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English to Uzbek: The Coming Greater Depression of the 2020s General field: Art/Literary Detailed field: Journalism
Source text - English While there is never a good time for a pandemic, the COVID-19 crisis has arrived at a particularly bad moment for the global economy. The world has long been drifting into a perfect storm of financial, political, socioeconomic, and environmental risks, all of which are now growing even more acute.
NEW YORK – After the 2007-09 financial crisis, the imbalances and risks pervading the global economy were exacerbated by policy mistakes. So, rather than address the structural problems that the financial collapse and ensuing recession revealed, governments mostly kicked the can down the road, creating major downside risks that made another crisis inevitable. And now that it has arrived, the risks are growing even more acute. Unfortunately, even if the Greater Recession leads to a lackluster U-shaped recovery this year, an L-shaped “Greater Depression” will follow later in this decade, owing to ten ominous and risky trends.
The first trend concerns deficits and their corollary risks: debts and defaults. The policy response to the COVID-19 crisis entails a massive increase in fiscal deficits – on the order of 10% of GDP or more – at a time when public debt levels in many countries were already high, if not unsustainable.
Worse, the loss of income for many households and firms means that private-sector debt levels will become unsustainable, too, potentially leading to mass defaults and bankruptcies. Together with soaring levels of public debt, this all but ensures a more anemic recovery than the one that followed the Great Recession a decade ago.1
A second factor is the demographic time bomb in advanced economies. The COVID-19 crisis shows that much more public spending must be allocated to health systems, and that universal health care and other relevant public goods are necessities, not luxuries. Yet, because most developed countries have aging societies, funding such outlays in the future will make the implicit debts from today’s unfunded health-care and social-security systems even larger.1
A third issue is the growing risk of deflation. In addition to causing a deep recession, the crisis is also creating a massive slack in goods (unused machines and capacity) and labor markets (mass unemployment), as well as driving a price collapse in commodities such as oil and industrial metals. That makes debt deflation likely, increasing the risk of insolvency.
A fourth (related) factor will be currency debasement. As central banks try to fight deflation and head off the risk of surging interest rates (following from the massive debt build-up), monetary policies will become even more unconventional and far-reaching. In the short run, governments will need to run monetized fiscal deficits to avoid depression and deflation. Yet, over time, the permanent negative supply shocks from accelerated de-globalization and renewed protectionism will make stagflation all but inevitable.
A fifth issue is the broader digital disruption of the economy. With millions of people losing their jobs or working and earning less, the income and wealth gaps of the twenty-first-century economy will widen further. To guard against future supply-chain shocks, companies in advanced economies will re-shore production from low-cost regions to higher-cost domestic markets. But rather than helping workers at home, this trend will accelerate the pace of automation, putting downward pressure on wages and further fanning the flames of populism, nationalism, and xenophobia.4
This points to the sixth major factor: de-globalization. The pandemic is accelerating trends toward balkanization and fragmentation that were already well underway. The United States and China will decouple faster, and most countries will respond by adopting still more protectionist policies to shield domestic firms and workers from global disruptions. The post-pandemic world will be marked by tighter restrictions on the movement of goods, services, capital, labor, technology, data, and information. This is already happening in the pharmaceutical, medical-equipment, and food sectors, where governments are imposing export restrictions and other protectionist measures in response to the crisis.3
The backlash against democracy will reinforce this trend. Populist leaders often benefit from economic weakness, mass unemployment, and rising inequality. Under conditions of heightened economic insecurity, there will be a strong impulse to scapegoat foreigners for the crisis. Blue-collar workers and broad cohorts of the middle class will become more susceptible to populist rhetoric, particularly proposals to restrict migration and trade.2
This points to an eighth factor: the geostrategic standoff between the US and China. With the Trump administration making every effort to blame China for the pandemic, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s regime will double down on its claim that the US is conspiring to prevent China’s peaceful rise. The Sino-American decoupling in trade, technology, investment, data, and monetary arrangements will intensify.
Worse, this diplomatic breakup will set the stage for a new cold war between the US and its rivals – not just China, but also Russia, Iran, and North Korea. With a US presidential election approaching, there is every reason to expect an upsurge in clandestine cyber warfare, potentially leading even to conventional military clashes. And because technology is the key weapon in the fight for control of the industries of the future and in combating pandemics, the US private tech sector will become increasingly integrated into the national-security-industrial complex.
A final risk that cannot be ignored is environmental disruption, which, as the COVID-19 crisis has shown, can wreak far more economic havoc than a financial crisis. Recurring epidemics (HIV since the 1980s, SARS in 2003, H1N1 in 2009, MERS in 2011, Ebola in 2014-16) are, like climate change, essentially man-made disasters, born of poor health and sanitary standards, the abuse of natural systems, and the growing interconnectivity of a globalized world. Pandemics and the many morbid symptoms of climate change will become more frequent, severe, and costly in the years ahead.1
These ten risks, already looming large before COVID-19 struck, now threaten to fuel a perfect storm that sweeps the entire global economy into a decade of despair. By the 2030s, technology and more competent political leadership may be able to reduce, resolve, or minimize many of these problems, giving rise to a more inclusive, cooperative, and stable international order. But any happy ending assumes that we find a way to survive the coming Greater Depression.
Translation - Uzbek Dunyo hamjamiyatini kutib turgan buyuk tushkunlik
2007–2009-yillardagi iqtisodiy inqirozdan so‘ng yo‘l qo‘yilgan siyosiy xatoliklar shundoq ham jahon iqtisodiyoti to‘la bo‘lgan nomutanosibliklar va xavflarni yanada chuqurlashtirib yubordi. Hukumatlar esa moliyaviy inqiroz sabab ochilib qolgan darzlarni tizimli ravishda hal qilishga yondashmadi. Vaqtida hal qilinishi talab qilingan muammolar keyinga surildi.
Bugun yana dunyo iqtisodiyoti inqirozni boshdan kechirar ekan, jahon iqtisodiyotiga xavf tug‘dirayotgan tahdidlar yanada keskinlashadi va dunyo keyingi o‘n yillikda “buyuk depressiya”ni boshidan kechiradi, deb yozadi nufuzli nashrlardan biri The Project Syndicate nashri. Maqola muallifi Nuriel Rubini fikricha kutilayotgan depressiyaning eng mudhish o‘n belgisi mavjud.
Birinchi belgi hukumatlarning budjet defitsiti muammosi va unga yo‘ldosh bo‘lgan qarzdorlik va defolt muammosi. COVID-19’ga qarshi chora sifatida milliy hukumatlar budjet defitsitini yuzaga keltiradigan qarorlar qabul qilmoqda. Ayrim mamlakatlarda davlat qarzi hajmi esa to‘lab bo‘lmas darajaga kelib qolgan.
Eng yomoni esa oilalar va kompaniyalarning daromadlaridan ayrilgani xususiy sektor qarzining oshishiga olib keladi. Natijada, ommaviy kuzatiladigan defolt va bankrotlik holatlari sodir bo‘ladi. Davlat qarzlarining o‘sishi manzarasida bunday vaziyat iqtisodiyotni 10 yil avvalgi inqirozdan ham og‘ir kechishiga ishora.
Ikkinchi omil bu rivojlangan mamlakatlardagi demografik vaziyat bilan bog‘liq. COVID-19 pandemiyasi hukumatlarga sog‘liqni saqlash sohasiga ko‘proq mablag‘ ajratish lozimligini, chunki bu eng zaruriy soha ekanini ko‘rsatib qo‘ydi. Ammo rivojlangan mamlakatlarda aholining aksar qatlami keksayib borayotgan qatlam ekani inobatga olinsa, bu sohaga kelajakda ko‘proq mablag‘ ajratish sog‘liqni saqlash va ijtimoiy sug‘urta sohasini yetarli darajada moliyalanmasligi bilan bog‘liq maxfiy qarzlarni paydo qiladi.
Uchinchi muammo deflyasiya xavfining ko‘tarilishi bilan bog‘liq. Bugungi inqiroz nafaqat chuqur resessiyani yuzaga keltirdi, shuningdek, bozorlarda ortiqcha mahsulotning to‘planib qolishiga (mashinalar), mehnat bozoridagi ishsizlik, neft va sanoat metallari narxlarining keskin tushib ketishiga sabab bo‘ldi. Bu esa qarzdorlik deflyasiyani paydo qiladi va qarzni to‘lay olmaslikka sabab bo‘ladi.
To‘rtinchi muammo – valyutalar qiymatining qadrsizlanishi. Markaziy banklar deflyasiyaning salbiy ta’sirini kamaytirishga urinadilar va qarzlar miqdorining ortib ketishi bilan bog‘liq vaziyatda foiz stavkalarini keskin ko‘tarilishini oldini olishga harakat qiladilar. Shu sababdan monetary siyosat noan’anaviy tus oladi va havflarga to‘la bo‘ladi. Qisqa muddatli istiqbolda esa inqiroz va deflyasiyaning oldini olish uchun hukumatlar budjet taqchilligini monetizasiya qilishga to‘g‘ri keladi. Ammo proteksionist siyosatining qaytadan tiklanishi stagflyasiyani yuzaga keltiradi.
Beshinchi muammo – raqamli iqtisodiyotdagi keng va keskin o‘zgarishlar. Millionlab insonlar o‘z ishidan ayrilayotgan yoki kam ishlab topayotgan bir sharoitda XXI asr iqtisodiyotida daromadlar va boyliklar o‘rtasidagi farq juda katta bo‘ladi. Ishlab chiqarish zanjirlari uzilishi oqibatida biznes zavodlarini o‘zlarining mintaqalariga ko‘chira boshlaydi. Biroq bu ishlab chiqarishning yanada avtomatlashtirilishiga, ish haqlari miqdorining pasayishiga olib keladi. Natijada, populistik siyosat, millatchilik va ksenofobiya yuzaga keladi.
Deglobalizatsiya esa oltinchi muammodir. Pandemiya esa jahon iqtisodiyotining bir-biridan uzilish jarayonini tezlashtirdi. AQSh va Xitoy o‘rtasidagi aloqalar uzilishi yanada tezlashadi. Aksar mamlakatlar buning ta’sirida o‘z iqtisodiyotlarini proteksionizm siyosati bilan himoya qilishga urinadi. Pandemiyadan so‘ng tovarlar, xizmatlar, kapital, ishchi kuchi, texnologiyalar va axborot almashish borasida siyosat keskinlashadi. Ayni paytda oziq-ovqat, dori-darmon kabi mahsulotlarning eksporti proteksionist siyosati natijasida ancha kamaydi.
Bu esa o‘z navbatida demokratiyadan norozilik kayfiyatini yuzaga keltiradi. Bunday vaziyatda esa liberal populistlar yaxshigina foydalanib qoladi. Sababi ular ishsizlik sonining o‘sishi, zaif iqtisodiyot va tengsizlikning kuchayishidan manfaatdor.
AQSh va Xitoy o‘rtasidagi geostrategik qarama-qarshilik – sakkizinchi muammo. Sababi AQSh prezidenti COVID-19 pandemiyasi uchun bor mag‘zavani Xitoyga ag‘darishga harakat qilar ekan, Xitoy tomoni ham AQSh-Xitoy iqtisodiyotining tinch rivojlanishiga to‘sqinlik qilmoqda degan siyosatni yurgizishda faollashadi. Savdo-sotiq, texnologiyalar, sarmoyalar, axborot almashinuvi borasida AQSh va Xitoy munosabatlari uzoqlashish kuzatiladi.
Eng yomoni esa AQSh bir tarafda, Xitoy, Rossiya, Eron va Shimoliy Koreya ikkinchi tomonda, yangi sovuq urushning boshlanishidir. AQShda navbatdagi prezidentlik saylovlari boshlanish arafasida ekan, yangi kiber hujumlar turli xil nizo va istiloflarni yuzaga chiqaradi.
O‘ninchi muammo esa ekologik o‘zgarishlar. COVID-19 sharoitida yuzaga kelgan iqtisodiy tartibsizlik moliyaviy inqirozdan ham og‘irroq inqirozlarga olib keladi. 1980-yillarda avj olgan VICH, 2003-yildagi SARS, 2009-yildagi H1N1, 2011-yildagi MERS va 2014–2016-yillardagi ebola kabi epidemiyalarning muntazam ravishda takrorlanishi iqlim o‘zgarishi kabi falokatlarga olib keladi. Bu eng avvalo tibbiy sanitariya standartlarining sifatsizligi, tabiiy boyliklarni suiiste’mol qilish va globallashgan dunyoda munosabatlarning chambarchas bog‘liqligi bilan ham izohlanadi. Kelgusida iqlim o‘zgarishi bilan bog‘liq muammolar hukumatlar uchun og‘riqli, qimmatga tushadigan jarayonga aylanadi.
Bunday tahdidlarni COVID-19 pandemiyasidan oldin ham kuzatish mumkin edi. COVID-19 esa bu muammolar dunyo hamjamiyatini og‘ir kechadigan o‘n yillikka mahkum ekanini yanada tezlashtirib yubordi. 2030-yillarga borib taraqqiy etgan texnologiyalar va oqilona siyosiy rahbarlik bu muammolarning salbiy ta’sirlarini yo‘qqa chiqarishi yoki kamaytirishi mumkin. Baxtli yakun esa xalqaro hamjamiyatning qanchalik bir-biri bilan hamkorlik qilishiga bog‘liq bo‘lib qoladi.
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