
Opleidingsbehoeftes
Verteenwoordigers van die Opleidingskomitee (Jackie Naudé en Kobus Marais) is genooi om aan te sluit by die middag se vergadering om die opname te bespreek wat hulle vroeër in die jaar uitgevoer het in verband met lede se behoeftes vir opleiding. Die resultate van die opname word ontleed en sal mettertyd aan lede beskikbaar gemaak word, tesame met die die gevolgtrekkings wat gemaak is oor hoe SAVI in die behoeftes van lede kan voorsien.
| Afrikaans to English: Rosmini on Individual Rights
General field: Social Sciences
Detailed field: Education / Pedagogy | Source text - Afrikaans
Rosmini oor Individuele regte
Die siel (rede) as voorloper van individuele regte (vanaf fetale- tot volwasse stadium)
Dr Nico P. Swartz : Senior lecturer.
Abstrak
Die vraag wat vandag gevra kan word, is: Wat is die relevansie van Rosmini se regsteorie oor individuele regte vir die mens van vandag? Rosmini se individuele regte het nie net sommer uit die lug geval nie. Hy uit die opinies van sommige Griekse skrywers tot ‘n gevolgtrekking gekom dat die siel weens die einskappe van onsterflikheid en beweeglikheid, goddelik van aard is en dien dit daarom as ontstaansbron van individuele regte. Rosmini meen, anders as Thomas Aquinas, dat die beskerming van individuele regte tot alle vlakke van die menslike bestaan moet deursypel: vanaf die fetale stadium tot by die mens se volwasse lewe. Hy glo in teenstelling met die Aristoteles-Thomistiese hylomorfisme-leer, dat die fetus selfs in die vroëe stadium, net soos die volwasse mens ook oor ‘n siel beskik en is dit geregtig op die beskerming van sy/haar individuele regte ingevolge die Grondwet van Suid-Afrika 108/1996. Op grond van die ingeskapenheid van die siel in die mens het Rosmini daarin geslaag om God as ontologiese verwysingsraamwerk vir die individuele regte van die mens te postuleer. Treffend is die beskrywing van die besondere waarde van die mens in Psalm 8: 6 “U het hom net ‘n bietjie minder as ‘n hemelse wese gemaak en hom met aansien en eer bekroon.” Die mens as beelddraer van God, word sodoende met individuele regte beklee, wat deur almal, selfs deur die staat gerespekteer moet word. Rosmini verwerp hiervolgens die leerstuk salus rei publicae suprema lex wat deur Thomas Aquinas onderseun word. Indien dié (salus reipublicae suprema lex) leerstuk gevolg gaan word, argumenteer Rosmini, sal die staat inbreuk op die individuele regte van die burgers maak. Hy glo origsins dat die staat juis ingestel is om die individuele regte van die burgers te beskerm. Rosmini argumenteer derhalwe dat die belange van die staat die beste gedien word indien die belange van die burgers éérs beskerm word.
DIE SIEL
1 Inleiding
Die studie van die antropologie fundeer die fundamentele konsep van die siel as die duplikaat van die mens. Dit is daarom moontlik om die stappe waarvolgens tot só ‘n bevinding gekom word, na te spoor. Enersyds, was aktiwiteite in die mens aanduidend van die siel se teenwoordigheid in (hom/haar), maar by sy afsterwe, word die afwesigheid daarvan in die mens beklemtoon. Andersyds, was die siel ook beskou as ‘n konkrete materiële entiteit, ‘n miniatuur deel van die liggaam, dat dit in drome gesien word, in skadu’s en refleksies, en dat dit kom en gaan in die liggaam van die mens. By die afsterwe van die mens skei dit derhalwe van die liggaam. Dat die siel die liggaam oorleef was algemeen aanvaar: “The opening lines of the Iliad draw a sharp distinction between the heroes themselves, left a prey for dogs and vultures, and their souls, sent down to Hades […]” In die gedigte van Homer en latere digters word dieselfde oortuiging (as in die Iliad) net aangepas, soos in die geval van Hesoid waar die helde nie meer na die onderwêreld gaan nie, maar eerder na die Isles of the Blest waar hulle ‘n voordelige invloed op hul navolgers sou uitoefen.
In ons ondersoek oor die opinies van skrywers oor die siel is dit duidelik dat daar ooreenkomste sowel as verskille is. Desondanks die ooreenkomste en verskille, sal dié opinies bymekaar gemaak word om tewens ‘n geheelbeeld oor die siel te skets. Ons ondersoek word derhalwe afgeskop met wat algemeen aanvaar word as die natuurlike eienskappe van die siel. Twéé eienskappe van die siel word beklemtoon, naamlik beweging en gewaarwording (sintuiglike gevoelshandeling). Dié eienskappe wat deur Griekse voorgangers aan ons nagelaat of oorgelewer is dui op die goddelikheid van die siel en sal dus as aanloop dien vir ons behandeling van die siel.
Rosmini sal derhalwe dié eienskappe van die siel só fundeer dat dit weldra as basis of objek van individuele regte in die menslike samelewing dien.
2 OPINIES VAN ANTIEKE SKRYWERS
Die Ioniërs, en Empedocles soek die bestaan van die siel in lug, aarde, water en vuur, wat die oorsaak van lewensfunksies is. Hulle beklee die siel met eienskappe van kennis, waarneming sowel as die vermoë om die liggaam te beweeg.
In die leerstellinge van die Atomiste beweer een van hul volgelinge Democritus, dat die heelal uit atome van verskillende groottes en vorme opgebou is. Die siel is nié ‘n uitsondering nie. Democrites en Heraclitus argumenteer byvoorbeeld dat die siel ‘n tipe vuur of hitte is. Heraclitus skryf: “[…] fire contained the elementary principle, that is, the substratum of everything, the universal agent.” Daardie “shapes” of atome wat sferies (bolvormig) is, is vir die Atomiste vuur en dus siel. Die eienskap van beweging word veronderstel.
Die leerstellinge van Pythagoras bevat dieselfde gedagtestrekking as dié van die Atomiste. Sommige Pythagoriërs identifiseer die siel met stofdeeltjies in die lug en, ander, met dit wat hierdie stofdeeltjies in beweging bring. Van hierdie stofdeeltjies word gesê dat dit in voortdurende beweging verkeer. Die siening van sommige skrywers wat die siel beskryf as dit wat dit self beweeg, val ook in dié kategorie. Bykans al hierdie denkers beskou beweging as die mees besonderse eienskap van die siel. Hulle verklaar: “Everything else […] is moved by the soul, but the soul is moved by itself.”
Anaxagoras beweer benewens die siel as bewegende beginsel, die element van gewaarwording ook konstitutief daarvan is. Hy is egter minder akkuraat in die gebruik van sy terme. In baie gevalle praat hy van die gedagte/rede (nous) as die oorsaak van goedheid en orde, terwyl hy dit (die nous) elders met die siel identifiseer. Hy skryf die nous aan alle lewende wese toe. Dit beteken dat benewens die mens, diere ook oor rede beskik.
Empedocles ondermyn die element van gewaarwording (sintuie) en meen dié element is onvolmaak. Dit is duidelik dat hy albei aanvaarde eienskappe van die siel, beweging en gewaarwording veronagsaam en ‘n heterodokse koers inslaan, deur die siel te fundeer in die element van bloed. Empedocles beweer dat bloed uit die elemente lug, water, aarde en vuur saamgestel is. Rosmini haal ‘n aanhaling van Tertullianus aan: “Empedocles […] form the soul out of blood.” Volgens Rosmini sou Tertullianus en ander (byvoorbeeld Plinius) laasgenoemde opinie van Homer afgelei het.
Plato het ook die siel uit hierdie vier elemente gekonstrueer. Hy fundeer die siel in nommers of syfers. Die nommers of syfers wat volgens hom die siel is, is ook sy idees (idee-leer). Hierdie idee-nommers is die vorm van dinge, byvoorbeeld, die siel: “[…] the self-animal or universe is made up of the idea of One, […] of the idea-numbers Two, or primary length, Three, primary breadth, and Four, primary dept […] reason is the One, knowledge is the Two, […] opinion is the number of a surface , Three, and sensation the number of a sold Four. […] the numbers are the ideas themselves.” Plato konstrueer uit sy idee-leer, die siel, wat vermoedelik uit albei eienskappe, beweging en gewaarwording, saamgestel is: “[…] since the soul was held to be thus cognitive as well as capable of causing motion, [Plato] combined the two and defined the soul as a self-moving number.”
Democritus beskou net soos Anaxagoras, die siel as identies met die gedagte/rede (nous) en argumenteer op grond daarvan dat dit die oorsaak van beweging is. Heelwaarkynlik is die element van gewaarwording ook van toepassing.
Thales beklemtoon net soos Democritus, die siel as die oorsaak van beweging. Hy argumnteer dat die magneetsteen oor ‘n siel beskik omdat dit yster-objekte aantrek. Hy laat derhalwe die eienskap van gewaarwording weg.
Diogenes van Apollonia was nie tevrede met die oplossing wat Anaxagoras (wat beweer het die siel is die nous [gedagte/rede) gelewer het nie. Hy ondersteun die teorie van die Ioniërs, by name Anaximenes, Archelaus en Diogenes, wat lug as die primêre element (siel) geïdentifiseer het. Hulle skryf: “All creatures, live and see and hear by the same thing (viz air) and from the same thing all derive their intelligense as well.” Lug wat ‘n belangrike rol in persepsie en denke speel, is vir hom die siel. Weereens word die eienskap van beweging veronderstel.
Heraclitus identifiseer siel met damp/wasem waardeur alle dinge ontspring. Stoom/wasem is die laaste liggaamlike toestand van dinge en verkeer in voortdurende veranderlikheid. Alles wat bestaan verkeer in beweging.
Alcmaeon van Croton het ‘n soortgelyke opinie as dié van Heraclitus. Hy handhaaf dat die siel onsterflik is, omdat dit voortdurend in beweging verkeer. Hy skryf die voortdurende staat van beweging aan die maan, son, sterre, die hemel ensovoorts toe, en noem dit goddelik. Dit is die siel.
Vir Hippo is die siel water. Die rede hiervoor is dat in alle lewende wese saad nat/vogtig is. Hy verwerp die opinie van Empedocles as hy argumenteer dat saad nie bloed is nie. Saad is dus vir hom die onontwikkelde siel.
Critias vereenselwig hom met Empedocles teen Hippo as hy sê dat die siel bloed is. Hy verskil egter van Empedocles in die sin dat hy nie aarde as die samestelling van die onderskeie komponente vir die vorming van bloed insluit nie. Origsins vertoon sy opinies parallele met dié van Empedocles.
Parmenides fundeer die ontstaan van die siel in verwekking en verval. Dit dui op voortdurende beweging. Sy teorie van verwekking en verval sal dien as voorloper vir Aristoteles-Thomas Aquinas se hylomorfisme-leer.
In die Christelike godsdienstige opvatting beskou die Bybel die siel as asem “breath.” Rosmini skryf: “[The] soul was infused by breath from the mouth of God.” Tertullianus assosieer hom met hierdie opinie. Hy sê: “The soul is substantially breath, but form its effect it is called spirit because it breathes.”
In afsluiting van die opinies van die antieke skrywers is bepaal dat die opinies van Hippo, Empedocles en Critias nie voldoen het aan die eienskappe, beweging en gewaarwording, wat algemeen vir die siel gestel is nie. So ook die opinies van Anagoras wat aan diere ‘n siel toeskryf en Democritus wat meen dat ‘n regsobjek soos byvoorbeeld ‘n steen ook ‘n siel het. Dit blyk dat Rosmini enersyds met betrekking tot die bewgingsbeginsel met sommige filosowe saamstem, en andersyds verskil hy van hulle wat beweer dat die siel net materie is. Hy skryf enersyds teen die opvatting dat die siel materie is: “[…] the human soul is entirely devoid of all matter,” en “[…] true opposition between the consept of soul and that of matter.” Met betrekking tot die bewegingsbeginsel waarmee hy met sommige antieke filosowe saamstem skryf hy: “Soul is the principle of an act […] soul as principle is mover, but is not mobile.” Alhoewel hy in beginsel die teorie van die antieke filosowe aanvaar oor die beweeglikheid, is hy egter van mening dat die siel onbeweeglik is. Die siel beweeg nie, dit is eerder die liggaam wat verander en nie die siel nie. Rosmini erken nietemin dat dié twee eienskappe van die siel naamlik, beweging en gewaarwording, konstitutief vir die siel is.
Met die oog op die goddelikheid van die siel, sou Rosmini (en Aristoteles) heelwaarskynlik die opinies van Alcmaeon, Democritus en Anaxagoras kon aanvaar, wat gemeen het dat die siel onsterflik en identies met die rede is: “eternal and divine.” Rosmini argumenteer (soos bo genoem) dat ‘n substans, byvoorbeeld die siel, wat nie oor ‘n liggaamlike entiteit beskik nie (onsterflik) is, ‘n gees is. Hy noem dié gees oneindig en meen dat dit nie menslik kan wees nie, maar goddelik: “The infinite is found in man only by having recourse to ideal being which […] is not part of man himself.” Rosmini haal Iamblichus aan: “The very unity of the gods (these gods are the ideas) unites souls to themselves,” en skryf ten opsigte van die mens: “Each one knows that he is finite.”
3 DIE MENS AS SAMESTELLING VAN SIEL EN LIGGAAM
Die onbeweeglikheid van die siel het Rosmini afgelei uit die vorm/materie en akt-potensie-leer van Aristoteles. In dié leer is gepoog om die mens as samestelling van siel en liggaam te bewerkstellig. Materie word analoog aan potensialiteit en vorm aan aktualiteit gestel. Hierin word die siel en liggaam teenoormekaar afgespeel. Die bevinding was dat die liggaam nie die siel is nie. Dit is wel materie (potensialiteit), terwyl die siel die vorm van die liggaam (aktualiteit) is: “[The] soul is the first actuality of a natural body having in it the capacity of life.” Rosmini stem saam: “In the composite, soul is the form, body the matter of the human being.” Origsins is die siel volgens Rosmini en Aristoteles nie onafhanklik van die liggaam nie. Hulle skryf: “[Those] perishable creatures which possess reason […] are endowed with […] a soul” en “If the soul is a substance altogether different from the body, we cannot infer the death of the soul from the death of the body.” Uit hoofde hiervan kom hulle tot die gevolgtrekking dat die mens ‘n samestelling van materie (potensialiteit) en vorm (aktualiteit) is: “[…] the body is essentially bound […] to the soul [and] imitates the life of the soul.” Die mens is dus nie alleen siel of liggaam nie, maar is siel en liggaam saam. Dit beteken dat indien die vraag ten opsigte van die mens gestel word, naamlik wat bestaan hier? Sal die antwoord nie soseer: “’n Siel of ‘n liggaam bestaan hier, nie, maar liewers “’n Mens bestaan hier.” Op dieselgde wyse sê ons nie byvoorbeeld: “My gedagte glo,” of my hand speel die piano nie, maar sê ons eerder: “Ek glo” of “ek speel.” Die mens as eenheid van siel en liggaam blyk uit Rosmini se teologiese en filosofiese standpunte in die Anthropologia in Servizio en Psicologia. Hiermee word die mens as samestelling van siel en liggaam afgesluit.
4 DIE GODDELIKHEID VAN DIE SIEL/MENS
Rosmini tree met Aristoteles en Thomas Aquinas in debat oor die goddelikheid van die siel. Hy argumenteer dat die menslike siel uit twee komponente bestaan: ‘n liggaamlike (natuurlike) sowel as ‘n intellektuele (goddelike) siele-deel. In die menslike liggaam word (soos reeds gemeld) dié twee siele-dele tot ‘n eenheid saamgesnoer, sodat die mens net oor één siel beskik: “[…] the soul is one in each human being […] not two or more.” Sowel Rosmini as die Aristoteles-Thomisme gaan van die standpunt uit dat die mens oor méér as een siele-deel beskik, maar Rosmini remedieer die posisie as hy meen dat die liggaamlike (natuurlike) met die intellektuele (goddelike) siele-deel verenig en laasgenoemde (die goddelike) die resultaat van dié samesmelting is. Die twee siele-dele verkeer in wisslewerking in die mens, die een siele-deel verval nie en word nie deur ‘n meer ontwikkelde siele-deel gevolg nie, maar bestaan gelyktydig totdat dit kulmineer in ‘n intellektuele (goddelike) siel, wat die vorm van die mens aanneem. Thomas Aquinas is egter deur Aristoteles beïnvloed en het vervolgens die leer van die hylomorfisme van Aristoteles aanvaar. Ingevolge dié leer onderskei Thomas Aquinas net soos Rosmini (twee siele-dele) en Aristoteles drie siele-dele. Die hylomorfisme behels dat ‘n vegetatiewe siele-deel verval en deur ‘n meer ontwikkelde siel, die sensitiewe siele-deel vervang word, wat weer verval en uiteindelik in ‘n rasionele siele-deel (in die mens) kulmineer. Rosmini ondersteun dus insgelyks nie dié hylomorfistiese gedagtestrekking van die Aristoteles-Thomisme nie.
Nadat één siel in die mens geïdentifiseer is, moet ons die goddelikheid daarvan ondersoek. Omdat die siel nie ‘n liggaamlike entiteit is nie, moet dit derhalwe goddelik wees. Rosmini skryf: “But a sybstance which has no bodily or material property is called ‘spiritual’ or spirit. The human soul, therefore, is a spirit.” Die konsep goddelikheid vind noodwendig aansluiting met onsterflikheid. Die woord “dood” verwys slegs na ‘n liggaamlike (natuurlike) entiteit: “[…] it would be absurd to attribute it to what is not body.” Omdat goddelikheid op nie-liggaamlikheid dui, is eersgenoemde nie aan die dood onderworpe nie. Rosmini konkludeer deur te sê dat die siel goddelik en derhalwe onsterflik is. Uit hoofde van die feit dat die mens die eenheid van siel en liggaam is en dat die siel derhalwe die deurslag gee, kan daar afgelei word dat die mens dus ‘n goddelike wese is. Treffend is die beskrywing van die besondere waarde van die mens in Psalm 8: 6 “U het hom net ‘n bietjie minder as ‘n hemelse wese gemaak en hom met aansien en eer gekroon.”
Met die oog op die goddelikheid van die mens, sou Rosmini heelwaarskynlik die opinies van Alcmaeon, Democritus en Anaxagoras kon aanvaar, wat gemeen het dat die siel onsterflik en identies met die rede is: “eternal and divine.” Hy skryf vervvolgens: “The infinite is found in man only by having recourse to ideal being which […] is not part of man himself.” En haal vervolgens vir Iamblichus aan: “The very unity of the gods […] unites souls to themselves.” Uit hoofde van die siel se goddelike eienskappe, word die mens derhalwe as ‘n goddelike wese beskou.
5 MENSLIKE/FETALE LEWE
Onder invloed van die hylomorfisme ontken Thomas Aquinas dat die siel (menslike lewe) by konsepsie begin. Dit het veroorsaak dat hy met Rosmini in debat verkeer. In die aanloop tot die debat tussen Rosmini en Thomas Aquinas, skryf Rosmini ten opsigte van laasgenoemde: “[…] the difference between the perfecting of nature […] makes many [Thomas Auinas among them] err in their judgments and speculation about movement towards human perfection.” Hy skryf vervolgens: “People sometimes show enthusiasm for things which perfect human nature but do not improve the human person.” Dit is volgens Rosmini inderdaad die geval met Thomas Aquinas.
5. 1 VERSKILLENDE STADIA VAN MENSLIKE/FETALE LEWE
Thomas Aquinas argumenteer dat ‘n fetus nie as ‘n mens beskou kan word nie, omdat dit nie oor ‘n siel beskik nie. Hy verklaar: “[This= human life] does not occur until the fetus has developed its brain and sensory systems to the point where it can support the distinctive intellectual capacities of a human being.” Sy persepsie oor wanneer lewe begin, word gevorm deur sy siening dat materiële entiteite (mense) uit hoofde van die siel oor lewe beskik. Hy skryf: “[Until] the fetus has a human soul, it is not a human being, no matter what the underlying biology looks like.” Rosmini stem met Aquinas saam dat die siel lewe-gewende entiteit is, maar verskil egter van hom, as hy (Rosmini) meen dat die fetus vanaf konsepsie ook oor ‘n (menslike) siel beskik: “Primal, hidden, initial life […] never perishes.” Hiermee verwerp Rosmini Thomas Aquinas se argument dat voordat daar ‘n siel bestaan, daar eers ‘n fetale ontwikkelingsgang moet plaasvind, waarvolgens die vegetatiewe (plant) siele-deel verval en gevolg word deur ‘n meer ontwikkelde sintuiglike (dierlike) siele-deel wat tot niet gaan en waarna dit in ‘n rasionele (intellektuele) siel of die mens kulmineer. Eers by laasgenoemde ontwikkelingsgang het ‘n mens, volgens Aquinas eers te doen met ‘n menslike wese, waarin die siel oor ‘n volkome liggaam en ontwikkelde brein beskik om mee te handel. Aquinas beweer dat gedurende die vroëe stadium van swangerskap (anima vegetative en die anima sensitive) beskik die fetus nie oor daardie eienskappe (byvoorbeeld ‘n volkome liggaam en ontwikkelde brein) nie. Hy skryf dat, indien ‘n liggaam ontbreek daar nie ‘n siel en derhalwe ‘n menslike lewe kan wees nie. Anders gestel: Vóór die rasionele siel (anima rationalis) ingeskape kan word, sal die fetus nie oor die vermoë beskik om te kan dink nie. Volgens Aquinas is die fetus in die vroeëe stadium van swangerskap met ‘n plant en dier vergelykbaar, en is as sodanig nie ‘n mens nie. Soos reeds genoem erken Rosmini die bestaan van die siel reeds van die begin van ‘n fetus se lewe af (dit wil sê vanaf konsepsie) en is dit derhalwe vir hom ‘n menslike wese. Rosmini beklemtoon vervolgens die onsterflikheid van die siel. By Thomas Aquinas is die twee voorafgaande siele-dele egter sterflik. Rosmini argumenteer dat die siel nie verval nie en dat hulle eerder ‘n “[…] a harmonious stimulation in a perpetual cycle,” verkeer. Hy skryf derhalwe: “[…] the soul is immortal because life cannot lack life.” Omdat Rosmini bang is dat hy in dieselfde dilemma as Aquinas sal verval, beklemtoon hy dat die gevoels-element (dierlike) siele-deel in die rasionele (intellektuele siel) opgaan en dat laasgenoemde origsins die dueslag sal gee. Hiermee beklemtoon Rosmini weereens die eenheid van die menslike siel af en meen hy tewens dat daar nooit verskillende siele-dele bestaan nie : “the soul is one in each human being,” en argumenteer vervolgens: “[…] the unity of the soul disposes of the error requiring simultaneously three souls, animal, sensitive and intellective, which certain authors [soos byvoorbeeld Thomas Aquinas] have endeavoured to posit in human beings.” Rosmini sê in verband met die Aristoteles-Thomistiese hylomorfisme-leer: “Even granted the existence in human beings of a principle of vegetation and sensation distinct from myself, this principle would not be the human soul, but something different from it.”
Rosmini erken dus die bestaan van één siel wat ontwikkeling vertoon tot by die mens se uiteindelike geboorte.
Thomas Aquinas argumenteer gevolglik dat dit vir die rasionele siel onmoontlik is om op die oomblik van konsepsie by die mens ingeskape te kan wees. Hy beweer dat God nie ‘n rasionele siel by die fetus ingeskape sou wou hê nie. God sal eers die siel by die mens inskape op daardie tydstip wanneer die fetus voldoende ontwikkel het. Die vraag wat hier afgevra kan word is: Wanneer geskied daardie of sodanige tydstip? Volgens Aquinas het die fetus voldoende ontwikkel, gedurende middel swangerskap, dit wil sê die twintigste week van swangerskap. Dan het dit ‘n volkome liggaam en ontwikkelde brein: Dit is 40 dae vir mans en 90 dae vir vrouens. Die rasionele siel word eers op dié onderskei tydstipte by die verskillende geslagte ingeprent. Op dié onderskeie tydstipte sal die fetus in Thomistiese terme voldoende ontwikkel het en derhalwe as ‘n menslike wese beskou word. Gedurende die laat stadium van swangerskap, dit wil sê ná die twintigste week van swangerskap (besieling), het ons te make met ‘n menslike wese en word aborsie deur etiese oorwegings gestimuleer. Hiervolgens word aborsie gekriminaliseer en sal die neem van ‘n menslike lewe ‘n aantasting van individuele regte en gelykstaande aan moord wees. Thomas Aquinas beweer dus dat aborsie gedurende die vroeëe stadium van swangerskap toelaatbaar is, maar egter nie gedurende en ná die twintigste week van swangerskap nie. Met betrekking tot die Thomistiese onderskeid tussen vroeëe en laat stadium van swangerskap, het Thomas Aquinas in debat met Rosmini getree en het hy ‘n skending van die individuele reg van die fetus veroorsaak deur aborsie in die vroëe stadium van swangerskap toe te laat. Thomas Aquinas se benadering is ondanks Rosmini se afkeur daarvan, deur die Suid-Afrikaanse Wet op Keuse oor die Beëindiging van Swangerskap 92 van 1996 aangeneem.
Dit is duidelik dat Rosmini die mens en so ook die fetus as intellektuele (rasionele) wesens beskou. Rosmini verklaar derhalwe dat die Thomistiese onderskeid tussen vroëe en laat begin van lewe onwaar is en moet van minder belang geag word. Ondanks Rosmini se assosiasie met die Kerk magesterium, wat stilswyend is oor die oomblik wanneer lewe begin, argumenteer Rosmini, net soos die meerderheid Katolieke dat daar ‘n werklike mens vanaf die oomblik van konsepsie bestaan. Die kerk magesterium beskou die fetus as ‘n geskenk deur God aan die mens. Op grond van die godgegewe geskenk, moet die fetus sodoende met goddelike eienskappe beklee word, sélfs vanaf die oomblik van konsepsie. Dit behels dus dat die fetus gedurende die stadium van konsepsie ook oor individuele regte moet beskik, wat uit hoofde van artikel 11 (die reg op lewe) van die Grondwet van Suid-Afrika, wet 108 van 1996, deur almal gerespekteer moet word. Hiervolgens sal die pleeg van aborsie (ongeag watter stadium van swangerskap) dus ‘n inbreukmaking op die individuele regte van die fetus veronderstel.
6 NASCITURUS-FIKSIE
Rosmini verkeer in ‘n dilemma. Hy wil regsubjektiwiteit aan die fetus toeskryf, maar word ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse gemenereg verhoed om dit te doen omdat ‘n regsubjek in regstegniese sin op iemand dui wat met regte en verpligtinge beklee is. Dit beteken dat ondanks die feit dat die fetus ‘n intellektuele en rasionele wese is en dus oor ‘n siel het, dit steeds nie oor regsubjektiwiteit beskik nie. Ingevolge die Suid-Afrikaanse gemenereg begin die regsubjektiwiteit van ‘n natuurlike persoon éérs by sy geboorte. ‘n Ongebore kind is vir doeleindes van die reg nie ‘n regsubjek nie, omdat dit nog nie gebore is nie. Rosmini se dilemma word egter deur die regsfiguur, die nasciturus-fiksie, van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg vir hom opgelos. Volgens Regter Hiemstra behels die nasciturus-fiksie in die saak van Pinchin v Santam Insurance Co. Ltd. dat die fetus as gebore geag word [ondanks die stadium van swangerskap], as dit in sy belang of tot sy voordeel is. Dié bevinding van die regter impliseer dat Thomas Aquinas se onderskeid tussen vroeëe en laat swangerskap mee weggedoen word en dat in beide stadia van swangerskap (vroëe en laat stadium) die fetus met regsubjektiwiteit beklee moet word. Die gedagte word afgesluit dat by die lewende geboorte van die fetus, dit tot sy/haar voordeel sal wees. Hiervolgens is die fetus benewens enige voordeel uit hoofde van die nasciturus-fiksie, net soos elke ander mens ook geregtig op die beskerming van sy/haar individuele reg, naamlik sy/haar reg op lewe (soos gewaarborg deur artikel 11 van die grondwet).
Uit hoofde van die nasciturus-fiksie sal die fetus oor subjektiewe regte beskik, indien tot sy/haar voordeel is. Maar wat daarvan as hierdie kwalifikasie nie aanwesig is nie? Beteken dit die fetus se subjektiewe regte hom/haar ontsê word? Indien dit die geval is, sal Thomas Aquinas se argument dat die fetus in die vroëe stadium van swangerskap ‘n plant (anima vegetativa) of dier (anima sensitiva) is, korrek wees. Die resultaat hiervan is dat die fetus nie ‘n regsubjek is nie, en daarom nie oor individuele regte beskik nie. Sy/haar individuele reg (reg op lewe) mag dus ingevolge Thomas Aquinas en die Suid-Afrikaanse gemenereg, aangetas word. Op grond hiervan sou Rosmini kon argumenteer dat die voorskrifte van die nasciturus-fiksie derhalwe uitgebrei word - nie net tot op daardie punt waar dit op ‘n voordeel geregtig is nie, maar ook as daar geen materiële voordeel vir hom/haar daaruit voortspruit nie. Rosmini pleit dus dat die Suid-Afrikaanse gemenereg in lyn met die Grondwet verkeer.
7 GRONDWETLIKE BESKERMING
Uit die debat tussen Rosmini en Aquinas en eersgenoemde se benadering die deurslag gee, kan tot die gevolgtrekking gekom word dat ‘n fetus ondanks die gebrek aan regsubjektiwiteit (volgens die Suid-Afrikaanse gemenereg) ook ‘n menslike persoon is. Op grond hiervan het Rosmini ‘n studie oor individuele regte vir almal (ook die fetus) moontlik gemaak.
Die voorskrifte van die morele reg, wat ‘n uitvloeisel van die natuurreg is, behels dat ‘n mens nie aan ander doen wat jy aan jouself gedoen wil hê nie. Die feit dat jy as volwassene toe jy ‘n embrio was nie geaborteer is nie, behels dat jy dieselfde moet doen met jou ongebore baba. Die onvervreembare reg op lewe moet deur sowel die staat as die howe erken en gerespekteer word. Onder dié onvervreembare regte ressorteer elke individu se reg op lewe en fisieke integriteit vanaf die oomblik van konsepsie tot by die dood. Die oomblik wanneer die staat, ‘n sekere kategorie menslike wesens van beskerming ontbeur/ontsê, sal dit die gelykheid van almal voor die reg, wat ingevolge Artikel 9 van die Grondwet van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 gewaarborg word, ontken. Ingevolge Artikel 9(3) van die Grondwet sal die staat dus in terme van die gelykheidsbeginsel onbillik diskrimineer teen die fetus, indien dit nie die fetus se reg op lewe beskerm nie. In die verband bepaal Artikel 9(3) dat die staat: “[…] unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone one one or more grounds, including […] age […] and birth,” indien dit nie die fetus se reg op lewe ingevolge die Grondwet waarborg nie. Na my mening sou Rosmini kon argumenteer dat daar nie gevolg gegee moet word aan die voorskrifte van die Wet op Keuse oor die Beëindiging van Swangerskap 92 van 1996 nie, omdat dit die gelykheidsbeginsel van die Grondwet ondermyn. Artikel 2 van die Grondwet gee immers uitdrukking aan die beginsel van grondwetlike of konstitusionele oppergesag. Artikel 8 van die Grondwet bepaal ook dat die Handves van Regte van die Grondwet heerskappy oor alle wetgewings geniet (insluitende oor die Wet op Keuse oor die Beëndiging van Swangerskap). Dié benadering word ondersteun deur die hofsaak Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC), waarin bepaal is dat: “Any law or conduct that is not in accordance with the Constitution […] will therefore not have the force of law.” Uit hoofde hiervan is die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet die beste waarborg vir die beskerming en handhawing van individuele regte. Een van die swakplekke wat in die Grondwet geïdentifiseer is, is dié wetgewing se neiging om die wense van die meerderheid wat hul eie belange bo dié van die algemene welsyn van die individu stel, te bevredig. Rosmini verwys hierna as die “Tyranny of the majority over the minority.” Die Grondwet behoort na my mening die Wet op die Keuse oor die Beïndiging van Swangerskap, ongrondwetlik verklaar.
8 DIE MENS EN DIE STAAT
Die praktiese implikasie van Rosmini se fundamentele regte-leer behels dat die mens vanaf die fetale stadium van swangerskap tot by volwasse stadium oor fundamentele regte moet beskik. Op grond hiervan mag individuele regte nie aan die mens ontsê word nie. Met betrekking tot die individualiteit van die menslike wese en die identiteit van die menslike persoon, bevestig die kerk magesterium in die Declaration on Procured Abortion en Tertullianus dat die fetus: “[…] would never be made human if it were not human already.” Dit is bewys daarvan dat ‘n menslike individu ‘n menslike persoon is.
Die persoon as intellektuele wese beskik oor ‘n siel of rede en uit hoofde hiervan word hy as draer van individuele regte beskou. Hiervolgens word die mens as intellektuele (goddellike) wese met morele waardigheid beklee. Hy moet gerespekteer word, omdat die mens beelddraer van God is. God dien dus as ontologiese bron, waaruit individuele regte aan die mens toegeskryf word. Dié goddelike intellek of rede, is konstitutief vir die waardigheid van die mens. Uit hoofde van dié waardigheid beskik die mens oor fundamentele individuele reg, wat nie aangetas mag word nie, selfs nie eens deur die staat nie. Hy skryf: “The State, for example, cannot absorb the inalienable rights proper to persons, nor can it be considered as more than its individual members in such a way that persons can be sacrificed for the sake of society,” en “Let civil society perish […] or be dissolved if this is needed for the salvation of individuals.” Hy sê verder: […] not a single right of individual citizens […] can be sacrificed for the sake of the public good […]” UIt hoofde van dié aanhalings van Rosmini sal daar nie gevolg gegee kan word aan die salus rei publicae suprema lex-leerstuk nie. Die implikasies van die salus rei publicae suprema lex-leerstuk staan véél nader aan die samelewingsleer van Thomas Aquinas, waar die staat as verhewe en meer goddelik (maius et divinius) as die individu bestempel is. Die totalitêre beskouing van die staat lei gewus tot ‘n verkleinering van die mens, as Thomas Aquinas skryf dat die individu aan die staat onderworpe is. Die behels dat die salus rei publicae suprema lex-leerstuk wat klaarblyklik deur Thomas Aquinas ondersteun word, die staat se mag om inbreuk op die individuele regte van sy burgers te kan maak, goedkeur. Die benadering word gedemonstreer aan die hand van die volgende verwysings: Ingevolge die hofsaak S v Essop and Others word die leerstuk salus rei publicae suprema lex soos volg verduidelik: “The safety of the State is the supreme law of a state.” Ander vermeldings van hierdie spreuk in die regspraak is te vinde in byvoorbeeld Africa v Boothan en S v Baker, S v Doyle. Die bron, Latin for Lawyers verduidelik dit as: “[The] welfare of the people, or of the public, is supreme law,” en gaan dan voort: “[This] phrase is based on the implied assent of every member of society, that his own individual welfare shall, in cases of necessity, yield to that of the community; and that his property, liberty, and life shall, under certain circumstances, be placed in jeopardy or even sacrificed for the public good.”
By die handhawing van staatsveiligheid (salus rei publicae suprema lex) enersyds en die beskerming van individuele regte andersyds het ‘n mens te doen met ‘n oënskynlike botsing van regsbeginsels. Die reg poog om die grootste moontlike beskerming aan individuele regte te verleen, byvoorbeeld om daardie regte in die Grondwet of Handves van Regte te verskans, sodat hulle nie maklik opgehef of afgeskaf kan word nie. Verder word remedies verleen vir die onregmatige inbreukmaking op daardie regte. Basiese individuele regte word as onaantasbaar beskryf. Tog geld die beginsel dat die owerheidsgesag al die middels tot sy beskiking kan aanwend om enige bedreiging van die veiligheid van die staat die hoof te bied, al word individuele regte daardeur ingeboet (salus rei publicae suprema lex). Die beginsel in Krohn v Minister of Defence and Others word treffend deur regter Rose-Innes uitgedruk: “[…] but there is an inherent right in every state, as in every individual, to use all means at its disposal to defend itself when its existence is at stake; when the force upon which the courts depend and upon which the constitution is based, is itself challenged. Under such circumstances the state may be compelled by necessity to disregard for a time the ordinary dafeguards of liberty in defence of liberty itself, and to substitute for the careful and deliberate procedure of the law a machinery more drastic and speedy in order to cope with an urgent danger.”
Inderdaad het ‘n mens nie net te doen met ‘n botsing van regsbeginsels nie, maar met ‘n opweging en afbakening van belange. Die reg van die individu is baie belangrik en word daarom beskerm tot op daardie punt waar die belang van die gemeenskap oorheersend word, omdat sy voortbestaan bedreig word. Volgens Rosmini sou die individu se reg immers nie kon voortbestaan as die gemeenskap waarin hy daardie reg uitoefen, ondergaan nie. Rosmini stel dit soos volg: “[…] society must prefer not to do harm to a private individual even for the sake of obtaining the safety of all the others. Conversely, it cannot do some good to the individual unless this good comes about without any damage or diminution of public good.” Die algemene regsgevoel soos blyk uit die Krohn-saak is dat daar ‘n gebalanseerde verhouding tussen individuele regte en staatsveiligheid gehandhaaf moet word. Dit blyk egter nie die geval by Rosmini en Thomas Aquinas te wees nie. Eersgenoemde neig meer om die individu bo die staat te bevoordeel: “Not a single right of individual citizens […] can be sacrificed for the sake of the public good.” Hy skryf vervolgens: “Public good must be preferred to private good once the rights of individuals have been safeguarded.” Laasgenoemde is egter ten gunste daarvan dat die belange van die individu aan die staat onderhewig gestel word. Hy beskou die staat as ‘n totaal-gemeenskap : “[…] the individual as subordinate to the [state].”
9 Gevolgtrekking
Die boodskap is gerig op daardie individue wat vir die formulering van die gewete en die openbare mening verantwoordelik is naamlik wetenskaplikes, medici, juriste en politici. Hulle moet die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet, wat die beste waarborg vir die beskerming en handhawing van individuele regte is (van die fetus en die volwasse persoon), onderskraag, en die gebreke wat dit kniehalter ongedaan maak, sodat die praktiese implikasies van Rosmini se Christelike beskouing van individuele regte kan, met verwysing na die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet, toegelig kan word. Dit is vanselfsprekend dat Rosmini se behandeling van individuele regte as voorganger vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet beskou kan word. Die Handves van Regte, in die Grondwet, vind onderskraging by Rosmini se hantering van individuele regte. Indien Aquinas oor die feite van embriologie beskik het, sou hy ‘n heel ander siening oor die begin van biotiese lewe gehad het. Hy was wat die embriologie betref heeltemal deur Aristoteles beïnvloed. Wat betref die onderskeid tussen vroeë en laat begin van lewe en Aquinas se keuse ten opsigte van eersgenoemde, en ook weens sy (Thomas Aquinas) se totalitêre staatsbeskouing, is daar veroorsaak dat hy in debat met Rosmini sou tree.
| Translation - English
Rosmini on Individual Rights
The soul (reason) as forerunner of individual rights (from foetal to adult stage)
Dr Nico P. Swartz : Senior lecturer.
Abstract
The question that can be asked today is: Of what relevance is Rosmini's legal theory on individual rights for modern man? Rosmini's individual rights did not appear from nowhere. From the opinions of some Greek writers, he concluded that the soul, as a result of its immortal and mobile qualities, is divine in nature and therefore serves as the origin of individual rights. Rosmini is of the opinion, unlike Thomas Aquinas, that the protection of individual rights should filter through to all levels of human existence; from the foetal stage to adult life. In contrast with the Aristotelian Thomistic hylomorphism doctrine, he believes that just like an adult, a foetus has a soul, even in its early stages, and is entitled to the protection of his/her individual rights in terms of the Constitution of South Africa 108 of 1996. Owing to the innate nature of the human soul, Rosmini succeeded in postulating God as ontological framework for the individual rights of man. The description of the unique value of humans at Psalm 8:5 is striking: “For thou hast made him but little lower than God, and crownest him with glory and honor.” (American Standard Version) Man, as image bearer of God, is thus endowed with individual rights that must be recognised by all, including the state. Rosmini hereby rejects the salus rei publicae suprema lex doctrine supported by Thomas Aquinas. Rosmini argues that, if this (salus reipublicae suprema lex) doctrine were to be followed, the state would be encroaching on the individual rights of its citizens. Furthermore, he believes that the state is geared to protect the individual rights of its citizens. Rosmini thus argues that the interests of the state are best served if the interests of the citizen are first protected.
THE SOUL
1 INTRODUCTION
The study of anthropology constitutes the fundamental concept of the soul as a duplicate of man. It is therefore possible to trace the steps according to which this conclusion is made. On the one hand, activities in man are indicative of the soul's presence in him/her, but at his/her death, the absence thereof is emphasised. On the other hand, the soul was also viewed as a concrete material entity, a miniature part of the body, which can be seen in dreams, in shadows and reflections, which comes and goes in the body of man. It therefore parts from the body at death. That the soul survives the body was commonly accepted: “The opening lines of the Iliad draw a sharp distinction between the heroes themselves, left a prey for dogs and vultures, and their souls, sent down to Hades […]” In the poems of Homer and subsequent poets the same conviction (as in the Iliad) is simply adjusted, as in the case of Hesiod, where the heroes no longer go to the underworld, but rather to the Isles of the Blest, where they can exercise a beneficial influence on their successors.
In our investigation into the opinions of writers regarding the soul, it is clear that there are both similarities and differences. Notwithstanding the similarities and differences, these opinions will be compiled to also outline an overall view of the soul. Our examination will begin with what are commonly accepted as the natural characteristics of the soul. Two characteristics of the soul will be emphasised, namely mobility and perception (sense impression). These characteristics that were left, or handed down, to us by our Greek forebears indicate the divinity of the soul and will thus serve as a preamble to our discussion of the soul.
Rosmini therefore constitutes these characteristics of the soul in such a way that it subsequently serves as a basis or object of individual rights in human society.
2 OPINIONS OF ANCIENT WRITERS
The Ionians, and Empedocles, seek the existence of the soul in air, earth, water, and fire, which are the origins of the vital functions. They clothe the soul with the qualities of knowledge, perception, and the ability to move the body.
In the doctrines of the Atomists, one of their adherents, Democritus, asserts that the universe consists of atoms of different sizes and shapes. The soul is not an exception. For example, Democritus and Heraclitus argue that the soul is a type of fire or heat. Heraclitus writes: “[…] fire contained the elementary principle, that is, the substratum of everything, the universal agent.” These “shapes”, or atoms that are spherical, are to the Atomists fire and thus soul. The characteristic of mobility can be supposed.
The doctrines of Pythagoras contain the same line of thought as that of the Atomists. Some Pythagoreans identify the soul with dust particles in the air, and others with that which brings these dust particles into motion. Some of these dust particles are said to be in a state of constant motion. The view of some writers who describe the soul as that which propels itself, also falls into this category. Nearly all these thinkers view motion as the most distinctive characteristic of the soul. They state: “Everything else […] is moved by the soul, but the soul is moved by itself.”
Furthermore, Anaxagoras asserts that the soul is a moving principle, and that the element of perception is constitutive thereof. However, he is less accurate in the use of his terms. In many cases he speaks of the idea/reason (nous) as the cause of goodness and order, while he elsewhere identifies it (the nous) with the soul. He attributes the nous to all living beings. This means that besides man, animals also possess reason.
Empedocles undermines the element of perception (senses) and feels that this element is imperfect. It is clear that he disregards both accepted characteristics of the soul, motion and perception, and takes a heterodoxical tack by constituting the soul in the element blood. Empedocles maintains that blood consists of the elements air, water, earth, and fire. Rosmini quotes Tertullian: “Empedocles […] forms the soul out of blood.” Rosmini asserts that Tertullian and others (for example, Pliny) derived the latter opinion from Homer.
Plato likewise constructed the soul from these four elements. He constitutes the soul in numbers or figures. The numbers or figures that according to him are the soul are also his ideas (doctrine of ideas). These idea-numbers are the form of things, for example, the soul: “[…] the self-animal or universe is made up of the idea of One, […] of the idea-numbers Two, or primary length, Three, primary breadth, and Four, primary depth […] reason is the One, knowledge is the Two, […] opinion is the number of a surface, Three, and sensation the number of a solid, Four. […] the numbers are the ideas themselves.” From his doctrine of ideas, Plato constructs the soul, which presumably is made up of both characteristics, motion and perception: “[…] since the soul was held to be thus cognitive as well as capable of causing motion, [Plato] combined the two and defined the soul as a self-moving number.”
Like Anaxagoras, Democritus views the soul as identical to thought/reason (nous) and argues on the basis that it is the cause of motion. The element of perception is more than likely also applicable.
Thales emphasises, just like Democritus, that the soul is the cause of motion. He argues that lodestone possesses a soul because it attracts iron objects. He therefore omits the characteristic of perception.
Diogenes of Apollonia was not satisfied with the solution which Anaxagoras (who claimed that the soul is the nous [thought/reason) provided. He supports the theory of the Ionians, namely Anaximenes, Archelaus and Diogenes, which identified air as the primary element (soul). They write: “All creatures live and see and hear by the same thing (viz. air), and from the same thing all derive their intelligence as well.” Air, which plays an important role in perception and thought, is to him the soul. Again the characteristic of motion is supposed.
Heraclitus identifies the soul with vapour through which all things originate. Steam/vapour is the last bodily condition of things and is in a constant state of change. Everything in existence is in motion.
Alcmaeon of Croton holds a similar opinion to that of Heraclitus. He maintains that the soul is immortal, since it is in constant motion. He attributes the constant state of motion to the moon, sun, stars, the heavens, et cetera, and calls it divine. This is the soul.
To Hippo, the soul is water. The reason for this is that in all living beings semen is wet/damp. He rejects the opinion of Empedocles when he argues that semen is not blood. Semen is therefore to him the undeveloped soul.
Critias agrees with Empedocles against Hippo when he says that the soul is blood. He differs from Empedocles though, in the sense that he does not include earth in the composition of the distinct components for the formation of blood. Moreover, his opinions show parallels to those of Empedocles.
Parmenides constitutes the origin of the soul in procreation and decay. This indicates constant motion. His theory of procreation and decay serves as precursor to the hylomorphism doctrine of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.
In the Christian religious belief, the Bible views the soul as “breath.” Rosmini writes: “[The] soul was infused by breath from the mouth of God.” Tertullian aligns himself with this opinion. He says: “The soul is substantially breath, but from its effect it is called spirit because it breathes.”
In conclusion of the opinions of the ancient writers, it has been established that the opinions of Hippo, Empedocles, and Critias do not conform to the characteristics of motion and perception, which are generally ascribed to the soul. So, too, the opinions of Anaxagoras, who attributes a soul to animals, and Democritus, who believes that a legal object, for example, a stone, also possesses a soul. It appears that Rosmini, on the one hand, agrees with some philosophers in connection with the motion principle, and on the other hand, differs with those who assert that the soul is simply matter. On the one hand he writes against the belief that the soul is matter: “[…] the human soul is entirely devoid of all matter,” and “[…] true opposition between the concept of soul and that of matter.” In connection with the motion principle on which he agrees with certain ancient philosophers, he writes: “Soul is the principle of an act […] soul as principle is mover, but is not mobile.” Although he accepts the theory on mobility of the ancient philosophers in principle, he is, however, of the opinion that the soul is immovable. The soul does not move, it is rather the body that changes, and not the soul. Nevertheless, Rosmini admits that these two characteristics of the soul, namely motion and perception, are constitutive of the soul.
In view of the divine nature of the soul, Rosmini (and Aristotle) would more than likely be able to accept the opinions of Alcmaeon, Democritus and Anaxagoras, who believed that the soul is immortal and identical to reason: “eternal and divine.” Rosmini argues (as noted above) that a substance, for example the soul, that does not possess a physical entity (immortal), is a spirit. He calls this spirit infinite and believes that it cannot be human, but divine: “The infinite is found in man only by having recourse to ideal being which […] is not part of man himself.” Rosmini quotes Iamblichus: “The very unity of the gods (these gods are the ideas) unites souls to themselves,” and writes in relation to man: “Each one knows that he is finite.”
3 MAN AS COMPOSITION OF SOUL AND BODY
Rosmini deduced the immobility of the soul from Aristotle's doctrine of form/matter and actuality/potential. This doctrine attempts to establish man as a composition of soul and body. Matter can be analogous to potentiality, and form to actuality. Herein the soul and body are played off against each other. The finding was that the body is not the soul. It is matter (potentiality), while the soul is the form of the body (actuality): “[The] soul is the first actuality of a natural body having in it the capacity of life.” Rosmini agrees: “In the composite, soul is the form, body the matter of the human being.” Moreover, the soul according to Rosmini and Aristotle is not independent of the body. They write: “[Those] perishable creatures which possess reason […] are endowed with […] a soul” and “If the soul is a substance altogether different from the body, we cannot infer the death of the soul from the death of the body.” On account of this, they reach the conclusion that man is a composition of matter (potentiality) and form (actuality): “[…] the body is essentially bound […] to the soul [and] imitates the life of the soul.” Man is thus not only soul and body, but soul and body combined. This means that were the question respecting man to be posed, namely: “What exists here?” the answer would not necessarily be, “A soul or body,” but rather, “A person exists here.” Similarly, we do not say, for example, “My thought believes,” or, “My hand plays piano,” but rather, “I believe,” or, “I play.” Man as unity of soul and body is apparent from Rosmini's theological and philosophical standpoints in the Anthropologia in Servizio and Psicologia. Herewith man as composition of soul and body is concluded.
4 THE DIVINITY OF THE SOUL/MAN
Rosmini enters into debate with Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas about the divinity of the soul. He argues that the human soul comprises two components: a physical (natural) as well as an intellectual (divine) soul portion. In the human body, these two soul portion are (as already mentioned) joined as a union, so that man possesses but one soul: “[…] the soul is one in each human being, […] not two or more.” Both Rosmini and the Aristotelian Thomism argue from the point of view that man possesses more than one soul portion, but Rosmini remedies the position in his belief that the physical (natural) unites with the intellectual (divine) soul portion, and the latter (the divine) is the result of this amalgamation. The two soul portions interact in man; the one soul portion does not expire and is not superseded by a more developed soul portion, but they exist simultaneously until they culminate in an intellectual (divine) soul, which takes on the likeness of man. However, Thomas Aquinas was influenced by Aristotle and subsequently accepted Aristotle's hylomorphism doctrine. In terms of this doctrine, Thomas Aquinas distinguishes two soul portions, like Rosmini, and Aristotle three. Hylomorphism involves that a vegetative soul portion expires and is replaced by a more developed soul, the sensitive soul portion, which also expires and eventually culminates in a rational soul portion (in man himself). Rosmini likewise does not support this hylomorphistic line of thought of the Aristotelian Thomism.
Having identified a single soul in man, we must investigate the divinity thereof. Since the soul is not a physical entity, it must therefore be divine. Rosmini writes: “But a substance which has no bodily or material property is called ‘spiritual’ or spirit. The human soul, therefore, is a spirit.” The concept of divinity naturally relates to immortality. The word “death” only has reference to a physical (natural) entity: “[…] it would be absurd to attribute it to what is not body.” Since divinity indicates non-corporeality, the former is not subject to death. Rosmini concludes by saying that the soul is divine and therefore immortal. Owing to the fact that man is a union of soul and body, and that the soul therefore preponderates, it can be inferred that man is a divine being. The description of the unique value of humans at Psalm 8:5 is striking: “For thou hast made him but little lower than God, and crownest him with glory and honor.” (American Standard Version)
In view of the divine nature of man, Rosmini would more than likely be able to accept the opinions of Alcmaeon, Democritus and Anaxagoras, who believed that the soul is immortal and identical to reason: “eternal and divine.” Subsequently, he writes: “The infinite is found in man only by having recourse to ideal being which […] is not part of man himself.” He also quotes Iamblichus: “The very unity of the gods […] unites souls to themselves.” On account of the soul's divine characteristics, man is considered to be a divine being.
5 HUMAN/FOETAL LIFE
Under influence of the hylomorphism doctrine, Thomas Aquinas denies that the soul (human life) begins at conception. This results in a debate with Rosmini. In the preamble to the debate between Rosmini and Thomas Aquinas, Rosmini writes regarding the latter: “[…] the difference between the perfecting of nature […] makes many [Thomas Aquinas among them] err in their judgements and speculation about movement towards human perfection.” He writes further: “People sometimes show enthusiasm for things which perfect human nature but do not improve the human person.” According to Rosmini, this is indeed the case with Thomas Aquinas.
5. 1 DIFFERENT STAGES OF HUMAN/FOETAL LIFE
Thomas Aquinas argues that a foetus cannot be viewed as a human, since it does not possess a soul. He explains: “[This=human life] does not occur until the foetus has developed its brain and sensory systems to the point where it can support the distinctive intellectual capacities of a human being.” His perception of when life begins is shaped by his view that material entities (humans) have life by virtue of the soul. He writes: “[Until] the foetus has a human soul, it is not a human being, no matter what the underlying biology looks like.” Rosmini agrees with Aquinas that the soul is a life-giving entity, but differs with him when he (Rosmini) holds that the foetus also possesses a (human) soul from conception: “Primal, hidden, initial life […] never perishes.” Hereby Rosmini rejects Thomas Aquinas' argument that before a soul can exist, a foetal development should take place, according to which the vegetative soul portion expires and is followed by a more developed sensory (animal) soul portion that perishes, after which it culminates in a rational (intellectual) soul of man. According to Aquinas, only by the latter development stage is there a human being, wherein the soul possesses a perfect body and developed brain with which to conduct life. Aquinas asserts that during the early stage of pregnancy (anima vegetative and the anima sensitive), the foetus does not have these characteristics (for example, a perfect body and developed brain). He writes that, if a body is not present, there is no soul and therefore there can be no human life. In other words: Before the rational soul (anima rationalis) can be created, the foetus will not have the ability to think. According to Aquinas, the foetus in the early stages of pregnancy is comparable to a plant or animal, and as such is not human. As mentioned previously, Rosmini acknowledges the existence of the soul from the beginning of the life of a foetus (that is, from conception) and is therefore, in his view, a human being. Rosmini thereafter emphasises the immortality of the soul. According to Thomas Aquinas, however, the two preceding soul portions are mortal. Rosmini argues that the soul does not expire and that they are rather in “[…] a harmonious stimulation in a perpetual cycle.” He therefore writes: “[…] the soul is immortal because life cannot lack life.” Since Rosmini is afraid that he will end up with the same dilemma as Aquinas, he emphasizes that the sensory element (animal) soul portion is absorbed by the rational (intellectual soul) and that the latter furthermore preponderates. Herewith Rosmini again emphasizes the unity of the human soul and also believes that different soul portions never exist: “the soul is one in each human being,” and argues further: “[…] the unity of the soul disposes of the error requiring simultaneously three souls, animal, sensitive and intellective, which certain authors [such as Thomas Aquinas] have endeavoured to posit in human beings.” Rosmini says regarding the Aristotelian Thomistic hylomorphism doctrine: “Even granted the existence in human beings of a principle of vegetation and sensation distinct from myself, this principle would not be the human soul, but something different from it.”
Rosmini thus acknowledges the existence of a single soul that shows development until man's eventual birth.
Thomas Aquinas consequently argues that it is impossible for the rational soul to be created in man at the moment of conception. He asserts that God would not want a foetus to have an innate rational soul. God would only create the soul in man when the foetus has sufficiently developed. The question that can be asked is: At what point does this moment occur? According to Aquinas, the foetus is sufficiently developed during mid-pregnancy, that is, the twentieth week of pregnancy. At this point it has a perfect body and developed brain: This is 40 days for men and 90 days for women. The rational soul is only implanted at these respective times in the different sexes. At these respective times, the foetus will have sufficiently developed in Thomistic terms and can therefore be viewed as a human being. It is during the late stage of pregnancy, that is, after the twentieth week of pregnancy (ensouling), that one has to do with a human being, and abortion is stimulated by ethical considerations. According to this, abortion is criminalised and the taking of a human life is an encroachment of individual rights and tantamount to murder. Thomas Aquinas thus asserts that abortion during the early stage of pregnancy is permissible, but not during and after the twentieth week of pregnancy. In relation to the Thomistic distinction between the early and late stage of pregnancy, Thomas Aquinas debates with Rosmini and causes a violation of the individual right of the foetus by allowing abortion in the early stage of pregnancy. Despite Rosmini's disapproval thereof, Thomas Aquinas' approach was accepted in South Africa's Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996.
Obviously, Rosmini views man, as well as the foetus, as intellectual (rational) beings. Rosmini therefore states that the Thomistic distinction between the early and late beginning of life are spurious and should be regarded as of lesser importance. Despite Rosmini's association with the Church magesterium, which is silent on the subject of at which moment life begins, Rosmini argues, as do the majority of Catholics, that an actual person exists from the moment of conception. The Church magesterium views the foetus as a gift from God to mankind. On the basis of this God-given gift, the foetus must consequently be endowed with divine characteristics, even from the moment of conception. This thus involves that the foetus also has individual rights during the stage of conception, which according to Article 11 (the right to life) of the Constitution of South Africa, act 108 of 1996, must be respected by all. According to this, performing an abortion (regardless at which stage of pregnancy) can therefore be considered a violation of the individual rights of the foetus.
6 NASCITURUS FICTION
Rosmini faces a dilemma. He desires to ascribe legal subjectivity (legal personality) to the foetus, but is prevented from doing this by South African common law, since a legal subject in the legally technical sense refers to someone that is endowed with rights and obligations. This means that despite the fact that the foetus is an intellectual and rational being and thus has a soul, it still does not have legal subjectivity. In terms of the South African common law, the legal subjectivity of a natural person only begins at birth. An unborn child is, for the purposes of the law, not a legal subject, since it has not yet been born. Rosmini's dilemma is, however, solved by a legal institution, the nasciturus fiction, of South African law. According to Judge Hiemstra, the nasciturus fiction in the case of Pinchin v Santam Insurance Co. Ltd. involves that the foetus can be viewed as born [regardless of the stage of pregnancy], if it is in the foetus' interest or to its advantage. This finding by the judge implies that Thomas Aquinas' distinction between early and late pregnancy can be dispensed with, and that in both stages of pregnancy (early and late) the foetus should be endowed with legal subjectivity. The thought can be rounded off as follows: When the foetus is born alive, it will be to his/her advantage. According to this, the foetus not only benefits by virtue of the nasciturus fiction, but, just like every other person, is also entitled to the protection of his/her individual right, namely his/her right to life (as guaranteed by Article 11 of the Constitution).
Owing to the nasciturus fiction, the foetus will have subjective rights, provided it is to his/her advantage. But what if this provision is not met? Does this mean that the foetus' subjective right is denied? If that is the case, Thomas Aquinas' argument that the foetus is a plant (anima vegetativa) or animal (anima sensitiva) in the early stage of pregnancy, would be correct. The result hereof is that the foetus is not a legal subject, and therefore does not have individual rights. His/her individual right (the right to life) can thus, according to Thomas Aquinas and the South African common law, be encroached upon. On these grounds, Rosmini can argue that the prescriptions of the nasciturus fiction should be expanded——not only to the point where it is entitled to an advantage, but also if there is no material benefit for him/her. Rosmini thus pleads that South African common law should coincide with the Constitution.
7 CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
From the debate between Rosmini and Aquinas, and the former's approach being superior, we can reach the conclusion that a foetus, despite the lack of legal subjectivity (according to the South African common law), is also a person. On this foundation, Rosmini has made a study of individual rights for all (including the foetus) possible.
The requirements of the moral law, which issues from the natural law, involves that one does not do to others that which one does not want done to oneself. The fact that you as an adult were not aborted when you were an embryo signifies that you should do the same for your unborn baby. The inalienable right to life must be acknowledged and respected by both the state and the courts. Among these inalienable rights are each individual's right to life and physical integrity from the moment of conception until death. As soon as the state denies or deprives a certain category of human beings protection, it denies the equality of all before the law, which is guaranteed in terms of Article 9 of the Constitution of South Africa 108 of 1996. In terms of Article 9(3) of the Constitution, the state will thus be unfairly discriminating against the foetus if it does not protect the foetus' right to life. In this regard Article 9(3) says that the state would: “[…] unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including […] age […] and birth,” if it did not guarantee the foetus' right to life in terms of the Constitution. In my opinion, Rosmini could argue that the requirements of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 should not be complied with, since it undermines the equality principle of the Constitution. After all, Article 2 of the Constitution expresses the principle of constitutional supremacy. Article 8 of the Constitution also stipulates that the Bill of Rights of the Constitution supersedes all legislation (including the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act). This approach is supported by the court case Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature v President of the Republic of South Africa 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC), in which it was determined: “Any law or conduct that is not in accordance with the Constitution […] will therefore not have the force of law.” In view of this, the South African Constitution is the best guarantee for the protection and preservation of individual rights. One of the weaknesses identified in the Constitution is the tendency of this legislation to satisfy the desires of the majority who put their own interests above those of the general well-being of the individual. Rosmini refers to this as the “tyranny of the majority over the minority.” The Constitution should, in my opinion, declare the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act unconstitutional.
8 MAN AND THE STATE
The practical implication of Rosmini's basic legal doctrine involves that man must be endowed with fundamental rights, from the foetal stage of pregnancy to adulthood. On the basis of this man may not be deprived of individual rights. In relation to the individuality of the human being and the identity of the human person, the Church magesterium, in the Declaration on Procured Abortion, and Tertullian confirms that the foetus: “[…] would never be made human if it were not human already.” This proves that a human individual is a person.
The person as an intellectual being possesses a soul of reason and, by virtue of this, is viewed as a carrier of individual rights. According to this, man as an intellectual (divine) being, is endowed with moral dignity. He must be respected, since man is the image bearer of God. God thus serves as ontological source, from which individual rights are attributed to man. This divine intellect of reason is constitutive of the dignity of man. By virtue of this dignity, man possesses a fundamental individual right, that may not be encroached upon, even by the state. He writes: “The State, for example, cannot absorb the inalienable rights proper to persons, nor can it be considered as more than its individual members in such a way that persons can be sacrificed for the sake of society,” and “Let civil society perish […] or be dissolved if this is needed for the salvation of individuals.” Further, he says: […] not a single right of individual citizens […] can be sacrificed for the sake of the public good […].” On account of these quotations of Rosmini, there cannot be complied with the doctrine salus rei publicae suprema lex. The implications of the doctrine salus rei publicae suprema lex are much closer to the social doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, in which the state is described as superior and more divine (maius et divinius) than the individual. The totalitarian view of the state unquestionably leads to a belittlement of man, since Thomas Aquinas writes that the individual is subject to the state. This means that the salus rei publicae suprema lex doctrine which Thomas Aquinas obviously supports, approves the state’s power to infringe upon the individual rights of its citizens. The approach is demonstrated in the light of the following references: In terms of the court case S v Essop and Others , the salus rei publicae suprema lex doctrine is explained as follows: “The safety of the State is the supreme law of a state.” This maxim is also mentioned elsewhere in judicature, for example, Africa v Boothan and S v Baker, S v Doyle. The source Latin for Lawyers explains it this way: “[The] welfare of the people, or of the public, is supreme law,” and further says: “[This] phrase is based on the implied assent of every member of society, that his own individual welfare shall, in cases of necessity, yield to that of the community; and that his property, liberty, and life shall, under certain circumstances, be placed in jeopardy or even sacrificed for the public good.”
With the maintaining of state security (salus rei publicae suprema lex) on the one hand, and the protection of individual rights on the other hand, one encounters an apparent conflict of legal principles. The law strives to give the greatest possible protection to individual rights, for example, by entrenching those rights in the Constitution or Bill of Rights, so that they cannot easily be repealed or abolished. Furthermore, there are remedies for the unlawful violation of those rights. Basic individual rights are described as unassailable. Yet, the principle still applies that the government authority can utilise all the means at its disposal to overcome any threat to the security of the state, even if individual rights are thereby sacrificed (salus rei publicae suprema lex). The principle in Krohn v Minister of Defence and Others is impressively expressed by Judge Rose-Innes: “[…] but there is an inherent right in every state, as in every individual, to use all means at its disposal to defend itself when its existence is at stake; when the force upon which the courts depend and upon which the constitution is based, is itself challenged. Under such circumstances the state may be compelled by necessity to disregard for a time the ordinary safeguards of liberty in defence of liberty itself, and to substitute for the careful and deliberate procedure of the law machinery more drastic and speedy in order to cope with an urgent danger.”
Indeed, there is not a conflict of legal principles, but there is a setting off and demarcation of interests. The right of the individual is very important and is therefore protected up to the point where the interests of the community prevail, since its existence is threatened. According to Rosmini, the individual's right would, after all, not be able to keep existing if the society in which he exercises that right, were to perish. Rosmini puts it this way: “[…] society must prefer not to do harm to a private individual even for the sake of obtaining the safety of all the others. Conversely, it cannot do some good to the individual unless this good comes about without any damage or diminution of public good.” The general legal feeling, as evident in the Krohn case, is that a balanced relationship must be maintained between individual rights and state security. However, this does not seem to be the case with Rosmini and Thomas Aquinas. The former tends to give preference to the individual over the state: “Not a single right of individual citizens […] can be sacrificed for the sake of the public good.” He further writes: “Public good must be preferred to private good once the rights of individuals have been safeguarded.” However, Aquinas is in favour of the interests of the individual being subject to the state. He views the state as a totalitarian society : “[…] the individual as subordinate to the [state].”
9 Conclusion
The message is directed to those individuals who are responsible for the formulating of the conscience and public opinion, namely scientists, physicians, jurists, and politicians. They should support the South African Constitution, which is the best guarantee for protection and preservation of individual rights (of the foetus and the adult), and undo the shortcomings which handicap it, so that the practical implications of Rosmini's Christian view of individual rights can be highlighted in reference to the South African Constitution. It stands to reason that Rosmini's treatment of individual rights can be viewed as a precursor of the South African Constitution. The Bill of Rights, in the Constitution, finds support in Rosmini's treatment of individual rights. If Aquinas had been in possession of the facts about embryology, he would have had a totally different view of the beginning of biotic life. Regarding embryology, he was completely influence by Aristotle. As for the distinction between the early and late beginning of life and Aquinas' choice respecting the former, and because of his (Thomas Aquinas') totalitarian view of the state, resulting in the debate between him and Rosmini.
|
More Less | | Years of translation experience: 7. Registered at ProZ.com: Dec 2008. | | N/A | English to Afrikaans (South African Translators' Institute / Suid-Afrikaanse Vertalersinstituut)
| | SATI / SAVI | | Adobe Acrobat, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Word, OmegaT, Powerpoint | | http://www.proz.com/profile/982934 | | English (PDF) | | Eugene Seegers endorses ProZ.com's Professional Guidelines (v1.0). | | About me Thank you for visiting my site!
In January 2009, my wife and I moved to Bloemfontein, the City of Roses, in Central South Africa. With my prior experience in translation, I was able to start a small business as a language practitioner.
Early days
As a child, I learnt to speak Afrikaans and English. (Strictly speaking, my "mother" tongue is English, but I am a native speaker of both languages.) My education was also bilingual. I attended English primary schools, but went to a dual-medium secondary school, where I received education in Afrikaans as a first language.
Professional experience
I worked in an unrelated field for a few years after school, where I picked up technical and interpersonal skills, after which I applied and was accepted as a non-salaried volunteer worker at the South African Branch Office of Jehovah's Witnesses in Krugersdorp. I spent a year and three months in the Printery. After completing two separate trial translations, I was invited to join the Afrikaans Translation Department.
My time in this department gave me invaluable experience in translating, proofreading, and editing texts, where the source language was English. Due to a confidentiality agreement, I am not able to specifically mention on which projects I worked, but suffice to say that I gained experience in translating a wide variety of texts, from medical, technical, religious, and other speciality fields to more general disciplines.
I became a member of SATI (South African Translators’ Institute) in 2009, and received my certification as an Accredited Professional Translator with SATI in May 2009.
Since beginning my venture as a freelancer, I have worked on several projects for several translation agencies, as well as for the local universities, other large corporations in South Africa and abroad and private individuals.
Work ethic
I strive to deliver projects on time, with the best quality possible, and the finest attention to detail. (I have been called pedantic by some, but I find this to my advantage in this field!)
Other interests
My avid interest in languages has led me to start learning Zulu, as well as South African Sign Language. There are an estimated one million deaf, first-language speakers of SASL.
I look forward to networking with like-minded professionals and offering quality solutions to clients around the globe. Please feel free to contact me! Visit my LinkedIn profile here: Genius Translation
Yours sincerely,
Eugene
|
|
Keywords: Vertaling, vertaler, afrikaans, english, translation, literature, advertising, history, education, philosophy, religion, proofreading, proofreader, redigering, teksversorging, general, editor, sub-editor, information technology, IT, technical, technical writer, technical writing, writing
Profile last updated
Sep 7, 2011 |
The translation workplace 
