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Source text - English THAT POWER IS NOT JUSTICE.
Respondent’s claim that justice is power cannot stand, nor can the derivative theory
that justice is defined by legality. These represent the notion that justice is
actually the opinion of the powerful, and we have already seen that opinion cannot be
truth. Opinion may correspond to the truth, and likewise the laws of the powerful may
be just, if they correspond to true justice. But they are not the measure of justice for
the same reason that man is not the measure of all things. The opinions of human beings
are relative. The truth is not.
Thus, the nature of justice cannot be an opinion, neither that of an individual nor
a government. The opinion of a government is still an opinion and not causative of the
truth any more than an individual’s. If the government believes its laws just, that does
not make them so. They may be just or the reverse, but not due to the government’s
opinion of the matter. Rather, it would be due to the congruity or lack thereof obtaining
between the law and true justice.
Some would even argue that the opinion of a God is yet an opinion, a position
seemingly more compelling when one considers the imperfect nature of the Pagan
Gods, constantly squabbling and scheming. It is beyond our scope to inquire whether
the opinions of an omniscient infinite deity on the subject of justice are, in themselves,
truth, though it would seem that they would merely correspond to truth until
they became the object of the divine will, whereupon they could become actual truth.
An all-knowing God’s opinion of justice could not fail to be a true opinion. Yet,
unless God then proceeded to will his opinion into being, it seems that it would remain
an opinion. Even afterwards, there would presumably remain the dichotomy
between the opinion in the almighty mind and the otherness called justice which God
just created, though they are nearly coeval. This is where we must abandon the topic,
for further pursuit requires asking whether Gods opine at all, which in turn mandates
positing an entire theology, which we shall not do here. This is probably a fatal omission,
for without an understanding of the holy and the divine, how it is and whether it
is, it may be impossible to identify justice, without which the ideal system of justice
will irrevocably fall beyond our intellectual reach. Certainly, we would need to address
this question. Petitioner and Respondent, however, have both instructed us to
pass over this issue. Therefore we shall move on.
Translation - Chinese 权力不是正义。
English to Chinese: America On Trial
Source text - English THAT LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION ARE DISTINGUISHABLE
AS OPPOSITES IN SEVERAL RESPECTS.
Respondent has claimed that our attempts to distinguish legislative from adjudicative
acts are moot, since in many cases these two types of action are not clearly
different and indeed sometimes appear nearly identical. We disagree, since even in
cases of striking similarity they are clearly distinct, as they contain opposite essences
and therefore cannot possibly be the same thing. Legislation and adjudication differ
spatially and temporally. Spatially, legislation applies to the whole, while adjudication
applies to a part. Temporally, legislation applies to future acts while adjudication
applies to past acts. Therefore, decisions which apply in the future to the whole are
solidly legislative in nature, while decisions that apply to the past of a part of the
whole are clearly adjudicative. Now, certainly the Respondent is correct that the definition
of the whole can be manipulated so as to clothe adjudications in legislative
costume, but such is trickery,80 and the manipulative parties will not be so easily able
to redefine the past as to make it appear to be the future, or describe the future so as to
deceive people into thinking it the past. Thus, temporal opposition is the clearest way
to distinguish legislation from adjudication. We note that the Respondent’s own constitution
makes use of these two distinguishing factors, for it forbids the Congress
from passing any bill of attainder or ex-post facto law. These forbidden ‘laws’ are in
fact adjudications, being in the one case too narrow, and in the other, applicable to the
past, precisely the two factors which distinguish adjudication from legislation.
Respondent complains, however, that while we first criticized Respondent for its
failure to see the underlying ratios which define legislative and adjudicative action, we
now abandon those distinctions and criticize them for failing to see a new, unrelated
distinction between these powers, namely past or future applicability to whole or partial
groups. Respondent asserts that it cannot be liable for failure to appreciate both, since as
this court has already stated, there cannot be more than one true definition of a thing.
We agree that there cannot be more than one true definition of any thing, but we do
not agree that we have suggested two rival methods of viewing legislation and adjudication.
The spatial and temporal measures which we have just described are the natural
and necessary consequences of the ratio formulae of distributive and corrective justice.
They are not rival definitions, but obvious attributes arising from the application of
geometric and arithmetic means respectively. By way of illustration, an instance of corrective
justice is impossible but upon known facts. It requires a comparison of existing
circumstances. These cannot be matters of futurity, but must rather be things already past, lest they cease to be knowable and comparable. Thus, corrective justice applies by
nature to past events and cannot conceivably apply to future events. On the contrary,
distributive justice looks to the future result of a contemplated distribution in order to
verify whether that future result will admit of geometric proportionality. Thus, distribution
naturally involves an estimation of matters of futurity. With regard to the scope of
an act, whether it falls upon the whole or a discrete part, these factors are also natural
consequences of the operation of distributive and corrective justice. A correction cannot
involve the whole, for corrections require two parties, one with an unwarranted surplus
and the other a resulting deficit. The whole is a single party, and it cannot be said to be
simultaneously in a state of surplus and deficit in regard to itself. Corrective justice, by
nature, must therefore apply to parts of the whole and not to the whole itself. Correspondingly,
distributive justice is by definition an enterprise which involves
consideration of the proportionate effects of any distribution on the whole. For example,
the law ‘all non-felons shall be able to vote’ involves the distribution of enfranchisement
to a part of the whole, the non-felons, based on their merit compared to the felons,
and together, these elements, felon and non-felon, comprise the whole. Thus, the distribution
contemplates the whole and attempts to make a proportionate distribution in light
of the true differences among parts of the whole. As we noted before, however, the
definition of the whole can be manipulated by those desiring to manufacture a specific
outcome, an hence this measure is of less evidentiary value than temporal characteristics
like the prospective or retrospective nature of a decision.
Translation - Chinese 立法和裁判在数方面对立因而可区分