English to Chinese: Decision Points
General field: Social Sciences
Detailed field: Government / Politics | |
Source text - English
The freedom agenda was a sensitive subject with China. My policy was to
engage the Chinese in areas where we agreed, and use this cooperation
to build the trust and credibility we needed to speak plainly about our
differences.
I worked to develop close relations with China’s leaders, Jiang Zemin
and Hu Jintao. President Jiang and I got off to a rough start. On April 1,
2001, an American surveillance plane known as an EP-3 collided with a
Chinese aircraft and made an emergency landing on Hainan Island. The
Chinese pilot ejected from the cockpit and died. Our twenty-four-person
crew was held at a military barracks on the island and interrogated. The
Iranian hostage crisis was at the forefront of my mind. This was not the
way I wanted to start my relationship with China.
After several agonizing days of trying to reach the Chinese, I con-
nected with President Jiang, who was in Chile. The Chinese soon agreed
to release the EP-3 crew. In return, I wrote a letter expressing regret over
the death of their pilot and our landing on Hainan without verbal clear-
ance. I later learned that China’s handling of the EP-3 crisis was based on
the government’s belief that the Chinese people had perceived weakness
in the response to America’s accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy
in Belgrade in 1999. After the EP-3 incident, the Chinese sent us a $1
million bill for the American crew’s food and lodging. We offered them
$34,000.
In February 2002, Laura and I made our first trip to Beijing. President
Jiang was a cordial and welcoming host. After a banquet in our honor at
the Great Hall of the People, he entertained the crowd with a rendition
of “O Sole Mio,” accompanied by two beautiful Chinese women clad in
military uniforms. His serenade was a big change from the previous year,
when I couldn’t get him on the phone. It was a sign we were developing
trust.
That trust was strengthened by an understanding on Taiwan, the is-
land democracy that had been governed separately from the mainland
since Chiang Kai-shek clashed with Mao Zedong during the Chinese
Civil War in 1949. Every time I met with Chinese leaders, I confirmed
that America’s longstanding “one China” policy would not change. I also
made clear that I opposed any unilateral change to the status quo, in-
cluding a declaration of independence by Taiwan or military action by
China. | Translation - Chinese
自由议题对中国来说是一个敏感的话题。我的政策是以我们（中美）已达成共识的领域为基础，以此建立起一种信任和信誉，这种信任和信誉可以帮助我们坦率的就我们的分歧进行对话。我一直致力于增进和江泽民，胡锦涛等中国领导人的关系。江主席和我在执政初期都曾面临过一段艰难的时期。2001年4月，一架美制EP-3电子侦察机与一架中国军用飞机相撞，美侦察机在中国海南岛紧急迫降。中国飞行员被从驾驶舱中弹出，不幸遇难。我方的全体成员共24名被驻岛军队扣留审问。这次事件使我立即联想到伊朗人质事件。以这种形式开始与中国的关系并不是我所期待的。 经过几天的艰难努力，我终于与正在智利访问的江主席取得了联系。中方很快同意释放EP-3侦查机机组的所有成员。在给江主席的信中，我对中方飞行员的遇难以及美方在无声明的情况下在海南岛迫降表示抱歉。我后来得知，中方对EP-3事件的处理方式是基于1999年的那次事件。1999年美国误炸中国驻贝尔格莱德大使馆，中国民众普遍认为那次中国政府的态度不够强硬。在EP-3事件之后，中国政府向美国发出了100万美元的账单，用以支付机组成员的饮食和住宿。最后我们付了34，000美元。2002年2月，我和劳拉第一次访问北京。江主席热情的接待了我们。在人民大会堂用完欢迎宴后，江主席还为我们表演了“我的太阳”，伴奏的是两位身着军装的漂亮的中国女孩。他的这次演奏同去年（的态度）相比是个巨大的变化。这表示我们正在建立互信。
这种互信由于在台湾问题上的共识而得到了增强，经过1949年的中国内战，蒋介石和毛泽东分岛而治，台湾岛实行了民主制度。每次我与中国领导人会面，我都强调美国一贯奉行的“一个中国”政策不会改变。并且我明确反对任何单边改变现状的行动，无论是台湾独立还是中国动武。 |
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