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Translation - English The Anfal Processes and the
Silence of Media in Recognizing It
Dr. Kawa Raza
Dean of Dukan Technical Institute
Silemani Polytechnic University
Title of the study
The current study is a detailed analysis of the silence of the International Community, local and international media regarding the Anfal process. This study is also an attempt to highlight the factors behind the silence of the international media in recognizing the Anfal genocide, with taking into consideration the weak and ill-programmed local Kurdish media in publicizing and universalizing such issue.
Parts of the study
This study consists of three main parts. Each part consists of a number of (par w wachaparek). The first part is a theoretical framework of the research. The second part discusses the meaning of the word "Anfal", its stages, the setting through the Anfal processes were conducted, in addition to international interests and their silence in regards of serious crimes against humanity.
The third part is an inclusive analysis of the factors behind which the international media has turned a blind eye on the Anfal genocide. This is in addition to the fact that the Anfal has not yet been recognized as an internationalized crime, as The Holocaust. To confirm this issue, the researcher has depended on analyzing data collected through a survey related to the problem of the research. For this purpose, this part has been divided into two sections. The first section is dedicated to study the Anfal processes and the role of media in this concern. That is, it includes a discussion of extents to which Anfal has reflexed the media. As for the second section, the researcher attempts to highlight the factors behind the negligence of the Arabic and international media in regards of the Anfal processes. That is to say, it will include the reasons behind which media has been incapable of practicing its ethical role concerning the inhumane genocide of the Kurds during the Anfal processes.
Statement of the problem
The Media, despite its positive role as the fourth authority in the society, has been inconsiderate regarding the genocide of the Kurds during the Anfal processes. Thus, it has been incapable of subjectively dealing with this case, without being biased to the interests of the superpowers of the world. As a result, media not, yet, been able to internationalize the Kurdish Anfal. Meanwhile, the ineffectiveness and the laxity of Kurdish Media in terms of recognizing and internationalizing the Anfal genocide is another problem stated in the current study, and which will be examined in this study. The researcher suggests that the findings of this issue need to be thoroughly discussed by media experts and concerned institutes to further work on.
Significance of the study
The significance of the current study is stated in the following;
1- It is a rare research conducted about the Anfal processes and Media.
2- Through this research the weak points of the Kurdish media in terms of broadcasting the Anfal are shown.
3- The analyses of this study state the reasons behind the silence of the international media regarding the Anfal genocide. Thus, the current study shall function as an academic resource in recognizing the Anfal genocide. It shall also contribute as an effective resource related to the Anfal genocide in the Kurdish library.
4- The local Kurdish media may consider working on the findings and results of this study, as a starting point to further nationalize and internationalize the Anfal genocide through a national program.
Purpose of the study
The purpose of this study is to highlight the reasons behind the negligence of the Kurdish media in recognizing the Anfal genocide. It is also an attempt to state the factors behind the silence of the international media in broadcasting and internationalizing the Anfal genocide.
Methods and Materials
In this research, both analytical and practical methods are applied. The results of this study are analyzed based on the results of a survey regarding the problem of the current study. Fifty survey forms were distributed on fifty participants of different age groups, and diverse professional and political backgrounds within the city of Silemani. Notes, opinions, and analyses of the researcher will be offered anytime needed.
English to Arabic: Social Norms on Violence In and Around Schools in Tanzania and Iraq General field: Social Sciences Detailed field: Human Resources
Source text - English International Rescue Committee
Study Title: Social Norms on Violence In and Around Schools in Tanzania and Iraq
Oral Assent Script for Minors
Hello, my name is [enumerator name]. I am working with the IRC and a researcher in the United States in XX to do a study about bad things that happen to kids at school and around school. A research study is a way to learn more about people and their experiences. You are being asked to join this study because you are a child living in XX.
If you agree to be a part of this study, you will be asked to answer questions from a list. The questions will ask you about things that have happened or things that you think. Sometimes talking about these things can be nice, but sometimes it can also be sad and can make you feel uncomfortable or sad or unhappy. Since we’re going to talk about violence, it may not feel nice. If don’t feel like answering any question, you can say that you don’t want to answer that question. No one will be upset with you if you do not want to answer one question or all the questions.
If you decide to join this study and answer our questions, it will help us to understand what it is like to be a child in XX.
The interview will take about an hour.
When we are done talking to all the children and some adults, too, we will write a report about what we learned. This report will not have your name or anything about you in it.
You do not have to be part of this study if you do not want to. You can say ok now and change your mind later. If we start and you want to stop, that’s okay, too. All you have to do is tell us you want to stop. No one will be mad at you if you don’t want to be in the study or if you join the study and change your mind later and stop. Your parents also know that we’re talking with you. We won’t tell them any of your answers, but they do know you’re here.
Before we start the study, we will answer any questions you have. If you have questions or feel sad about what we talked about, please let us know at any time before, during or after the study. If you have questions or worries later, you or your parents can call or visit someone who works at the IRC in your community.
IF TANZANIA: His name is Thimotheo Masaniywa and you can call him at +255756 852 340. You may also visit the IRC Community Service Center at Nyarugusu Camp (see attached map).
IF IRAQ: Her name is Heather Hanson and you can call her at +964 (0) 770 478 2819. You may also visit the IRC office at Al Salam Quarter, House # 240/09/363, Ainkawa, Erbil, Kurdistan, IRAQ.
Do you agree to do the interview? (Please say yes or no. If you say “yes,” it means that you agree to take part in this research study.)
Translation - Arabic لجنة الإنقاذ العالمية
عنوان الدراسة: المعايير الاجتماعية بشأن العنف في وحول المدارس في دولتي تنزانيا والعراق
إستمارة الموافقة للمشاركة في مناقشات جماعية مركزة حول الأم والمعلم
مرحبا، اسمي [اسم العداد] وأنا أعمل مع الباحث في جامعة هارفارد في الولايات المتحدة. أنا أعمل مع لجنة الإنقاذ الدولية في السليمانية لإجراء بحوث بشأن المواقف والمعايير بشأن أعمال العنف التي يواجهها الأطفال في المدارس وحولها والعنف الأسري. لقد جئت لمجتمعكم من أجل فهم أفضل للوضع الراهن. لقد تم تحديدكم لهذه المجموعة التركيزية لكونكم والدوا أو معلموا الأطفال الذين تتراوح أعمارهم بين 7-12. وأود أن أتكلم معكم عن كل ما في هذا الإعداد المجموعات البؤرية الصغيرة وأسمع عن خبراتكم وآرائكم.
سوف أطرح عليكم مجموعة من الأسئلة. أود أن أطلب من جميعكم أن يشاركوا في هذه المناقشة. وأود أن أتأكد بأني أعطيت الجميع فرصة للتعبير عن رأيهم.
وسوف يتم إجراء 8-10 مجموعات التركيز مع مجموعه من 50 مشاركين في كل مجموعة تركيزية، للحصول على صورة شاملة. سوف نقوم بتسجيل الأجبة، والتي سيتم نسخها. وستبقى أجوبتكم سرية ولن تظهر اسمك وأسماء عائلتك من بين الملاحظات. وكذلك سوف نناقش السرية كمجموعة. سوف لن يكون هناك أي أرباط بينك وبين أجوبتك، لذا لا تتردد في إخباري وإخبار المجموعة عن رأيك.
سوف يأخذ المناقشة التركيزية الجماعية حوالي 1-2 ساعات من وقتك.
وجميع المعلومات التي تقدمها لي تبقى سرية ولن تكتب اسمك على أي من وثائقنا بحيث لا يمكن لأحد أن يحدد لك. لن يظهر اسمك على أية وثائق تتعلق بالدراسة. إذا كان لديك أسئلة أو استفسارات بعد المقابلة، يمكنك الاتصال بنا أو زيارة شخص يعمل في مكتب لجنة الإنقاذ الدولي.
إذا كانت في دولة تانزانيا: أسمه ثيموتيو ماسانيوا و سوف تتصل به عبر +255 756 852 340. وكذلك باستطاعتك زيارة مركز الخدمة المجتمعية التابعة للجنة الإنقاذ الدولي في مخيم نياروغوسو (أنظر الى الخارطة الملحقة)
إذا كانت في دولة العراق: أسمها هيثر هانسن و سوف تتصل بها عبر +964 (0) 770 478 2819. وكذلك باستطاعتك زيارة مكتب لجنة الإنقاذ الدولي الواقعة في الدار رقم # 240/09/363 حي السلام, عين كاوه, أربيل, كوردستان العراق.
يرجى التأكد من أن:
1. المشاركة في هذه الدراسة طوعي تماما.
2. ومن حقكم أن عدم إجابة أي من الأسئلة المطلوبة.
3. أنت حر في إنهاء الإستفسار متى ما شئت.
4. اسمك وهويتك ستبقى سرية في أي من المنشورات أو المناقشات.
5. يحق لك الحصول على نسخة ورقية من هذا الإشعار السرية. رجاءاُ أسأل إذا كنت ترغب في الحصول على نسخة واحدة.
أرى المخاطر الناجمة عن مشاركتكم في هذا البحث من الدرجة الأدنى. قد يكون هناك بعض التوتر المصاحب مناقشة العنف ضد الأطفال، وخاصة بين أقرانك، في قضية أن يكون لديك تجربة مع مثل هذه الحالات. في الحالة التي كنت تشعر بعدم الارتياح أو بالأسى، لدينا شخص متاح لك لاجراء محادثات مع ويمكن الرجوع لك الآخرين لاجراء محادثات مع أكبر. الآن بعد أن قد سمعت هذه المعلومات، هل لديك أي أسئلة أو طلبات خاصة؟
هل توافق على المشاركة في مناقشة مجموعة التركيز؟ (يرجى القول نعم أو لا)
Arabic to English: Funfairs General field: Social Sciences Detailed field: Education / Pedagogy
Source text - Arabic الملخص
ان مدن الملاهى تعنى المدن التى يتم فيها تقديم الخدمات الترفيهية من خلال بعض الالعاب الموجودة فيها والتى تستعمل من قبل الصغار والكبار، وهذه الالعاب تتكون اما من مجموعة من آلات واجهزة كهربائية او الكترونية او ما يدار باية قوة اخرى سواء كانت جسدية ام مائية ، واما تتكون من العاب اخرى التى تمارس من قبل المرتادين لهذه المدن كلعبة السباحة والسباقة ، وان ارتياد هذه المدن او استعمال او ممارسة العابها قد يصاب او يلحق ضررا ببعض المرتادين او المستعملين او الممارسين ولا سيما الاطفال منهم سواء اكان ذلك الضرر وفاة ام ضررا جسديا ام نفسيا وعصبيا فحسب.
وان هذه الاضرار التى تنتج من حوادث مدن الملاهى تؤدى الى اقامة المسؤولية المدنية على الجهة المنظمة لمدن الملاهى باعتبارها ملزمة بضمان سلامة هؤلاء المتضررين سواء كانوا من الزائرين ام من المستعملين او الممارسين، وان هذه المسؤولية محكومة بقواعد العامة للمسؤولية المدنية فى القانون المدنى سواء كانت عقدية ام تقصيرية بسبب عدم وجود تنظيم قانونى خاص لمسؤوليتها ، وبامكان المتضرر مطالبة الجهة المنظمة للمدينة التعويض عن ما لحقه من اضرار مادية وادبية حسب نوع المسؤولية للجهة المنظمة لمدن الملاهى ، ومن جهة اخرى هناك ضمانات للمتضرر لحصوله على مبلغ التعويض بشكل مؤكد او بشكل سهل ويسير وتتمثل ذلك بتأمين مسؤولية الجهة المنظمة لمدن الملاهى ، لذا يجب الزام الجهات المنظمة لمدن الملاهى بابرام عقد التأمين مع احدى شركات التأمين لتأمين مسؤوليتها ، وبالمقابل هناك ضمانات للجهة المنظمة للمدينة فى بعض الحالات التى يمكن للجهة المنظمة للمدينة فيها دفع المسؤولية عن نفسها.
وبعد ان يلحق بالمرتادين سواء اكانوا من الزائرين ام المستعملين ام من الممارسين ضررا يحق لهم ان يقيموا الدعوى لحصولهم على التعويض ، وبعد ان تثبت مسؤولية مدن الملاهى نتيجة الدعوى التى اقامها المتضرر عليها ، فيستحق المتضرر التعويض المادى والادبى حسب نوع المسؤولية التى قد تكون عقدية اذا كان المتضرر قد تضرر نتيجة اخلال الجهة المنظمة للمدينة بالتزاماتها العقدية ، وقد تكون تقصيرية اذا كان المتضرر لم يكن له عقد ما مع الجهة المنظمة لمدن الملاهى وقد تضرر نتيجة اخلال الجهة المنظمة لمدن الملاهى بالتزاماتها القانونية ، ومناط هذه الالتزامات هو عدم الاضرار بالآخرين.
Translation - English Abstract
Funfairs refer to the places in which entertainment services through some games are provided, which are used by both the youth and the elderly. These games include a set of machines and electrical or electronic appliances, games that are managed by any other physical or waters force, other games that exercised by the habitué of these places such as swimming and racing. The frequent visits to these funfairs, and the constant use and practice of their games might hurt or cause or damage to some habitués, particularly children. These damages might be death or physical, psychological and neurologically harm.
The damage that are resulted from accidents in the funfairs lead to the establishment of civil liability on the organizers of these funfairs as an obligation to ensure the safety of those affected, whether they are visitors or users or practitioners. This responsibility is governed by the general rules of civil liability in civil law, whether contractual or neglecting, because of the lack of legal regulation a special responsibility, and could aggrieved claim the organizer of the funfair to compensate for what the subsequent damage to material and moral depending on the type of responsibility Organization destination for amusement parks. On the other hand, there are guarantees for the victims to receive the amount of compensation surely and easily. Thus it is necessary to oblige the organizers of the funfairs to sign an insurance contract with an insurance company to secure its responsibility. In return, there are guarantees for the organizers of the funfair in some cases in which they can be free of responsibility.
When damage is caused to visitors, users or practitioners, they are entitled to file a lawsuit to get compensation. When funfairs are found accountable for the damage, the affected shall be entitled to financial moral compensation depending on the type of responsibility. The type of responsibility may be contractual if the victim is harmed as a result of a breach of the organizer of the funfair obligations. It may also be negligence if the victim did not have a contract with the organizer of the funfair and is harmed as a result of breach of the organizers of funfair with its legal obligations, and the focus of these commitments is not to harm others.
Arabic to English: Fundamental Objectives General field: Social Sciences Detailed field: Agriculture
Source text - Arabic .الاهداف الشاملة (الاساسية) Fundamental objectives
وهي الاهداف المتعلقة بالمجتمع بشكل اساس, ويمثل تحقيقها او الوصول اليها تغيرات في النواحي الاجتماعية والاقتصادية والثقافية, ونبذ القيم والممارسات والاتجاهات المرفوضة واحلال البديل الايجابي مكانها وذلك للوصول الى المجتمع انتاجاﹰ وتعلماﹰ وعلاقات .ومن الامثلة على هذا المستوى من الاهداف , ايجاد المواطن الصالح , وتمتين الترابط الاجتماعي , ورفع مستوى كفاءة الاقتصاد الزرعي , وتقليص الفوارق بين الريف والمدنية.
2.الاهداف العامة General objectives
وهي ذات صفة عامة قياسا للمستوى اللاحق من الاهداف , واكثر تحديداﹰ ودقة من المستوى السابق لها ويرتبط هذا المستوى بصورة مباشرة مع نشاطات وجهود الخدمة الارشادية. وتتمثل بصورة العمومية وتبنى عليها اهداف البرامج الارشادية التي تستهدف تحسين نوعية حياة المجتمع كتحقيق دخول زراعية مرتفعة ,ورفع مستوى عوائل الريفية , وتنمية الروح القيادية , وتنمية المجتمعات الريفية وتطوير الخدمات بها .
3.الاهداف التنفيذية Working objectives
وهي الاهداف الدقيقة والمحددة التي بتحقيقها نصل الى تحقيق هدف او اهداف عامة , وتتمثل هذه الاهداف باتجاه الارشاد الزراعي واستهدافه رفع الكفاءة الانتاجية لاي من المحاصيل النباتية او الحيوانات المزرعية باستخدام اسلوب تقني او اكثر , وبتعليمه الافراد المحليين والتعاون معهم على المستوى المحلي . (السامرائي,1992: 72).
ثالثاﹰ:سياسة التخطيط البرامج الارشادية
عرف (1962)Kincaidالسياسة بأنها الوسيلة التي عن طريقها تستطيع الانتقال الى مرحلة الفعل العام حيث يتم خلالها تحقيق الاهداف الموضوعة. ويرى Kelsey و Hearn على ان كلمة السياسة تعني منهجاً مقرراً محدد يعتنقه ويسير عليه فريق أو هيئة ما, وهناك سياسات كثيرة غير مكتوبة تستعمل في تكوين الأداء والتقريرات اليومية بالنسبة لمزارع والخدمات العامة ويحدد درجة ودقة فعالية سياسة ماكونها معلنة او مكتوبة او لا((Kelsey,Hean,1954:111. السياسة هي الاداة التي بموجبها سيتم تحقيق الاهداف الارشادية التعليمية التي رسمتها المنظمة الارشادية والتي ترمي لتحقيقها وهي النهج الذي يحتذيه المخططون والذي يوجه سلوك وتصرف العاملين في تنفيذ البرنامج . فمن الثابت ان المنظمة الارشادية لاتتمكن من تحقيق اهدافها بالفترة الزمنية المحددة لها الا من خلال اتباع سياسة واضحة تحدد المسار نحو الاهداف المرسومة(لسامرائي,1992: 75). ويمكن تمثيل السياسة العامة للتخطيط الارشادي(بالمشاركة الجماهيرية)والتي من خلالها يفسح المجال بحرية وديمقراطية للمشاركين بالعمل لابداء الرأي والتعاون واحترام قيمة وجهود كل منهم الاخر(السامرائي والجادري,1990: 226).
رابعاﹰ:طرق تخطيط البرامج الارشادية Approaches in Extension Program Planning
عرف (1962)Kincaidالطريقة بأنها تنظيم اجراءات العمل في عمليات التخطيط برامج من خلال المشاركة في لجان التخطيط. فعندما تتمثل السياسة بالمشاركة الجماهيرية فأن الطرق تعني حينذاك كيفية تنفيذ المشاركة , كأن تنفذ بالاسلوب الرسمي أو اللارسمي , والكيفية التي ستنفذ بها , والجدول الزمني الذي ستنفذ ضمنه(السامرائي والجادري,1990: 227).
المرحلة الثانية:الحاجة للتخطيط
تتضمن تأكيد ونشر وتبرير أهمية عملية التخطيط واعطاؤها الصفة الشرعية بين الجماعات والجهات ذات علاقة وبين الافراد المعنيين بالبرامج الارشادية التعليمية . ويمكن النظر لهذه المرحلة على انها المدخل والخطوة الانتقالية للجهود التخطيطية الى المستويات المحلية(السامرائي والجادري,1990: 227 ). ولاجل استكمال هذه المرحلة وضمان نجاحها يفترض ان يتم التعرف على مجالين رئيسين هما الالمام بالفعاليات التخطيطية السابقة كيتضمن جيع المحاولات التي تمت في مجال التخطيط , وكذلك التعرف على النجاح والتقدم الذي تم انجازه , ونقاط الضعف او الفشل الى حدثت والاسباب التي ادت لكل من الحالتين, والطرق والاجراءات التي اتبعت في العمل , مع تقدير كامل للواقع الحالي , لكي يتم الابتداء من ذلك الموقع باتجاه التحسين والتغير.والمجال الثاني تحديد مجال ومدى الفعاليات التخطيطية للمستقبل ويطلب هذا من ضمن مايتطلبه الالمام بالنشاطات التخطيطية للجهات والتنظيمات التنموية الاخرى ذات العلاقة. وفي هذه المرحلة يجب ان تؤخذ الحاجة التي ستظهر مستقبلاﹰ بنظر الاعتبار , من اجل تصور مسؤولية وواجب كل من تنظيم الارشادي والتنظيمات او الجهات الاخرى ونوعية التنسيق المطلوب للعمل التنموي والكيفية التي يتم بها(السامرائي,1992: 122). وهناك عدة حالات او اعتبارات ترتبط بنجاح هذه المرحلة :
1.حصر الانشطة التخطيطية السابقة للعمل الارشادي بالمستوى المحلي .
2.تقييم الانشطة التخطيطية للمنظمات الاخرى المتصلة بالعمل الارشادي .
3.تحديد الافراد او الجماعات او الهيئات التي يمكن ان تسهم في الوقوف على الاحتياجات التحطيطية المحلية .
4.تحديد الاهداف والسياسات والمناهج المرتبطة بتخطيط البرامج الارشادية على المستوى المحلي, وتوضيحها وتفسيرها للمشتركين في تلك البرامج من العاملين الارشاديين, ومحاولة التوصل الى اتفاق عام فيما بينهم بشأن تلك الاهداف والسياسات والمناهج .
5.توضيح اهداف والسياسات ومناهج العمل الارشادي بالمستوى المحلي الى المنظمات والجماعات والحكومات المحلية ذات الصلة بالبرامج الارشادية او المعنية بتطوير الريف(صفاءالدين,1991: 126).
المرحلة الثالثة:التنظيم وتشكيل لجان التخطيط
وتعني تنظيم الموارد البشرية والمادية المتوفرة والمؤمل توفرها من أجل زجها في عملية التخطيط . وتشمل عملية تنظيم الموارد البشرية كلا من العاملين بالارشاد الزراعي , والافراد المعنيين بالعمل الارشادي التعليمي- فمن الضروري معرفة وتهيئة العاملين بالارشاد كما ونوعا وتوزيعها على المستويات المختلفة.ويعني التنظيم بالنسبة للافراد المحليين التوجه نحو تطبيق مبدأ المشاركة الجماهيرية , حيث يهيء الافراد المشاركون يرفع مقدرتهم وكفاءتهم للمساهمة بالعملية التخطيطية والتوجه نحو تنظيم لجان التخطيط(الصيغة الرسمية للمشاركة الجماهيرية) , وفيما يتعلق بالموارد المادية فيتم دراستها والتعرف على نوعيتها وكميتها سواء منها ماهو قائم اثناء التخطيط أو مستقبلا عند التنفيذ لكي يتم زجها في التخطيط وصولا لتحقيق الاهداف المرغوبة(السامرائي والجادري,1990: 228). واللجنة تعني مجموعة من الافراد المعنيين او المنتخبين تعد لهم مسؤولية القيام بعمل معين(السامرائي,1992 :82). هذا وتوجد انواع عديدة من اللجان قسمت وفقاﹰ لطبيعة الواجبات والمهام المكلفة بها, أو على اساس الوظيفة: فقد تكون ذات وظيفة مفردة او متعددة الوظائف , ووفقا لمحور الزمن(المدة) الى لجان دائمية و لجان وقتية , وعلى ضوء تشكيلها الى لجان رسمية و لجان لارسمية . (السامرائي,1992: 126).
Translation - English
1. Fundamental Objectives
These indicate the goals that are mainly related to the society. Their accessibility and achievement is resulted from some social, economic, and cultural changes and the values, practices and trends rejected and replaced by positive alternative in order to achieve the goals of society in terms of production, education and relations. Some examples of this type of goals are finding good citizens, strengthen social relationships, raising the level of efficiency of the agricultural economy, and reducing disparities between rural and civil lives.
2. General Objectives
These objectives share a general description as compared to the following level of goals, and more specifically and accuratelt to the previous levels. This level of goals is is directly associated with the activities and efforts of the Extension Service. These goals are more general and upon which the goals for extension programs are set up for the purpose of improving the quality of life of the community, raising the level of rural families, and the development of the spirit of leadership, rural communities and services in those communities.
3. Working Objectives
These are the specific and accurate objective. When these objectives are achieved, that means some other goals are achieved. These objectives aim at agricultural extension in terms of raising the production proficiency for any plant products or farm animals through the use of one or more technical style, and by teaching those styles to the local individuals and cooperating with them locally (Al-Samarrai, 1992: 72).
Third: The policy of Extension Programs Planning
Kincaid (1962) has defined the policy as the mean through which the transitioning to the general stage act in which the subjective goals are achieved is made possible. Kelsey and Hearn think that policy indicates a decided upon and specific curriculum that a group or a staff embrace and follow. There are also other unwritten policies that are used for the formation of performance and daily reports for farms and public services. These plans determine the degree of the accuracy and effectiveness of a policy whether written or not (Kelsey, Hean, 1954:111(. Policy is the means by which the pedagogical extension goals set up by the extension organization are achieved. It is an approach which planners take as a model, and directs the behavior and conduct of the employees in the implementation of the program. It is certain that indicative organization in unable to achieve its objectives the time period specified, unless a clear policy that defines the path towards the goals set is followed (for Samarrai, 1992: 75). The general policy of the indicative planning can be represented through the public participation and in which the participants get a chance, freely and democratically, to work, share opinions, cooperate, and appreciate the efforts of each other (Samurai Agadira, 1990: 226).
Fourth: Approaches in Extension Program Planning
Kincaid (1962) has defined the approach as an organization of work in the processes of planning programs through participation in planning committees. When the policy is represented by the public, the approaches then mean how to implement the participation, whether implemented formally or informally, how they would be carried out, and the timetable in which the approaches will be implemented (Samurai Agadira, 1990: 227).
Phase II: The Need to the Plan
This Includes confirmation, publishing and justifying the importance of the planning process and giving it legitimacy among the concerned groups, entities and individuals involved in the educational guidance programs. This phase could also be considered as an entrance and a transitional step to the efforts of planning to local levels (Samurai Agadira, 1990: 227). But in order to complete this phase and ensure its success it is supposed to introduce two main areas. Namely, the knowledge of the previous planning activities to ensure all attempts that are made in the field of planning, as well as to identify the success and the progress that has been accomplished, and weaknesses or failures that have occurred and the reasons that have led to each of these two cases, and the methods and procedures followed in the work, with a full estimation of the current situation, In order to get started from that spot toward improvement and change. The second area is to determine the scope and extent of the planning activities for the future. This requires what it takes within the knowledge of the planning activities of other development agencies and the related organizations. At this stage, it is necessary to take into consideration the need that may appear in the future, in order to visualize the responsibility and the duty of each of the indicative organization and other organizations and entities, and the quality of the required coordination for the development work and how it works (al-Samarrai, 1992: 122). There are several cases or considerations linked to the success of this phase:
1. Inventory of the previous planning activities to work indicative local level.
2. Assessing the planning activities of the other organizations and related to indicative work.
3. Identifying individuals, groups or entities that may contribute to stand on local planning needs.
4. Determining the objectives, the policies and the curricula associated with planning extension programs locally, and clarifying and interpreting those curricula to the participants in those programs of extension, and attempting to reach a general agreement among themselves on those objectives, policies and curricula.
5. Clarifying the objectives, policies and curricula of the extension work locally to organizations and groups and local governments that are concerned with the extension programs or those related to the development of the countryside (Cefadin, 1991: 126).
Phase III: The Organization and Formation of the Planning Committees:
This refers to the organization of the available human and material resources which are expected to be provided to be included in the planning process. The process of organizing human resources includes both workers in the agricultural extension, and concerned individuals in the educational indicative work. It is necessary to know and to qualify the workers in the extension programs in their quantity and quality and distribute them on different levels. Organization for local people means to go about applying the principle of public participation, which prepares the participants to raise their ability and competence to contribute to the process of planning and orientation towards the organization of planning committees (the official version of public participation). As for the material resources, they are studied and their quality and quantity are identified whether those two are during the planning or in the future implementation of to be implicated in the planning in order to achieve the desired goals (Samurai Agadira, 1990: 228). The committee means a group of concerned or elected individuals. Their responsibility is to do a particular job (al-Samarrai, 1992: 82).There are many types of committees divided according to the nature of the duties and tasks assigned to them, or on the basis of career: one may be a single function or multifunction, and according to the time (period) to the permanent and temporary committees, and in the light of its formation on official non-official committees (Al-Samarrai, 1992: 126).
English to Kurdish: The Kurds and Kurdistan: History, Politics,Culture General field: Social Sciences Detailed field: History
Source text - English Draft Paper for the Conference “The Kurds and Kurdistan: History, Politics,Culture” at Centre for Kurdish Studies – University of Exeter – 2-3 April, 2009.
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Iraq : Origins, Ideologies, Visions and Realities
By: Omar Sheikhmous
Origins:
The Formation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), on June 1st. 1975, owes its origins to a number of conditions and factors that existed at the time. First and foremost, it was an emotional reaction to the collapse of the 1961-1975 autonomy movement in Iraqi Kurdistan and the defeatism of the then leadership of KDP, headed by the late Mustafa Barzani, in accepting the consequences of the Algiers Accord, of March 6th-1975 between the Shah of Iran and Saddam Hussein of Iraq , and dissolving the armed movement and the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq (KDP-Iraq). Secondly, the Left and the Modernist stream within the Kurdish nationalist movement seized its historical opportunity in retaking the leadership of the movement. A struggle that had existed between the tribal and traditional groupings of the nationalist movement and its more modernist elements, since the 1920’s, in Turkey, Iraq and later in Iran. Especially, within the Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925), Ararat (1930), “Hiwa” and “Rizgari” parties (1937-1945), “Shorash” and “KDP” (1946), and between Komalay J.K. and KDP in Iranian Kurdistan (1945-1946). This struggle continued within KDP of Iraq from the end of the 1950’s to 1970. Thirdly, at the time there was a mood of anger, outrage and animosity towards the United States, Iran, Iraq and Israel for letting the movement collapse and thus undermine the nationalist aspirations of the Kurds not only in Iraq but in other parts of Kurdistan as well. The founders of the PUK capitalised on this mood and utilised it for recruitment and mobilisation purposes. Fourthly, for a number of states that were in conflict with Iraq and Iran, at the time, like Syria, Libya and the Soviet Union considered the raproachment between Iran and Iraq a threat to their interests and influence in the region. They, therefore, favoured the emergence of a new movement in Iraqi Kurdistan and in different degrees supported or encouraged the efforts of the PUK founders.
The creation of the PUK was a joint effort of different Kurdish nationalist groupings inside Iraq, among the Iraqi Kurdish refugees in Iran, in Syria and in Europe. The main initiative taker was Mr. Jelal Talabani.
A group within the KDP that were refugees in Iran or represented the movement in the Middle East sought contact with Mr. Talabani and then joined him in Syria (Dr. Fuad Masoum, Adil Morad, Abdul-Razzaq Mirza (Feyli). Other KDP profiles from the KDP that also took contact with Mr. Talabani and aspired to form and join a new movement were Dr. Mahmoud Ali Osman, Nouri Shaweis and Ali Sinjari. Another group that were in Iran and that had decided to return to Iraq or go abroad, during the Amnesty period issued by the Iraqi Government in April 1975, had a series of meetings and decided to form a party named “The Social Democratic Party of Kurdistan”. These were headed by Ibrahim Ahmed, Ali Askari, Rasool Mamend, Omar Mostafa (Debaba) and Dr. Khalid Said. After returning to Iraq, they were joined by Salih Yousify, Ali Hezhar and Kardo Gelali to form “The Socialist Movement of Kurdistan”. Ibrahim Ahmed did not return to Iraq and took refuge in the United Kingdom.
Inside Iraq, since 1970, a group around Shehab Sheikh Nouri had formed: “The Association of Marxist-Leninists of Kurdistan- Komala”. Until 1972, before leaving for Lebanon and Egypt, Jelal Talabani was the Secretary General of that organisation and Nawshirwan Mostafa was one of its leading profiles until 1972 when he sought asylum in Austria. They were working underground even within the Kurdish armed movement headed by KDP. They made a serious effort to continue with armed struggle after the Algiers agreement of 1975, together with some of the cadres of KDP and some leftist groupings like the Maoist group called “Central Leadership of the Iraqi Communist Party”, but had to abandon the idea after strong opposition from Barzani’s leadership and other practical conditions facing them.
In Europe, There were a number of Kurdish activists from all parts of Kurdistan that were dissatisfied with the policies of the leadership of the movement in Iraqi Kurdistan, who worked independently for the Kurdish cause along leftist lines. Another number of supporters of the old KDP polit-bureau line that formed the “Kurdistan Revolutionary Party” had stayed on the margins and worked independently. In April 1975, Mr. Talabani came to West Berlin to meet with Dr. Kamal Fuad and me to discuss future paths and activities. He also informed us about the activities and contacts that he had had with the groupings inside Iraq, in Iran and in Syria. We decided to convene a meeting for some 20-25 of such activists around the 20th of May 1975 in West Berlin to discuss future action, after he develops his ideas with the groupings in Syria and Iran. At the same time, Mr. Talabani had nurtured and developed contacts and cooperation with a number of Iraqi Arab opposition groups in Syria, including the pro-Syrian Left Baath Party, the Arab Socialist Movement, the Central Leadership of the Iraqi Communist Party, the People’s Liberation Army of Iraq and the Arab Nationalist Movement. These were organised in a coalition that was called “The Patriotic Gathering of Iraq – Al-Tajamu’ Al-Watani Al-‘Iraqi”.
The themes that were discussed during the meetings in West Berlin between 27-31 of May by the participants including Mr. Talabani were:
1- What is to be done ? A new armed movement or formation of a political movement ? in which part of Kurdistan ?
2- What sort of organisation should be established ? An all Kurdistani movement or just in Iraqi Kurdistan ? Should it be communist, socialist, social democratic or nationalist leftist ?
After three days of discussions, the European group could not reach a specific decision. Mr. Talabani then presented a document of principles and a statement of declaration that had been agreed upon by the group in Damascus, which called for the establishment of a wide alliance of Kurdish nationalist and ideological streams within Kurdish Society in Iraqi Kurdistan in a semi-front organisation called: “Yekiti Nishtimani Kurdistan” in Kurdish and “Al-Ittihad Al-Watani Al-Kurdistani” in Arabic. In English, the group had proposed “The National Union of Kurdistan”, but on my suggestion, it was changed to “The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan”. After few changes in the proposed statement by the participants of the meeting, it was agreed that the statement would be announced officially and simultaneously in Damascus and Europe on June 1st.,1975 as the official date for the foundation of the PUK. Unfortunately, the group in Damascus hastened the proclamation and gave it to the media on May 22nd., 1975. Hence, the ensuing discrepancy concerning the date of the foundation of the PUK.
Organisation and Ideology:
After the official announcement of the PUK, the meetings in Europe and Damascus decided to establish a “Founding Leadership Committe -FLC” consisting of the following persons: Jelal Talabani, Dr. Fuad Masoum, Dr.Kamal Fuad, Nawshirwan Mustafa, Adil Morad, Abdul-Razzaq Mirza, and Omar Sheikhmous. This was later joined by Dr. Kamal Khoshnaw in 1977. It was also agreed that a similar “Founding Leadership Committee” should be established in Iraqi Kurdistan to lead the struggle inside the country. It was planned that both efforts would be coordinated. After this, the PUK started a very serious effort in forming a strong organisation among the Kurds in Europe, the Middle East, among the Iraqi Kurdish refugees in Iran and inside Iraq. Contacts and cooperational efforts were made with Kurdish movements in all parts of Kurdistan.
In August 1975, “Komala” dispatched Mr. Shazad Saib to London to meet with Mr. Talabani to enquire about the new organisation, its aims and plans. At the end of the same month, Komala sent Mr. Faridoun Abdul-Qadir, in secret, to West Berlin to meet with Mr. Talabani, during the Congress of the “Kurdish Students’ Society in Europe – KSSE”, to inform him of the decision of “Komala” to join the PUK and draw plans for organisational work in Iraqi Kurdistan. In September 1975, the Iraqi Government dispatched Mr. Omar Mostafa (Dababa), who was one of the leaders of the underground newly formed “Kurdistan Socialist Movement-KSM” to Syria to convince Mr. Talabani and the other leaders of PUK to return to Iraq with numerous promises of Amnesty and the willingness to allow legal status for Kurdish political work in Iraq. Instead, Mr. Talabani and the members of the leadership of PUK drew up plans with Mr. Omar Mostafa for KSM to join the PUK and coordinate matters with “Komala” to establish a “Leadership Committee” in Iraqi Kurdistan. He was also given general organisational outlines to be implemented inside the country. Later in 1975, KSM also officially joined the PUK. In these early days, the PUK suffered a very serious blow to its efforts inside Iraq. The top leadership of Komala around Shehab Sheikh Nouri had to escape from Iraq and sought to come to Syria through Iran, but they were arrested by the Iranian authorities and handed over to the Iraqi Government. Shehab and two of his comrades: Jafar Abdul-Wahid and Anwar Zorab were executed by the Iraqis in November 1976. The others were kept in prison until August 1979. This put Komala in a period of disarray and confusion until a new young but inexperienced leadership emerged around Shaswar Jelal “Aram” by the name of “Committee of the Provinces of Komala”.
The PUK then initiated publication of a number of declarations and statements of policy like “Why PUK?”, “The Current Tasks of Our Struggle” and later the “Program and Internal Statutes of the PUK”. These were published in Arabic and Kurdish and later translated to many other languages. In November 1975, the first number of the Arabic organ of the PUK “Al-Sharara – The Spark” was published. It was followed by the first number of its Kurdish organ “Rêbazi Nwê- The New Path”. In February 1977, I started with the publication of an English organ of the PUK called “The Spark” while doing research for my Ph.D. thesis at the University of Maryland-College Park in the United States. Later on, a French “ L’Etincelle” and a German “Der Funke” versions of “The Spark” were also published in France and Germany.
The first meeting of the “Founding Leadership Committee” of the PUK was held in December, 1975. I could not attend because it was held in Damascus. Most of these documents were prepared and adopted by that meeting. The second meeting of the “Founding Leadership Committee” was held in Vienna in April, 1975. Originally, the PUK had drawn plans for establishing a strong popular underground political organisation that would eventually (after 2-3 years) prepare for a popular uprising against the Baath regime in coordination with other Iraqi opposition groups. In the beginning of 1976, however, a number of developments had forced the PUK to modify its original plans. Firstly, the Iraqi Government had initiated its forced deportation and destruction of villages plan along the borders with Iran and Turkey, for the creation of 20-30 KM. nomansland, for the hindrance of eruption of any Kurdish future armed resistance movement in Iraqi Kurdistan. Some of the affected people in Qala Diza area had spontaneously resisted the forced deportations with arms and taken to the mountains. They were joined by more than few hundred men from similar areas along the border. This small pocket of resistance became very popular among the people. This development made the FLC revise its original assumption that the people of Iraqi Kurdistan might not be ready for an armed resistance movement for few years due to the psychological shock of 1975. Secondly, the FLC became worried that the speeding up of the Iraqi Government plans for the establishment of the border belt would undermine future resistance efforts across Turkish and Iranian borders and the establishment of partisan bases in that area. Thirdly, KDP-Iraq that had been dissolved in March 1975 reemerged again first in August 1975, as the European Branch of KDP and then as the Provisional Leadership of KDP (KDP-PL) in the beginning of 1976. They were propagating and agitating strongly against the PUK and competing with it among the Kurds. Fourthly and most importantly, the leadership of the pro-Syrian Left Baath Party had informed Mr. Talabani that they were planning a military coup d’etat in Iraq by some of their loyalists during the summer of 1976. In the light of these developments, the meeting of FLC of PUK in Vienna decided to speed up its plans for the intiation of an armed resistance movement on June 1st., 1976. One year after the foundation of PUK. The main argument was that the PUK and the Kurdish people would be in a stronger position to negotiate their rights with any new emerging Iraqi Government if they had a strong organisational and military presence in Iraqi Kurdistan.
After this decision, Mr. Talabani started communicating with the leadership of the movement inside Iraq to prepare themselves for such a development. For this pupose, a series of meetings of PUK’s FLC together with many of its military and political cadres took place in Damascus, in the second half of May 1976. They culminated in the adoption of a project called “Rizgari – Liberation” presented by Mr. Talabani in the final meetings of 23-24 of May, 1976. The main aim of the project was to prepare the ground for sending small guerilla units from Syria through Turkey to Iraqi Kurdistan to join the forces that would come from the different cities and provinces of Iraqi Kurdistan to the mountains and establish bases for the resistance army. It was also planned that the group in Syria would provide arms, ammunitions and financial support to the movement. The main aim of the project was outlined as: “Reigniting the flame of revolution in Kurdistan in preparation for an Iraqi revolution of Arabs and Kurds that would establish democray in Iraq and genuine autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan”.
This work was hampered and complicated by conflicts with KDP-PL that sabotaged and undermined the efforts of PUK in 1976 and 1977. Despite an agreement between Mr. Talabani for PUK and Mr. Masoud Barzani for KDP-PL in February 1977 for a cease-fire and cooperation. It never materialised and the conflict between both organisations went on intermittently until the establishment of the “Kurdistan Front” in 1988. Still, the PUK managed to send a number of its guerilla units to Iraqi Kurdistan from Syria with the help and cooperation of the main Kurdish organisation in Turkey, namely DDKD and one of its main active leaders Necmettin Buyukkaya, who was later arrested in 1982 and killed in Diyarbekir prison in 1984. and PUK organisations inside Iraq managed to establish a number of bases in different provinces of Iraqi Kurdistan.
From FLC, Nawshirwan Mustafa returned in April 1977 with a number of Pesh Mergas from Syria and Mr. Talabani returned in July 1977. For the first time a meeting was held between FLC-outside and the leadership of PUK inside Iraqi Kurdistan, between August 31- September 12, 1977. From the start, it became very clear that there were many differences between the approaches of the Leadership inside and FLC –outside as far as form of organisation, ideology and political aims. These can be summarised in the following points:
1- The FLC-outside had contemplated a unitary form of organisation for the PUK, that engulfed different ideological tendencies within Kurdish society, while Komala and KSM had formed independent parallel organisations that accepted the program of PUK and cooperated with each other, but preserved their independent Pesh Merga units and political structures.
2- Komala was a Maoist organisation that thought in Marxist terms by considering itself to be the leaders of a national front, while KSM thought of itself as a social democratic and nationalist movement.
3- FLC-outside had committed itself to the slogan of overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein in its alliances with other Iraqi opposition forces, while KSM was for a negotiated settlement of the Kurdish question with the regime.
4- FLC-outside was strongly against the revival of the old KDP line and structures while KSM was for raproachment and cooperation with KDP-PL.
5- FLC-outside was for representation in the leadership organs of the PUK, based on merit and competence, while Komala and KSM insisted on shared representation on equal basis.
At the end of this meeting, Mr. Jelal Talabani was elected as General Secretary of the PUK and a polit-bureau as well as a common leadership committee were selected among the participants. It was also agreed that Komala and KSM, together with a third organisation to be formed by FLC-outside and people who follow the “General Line” of the program of the PUK would have their own organisation and equal representation in all the organs and Pesh Merga units of PUK and that they would have common PUK organisational structures. This organisational form created a lot of headaches and frictions within the organisation, over resources and positions, because originally KSM was numerically much more stronger than Komala and in later years the balance changed in favour of Komala after the split of the majority of KSM from PUK in March 1979 that later united with the Preparatory Committee of KDP, that was headed by Dr. Mahmoud Ali Osman, to form a seperate party called: “The United Socialist Party of Kurdistan”, in August 1979. A minority of KSM headed by Omar Mostafa (Debaba) stayed within the PUK.
In April 1978, The leadership Committee of PUK had a meeting at its headquarters in “Nokan” valley on the Iranian-Iraqi border and decided to move its main bases back to areas of the triangle along the borders of Turkey, Iran and Iraq for logistical purposes and in order to be nearer to the routes to Syria for getting more arms and ammunitions because PUK’s Pesh Merga forces were increasing all the time and more material resources were needed. The military force was split because of simultaneous attacks by Iraqi and Iranian forces on the columns. The advanced forces managed to establish bases in the triangle, but were later attacked by a joint tribal force and KDP-PL units. Many of the leaders of PUK were arrested, including Ali Askari, Dr. Khalid Said, Sheikh Hussein Yezidi, Omar Abdulla and Azad Hewrami. The former three were soon executed in captivity by KDP-PL and the others either escaped or were released in the summer of 1979. Mr. Talabani and Mr. Nawshirwan Mustafa had stayed behind in the Qandil Mountains. They later moved back to “Khirri Nawzang” and established a headquarter base there.
This was one of the most serious blows to the PUK. After this development, it was decided that all the members of FLC-outside, except for Dr. Kamal Fuad, should join the leadership inside Iraqi Kurdistan to help strengthen the movement and try to get as much help as possible with them. The remaining leadership also made very strong and serious efforts in regrouping and mobilising its remaining Pesh Mergas and underground organisations in the cities and towns of Iraqi Kurdistan.
What helped save the PUK from encirclement and much more negative consequences was the uprisings that were growing in Iran in the fall of 1978 and later collapse of the Shah regime in February 1979. PUK was very popular among the masses of the people in Iranian Kurdistan. All forms of spontaneous and organised aid was sent to the PUK by different groupings. Especially from a Kurdish Marxist group called “Komala” (not related to the Iraqi Komala and that was established in secret in 1969 in Iran) who dispatched two of their leaders, namely Mamosta Ibrahim( Saed Watandost) and Dr. Jafar Shafeii, to be with the leadership of PUK and mobilised all their supporters along the borders with Iraq to help and support the PUK. The popular leader Sheikh Izzedin Hosseini did the same as well as the Kurdistan Branch of the Fedayeen Movement. Furthermore, a number of independent Kurdish patriots that had formed their own small organisations took contact with the PUK and were helping it in all possible ways. Liberated Iranian Kurdistan became a haven for PUK in all sorts of ways. During this period also PUK’s main rival, KDP-PL ended up in disarray and nearly disappeared into oblivion because of the loss of the support of the Shah regime and the animosity of the masses of the Kurdish people in Iran towards them.
This organisational structure continued until the fall of 1983 when the remaining KSM and the “General Line” of the PUK united to form: “Yekity Shorashgirany Kurdistan – Union of Kurdistan Revolutionaries-UKR”. In 1984, Komala also experienced a split within its ranks when a splinter group calling itself “Alay Shorash- Flag of Revolution” left the PUK. This group was later dissolved and reunited with the PUK during the 1990’s.
During the 1980’s, the PUK went through a period of revision and reexamination of its Marxist outlooks and started to glide towards social democracy and a more liberal leftist tendency, realising that it had neither the theoretical cadres nor the class basis for a Marxist organisation. It became more realistic and adapted its strategies more and more to suit the social condition in Iraqi Kurdistan. No doubt, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe in 1989 helped them also in this process of ideological change.
During its first congress in December 1991-January 1992, both Komala and UKR decided to dissolve their organisations within the PUK and form a unitary political organisation, but with the right of maintaining seperate ideological platforms. Even this was later abandoned during the second congress of the PUK in 2001.
From this organisational history of the PUK, it can be concluded that the original structure of the PUK, as a semi-front organisation of different ideological tendencies within Kurdish society, was both a source of strength and also a source of weakness for the PUK. A source of strength for being able to mobilise as many groupings as possible within its ranks by providing them with the possiblity of maintaining their ideological and political platforms as well as publishing their own pamphletes and newspapers. But also a source of weakness due to lack of centrality, internal competitions and frictions over power and resources. The PUK still suffers from this heritage despite its unitary organisational form since 2001.
Visions and Reality:
The PUK started its path with grand visions of Change in Kurdistan, Iraq and the Middle East along revolutionary lines. It hoped that through alliance and cooperation with Kurdish parties and movements in other parts of Kurdistan, it would be able to formulate a common agenda for all the people of Kurdistan. It also hoped that through cooperation and coordination with leftist and democratically oriented political forces, in the countries where Kurds live, will be able to advance a radical and revolutionary change in all of these countries. At times, the leadership of PUK even flirted with the idea of becoming a new model for the liberation of Third World countries.
But the realities of the conditions in most of these countries, its own strength and lack of sufficient international support forced it to moderate its stance. The movements in other parts of Kurdistan had their own strategies and aims, and were not willing to exceed certain limits of cooperation and coordination. PUK’s alliance with Iraqi opposition forces forced it to adopt the slogan of : “Democracy for Iraq and Genuine Autonomy for Kurdistan”. This vision was gradually changed into “Federalism for Iraqi Kurdistan and Democracy for Iraq” during the early 1980’s. Today, the organisation is still committed to Federalism in Iraq but its grass roots are flirting with self-determination and independent statehood. Despite it original social agenda, it has yet not been able to carry the reforms required within Kurdish society.
Finally, PUK has gone through a pragmatic metamorphosis and changed from an organisation of revolutionary change into a party of government and power with all the ill symptoms of governance in most Third World countries.
Translation - Kurdish درافتی لێکولینەوەی زانستی بو کونفرانسی (كورد و کوردستان: مێژوو و سیاسەت و شارستانیەت" لە سەنتەری دیراساتی کوردی – زانکوی ئێکزێتەر ٢-٣/٤/٢٠٠٩
بەلام واقعی هەلومەرج و کاودانەکانی زوربەی ئەو ووڵاتانە وهێزەکەی و کەمی پشتگیری نێودەلەتی (ی ن ك) ی ناچارکرد کە پێگەی خوی کەم (مامناوەند) بکاتەوە. بزوتنەوەکانی پارچەکانی تری کوردستان ئامانج و ستراتیجی تایبەتی خویان هەبوو و ئامادەنەبوون لە رادەبەدەر هاوکاری و هەماهەنگی بکەن. هاوپەیمانیێتی (ی ن ك) لەگەل هێزەکانی موعارەزەی عیراقی یەکێتیی ناچار کرد کە سلوگانیەکەی بکاتە (دیموکراسی بو عێراق و حوکمی زاتی بو کوردستان). دواتر، لە سەرەتای سالانی هەشتاکان، ئەم روئیایە ووردە ووردە گۆڕا بو (فیدرالیەت بو کوردستانی عێراق و دیموکراسی بو عێراق). ئێستا، (ی ن ك) هەر پابەندە بە شیعاری فیدرالیەت بو عێراق، بەڵام قاعیدەکەی بیر لە مافی چارەنوس و ووڵاتێکی سەربەخوبوو دەکاتەوە. سەرەرای ئەجێندا سوسیالەکەی (کومەڵایەتیەکەی)، یەکێتی نشتیمانی کوردستان تا ئێستا نەیتوانیوە بەپێ ی پێویست کاری ریفورم بکات لە کومەلگای کوردەواری دا.
لە کوتایی دا، دیارە کە یەکێتی نشتیمانی کوردستان بە گۆڕانێکی کرداری دا تێپەریوە و لە رێکخراوێکی شورەشگێری یەوە گۆڕاوە بو پارتێکی بەشدار لە هێز و دەستهەڵات دا، کە گشت نیشانەکانی حوکمداری ووڵاتانی جیهانی سێیەمی پێوە دیارە.
English to Kurdish: The Kurds Between Iran and Iraq General field: Social Sciences Detailed field: History
Source text - English When the Gulf War reached Kurdistan in 1983 the KDP took part in the Iranian offensive, virtually acting as the Iranian army's scouts. The PUK declared it would resist this invasion. The offensive forced the PUK out of its headquarters on the border, and deeper into Iraq. The following year, Talabani went to the negotiating table in Baghdad.
Until the 1983 offensive, Baghdad's policy has been conciliatory. Faced with mass desertions by its Kurdish soldiers in January 1983, it amnestied the deserters and ruled that the Kurds could serve in the army corps stationed in the relatively quiet north instead of in the dangerous south. At the same time, it entered secret negotiations with all Kurdish organizations.
After the offensive, the Iraqi regime took severe reprisals, especially against those associated with the Barzanis. Eight thousand men, originally from villages in the Barzan region but then living in the camps of Qushtapa and Diyana, were driven off to an unknown destination and nothing has been heard from them since. Similarly, relatives of Barzani who lived in Baghdad (and had been cooperating with the government) disappeared. Military presence in Kurdistan was stepped up, and actions against the
Guerrillas were carried out more systematically and with greater ruthlessness, especially after the negotiations with the PUK had broken down. Meanwhile, unprecedented numbers of tribesmen were recruited into irregular regiments designed to protect their districts against Iranian invasion as well as against the nationalist Kurdish groups. Recent visitors to Iraqi Kurdistan estimated the number of these irregulars at 150,000 or even more. When these measures, and the economic blockade, did not sufficiently affect the guerrilla groups, the government had recourse once more to reprisals against civilians.
Iranian Kurdistan Since the Revolution
The sudden eruption of nationalism among the Iranian Kurds in 1979 came as a surprise, even to many of the Kurds themselves. Until then, discontent was directed against the shah, his imperial alliances and his nouveaux-riches clientele. The outburst of Kurdish nationalism after the revolution certainly contrasts with the absence of similar movements among the neighboring Azeris and the Arabs of the southwest. This cannot simply be ascribed to most Kurds' being Sunni Muslims. It is true that the Kurds of Kermanshah, most of them Shi'a, keep aloof from the Kurdish movement or even actively oppose it. But in 1946, when religion played no role at all, they also opted for the central government rather than the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. There were sectarian clashes in some mixed (Sunni-Shi'a) Kurdish villages in 1979, but they were short-lived and not repeated since. Sunni sentiment has been of minor importance in the Kurds' attitude towards the new Islamic Republic.
An explanation of the difference between the response of the Kurds and Iran's other ethnic minorities lies in the way political organizations and leaders channeled popular revolutionary sentiment during and immediately after the revolution. In most parts of Iran, religious and socialist revolutionaries of all ideological shades directed their efforts towards obtaining influence in the central institutions of the state. They engaged in tactical alliances with, or made concessions to, the heterogeneous power block around Khomeini. In Kurdistan, uniquely, there were two organizations with a history and a social base that from the very beginning demanded autonomy for their region and put the central government's institutions on a secondary plane
During most of 1979, these organizations could freely organize the population and broadcast their political ideas. The regime's first offensives only had the effect of strengthening the Kurds' nationalism and separatism. Another factor is that the Iranian Kurds had witnessed the Kurdish movement in Iraq and had received hundreds of thousands of refugees after the collapse of that movement in 1975. Barzani himself was generally disliked because of his collaboration with the shah's regime, but events in Iraq never theless stimulated the national awareness of Iran's Kurds as well. This did not mean that there was a direct Iraqi Kurdish influence. The Kurds of Iran are as much Iranians as they are Kurds, and in the political ideas current in the early 1980s there is little influence from the Iraqi Kurds. Even the Kurdish words for such concepts as "autonomy" are different in Iran and Iraq. The development of political discourse in Iranian Kurdistan was mainly the work of the KDPI and the Komala.
In the revolutionary year of 1978, there were large demonstrations in most of the Kurdish towns, and these were not noticeably different from those else where in Iran. The demonstrators demanded the liberation of political prisoners, basic civil liberties and the like. There were no specifically Kurdish demands. But the religious aspect, so prominent elsewhere, was lacking here. In June 1978, the burial of an old KDPI leader who had only recently been released after 25 years in prison turned into a large antigovernment demonstration with vague nationalist overtones, but throughout that year the demand of autonomy, so fundamental later , was not yet heard. After the fall of the Pahlavi regime, in February 1979, representatives of various political groups from all over Kurdistan met and formulated eight demands which they sent to the provisional government. One of these referred to self-determination for all Iran's people, within a federal state. Most of the other points concerned social and economic justice and revolutionary democracy
The vagueness of these demands, and the frequent changes in their formulation during the following months, reflected the amorphous and fluid political situation in Kurdistan in those days. There was a proliferation of political groups, Kurdish as well as all-Iranian, most of them richer in enthusiasm than in experience. Only the KDPI had a clear political program (dating from its third congress in 1973), but it had a shortage of good cadres and therefore could not yet dominate the discussion. In these circumstances, Izzaddin Husayni, a charismatic mulla from Mahabad, emerged as the recognized spokesman for the Kurds. He had excellent contacts with the radical left youth groups, had a reputation as a nationalist, and was acceptable to the more conservative segments of society because of his religious legitimation.
Complications and Clashes
The negotiations between the Kurds and the central government were initially thwarted by the multiplicity of power centers on both sides. The situation was further complicated by the presence, immediately behind the Iraqi and Turkish borders, of unknown numbers of partisans of the ancien régime led by notorious generals (such as Palizban, Uvayssi and Aryana) who tried to destabilize the new regime by carrying out raids into Iran. The Kurdish organizations were suspected, incorrectly it would seem, of collusion with these royalists. Moreover, all sorts of local conflicts suddenly assumed much wider importance when the parties to these conflicts allied themselves with the central government or with (a faction of) the Kurdish movement. In the spring and summer of1979, several of these local conflicts led to violent clashes between Kurdish and progovernment forces. The first large military offensive against the Kurds, in August 1979, was triggered by such a local clash in the town of Paveh.
The KDPI and, to a lesser extent, the Komala rapidly built networks of party branches and recruited party members and peshmergas, whom they gave political education and military training. In the context of the heated political discussions of the spring and summer of 1979, their conceptions of autonomy and popular sovereignty gained wide acceptance. After the first government offensive in August 1979, the KDPI emerged as the dominant political (and military) force in Kurdistan, and in the following years it further consolidated this position.
The strength of the Kurdish resistance to the summer offensive of 1979 forced the government to reopen negotiations and offer, as a concession to the demand of autonomy, a form of administrative decentralization. This was the most far-reaching offer ever made to the Kurds, but the KDPI rejected it as insufficient. It did guarantee certain cultural rights, such as the free use of Kurdish (and other minority languages), but did not recognize the Kurds as a nation. Also, the proposed decentralization was likely to cut Kurdistan into a number of districts, each including many non-Kurdish regions as well.
A major stumbling block in all negotiations has been the Islamic regime's consistent refusal to speak in terms of national rights. But this was not the only reason why the KDPI rejected the proposal. Izzaddin Husayni, with his radical supporters and the Komala , refused even to negotiate with the government, which they denounced as reactionary and more dictatorial than the shah's, and the majority of the Kurdish population seemed to support this attitude. With a conciliatory posture, the KDPI would risk losing a part of-its popular support to the more radical groups. Moreover, the proposal originated with the "liberal" wing of the regime, and people expected that the more fundamentalist factions would later not feel bound by it. Finally, the Kurds underestimated the strength of the regime, believing that it would either fall or could be forced to make further concessions.
It is not clear whether Iraq influenced the KDPI's rejection of the government's offer (and other proposals in the following year). When the pro-Tudeh wing of the KDPI broke away a few months later, it accused Qasimlu of close contacts with the Baghdad regime, but did not produce any evidence that party policies were affected by this. When Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, the KDPI proposed to Tehran a ceasefire and offered to fight the invader, provided Tehran gave in to its basic demands. There was no response. In fact, the government stepped up its military operations against the Kurds along with those on the Iraqi front. Since the beginning of the Gulf War, the KDPI has become even more dependent on Iraq. But unlike the Iraqi KDP, it appears to have guarded its independence in its major policy decisions.
As compared with the first year after the revolution, the situation is much less complex now. Only one of the original power centers in Tehran is left, the one least likely to make concessions to the Kurds. On the Kurdish side, the KDPI is clearly the major power. Early in 1982 it joined the National Resistance Council, formed the preceding year by former president Bani Sadr and Mas'ud Rajavi of the People's Mujahidin Organization after their escape from Iran to France. Bani Sadr was at last willing to give in to the KDPI's demand of autonomy. This coincided with a shift in the party's long term objectives: the new program adopted at the Fifth Party Congress (December 1981) called for the overthrow of the Khomeini regime before even referring to any specifically Kurdish demands. Until 1983, the KDPI had permanent control of vast areas in Kurdistan, and functioned there as a government — constructing roads, building houses, organizing schools and hospitals, even administering a court of law with an experienced and professional judge. A major Iranian offensive in the summer of 1983, in which the Iraqi KDP took active part, ended this experience. The KDPI headquarters are now across the Iraqi border.
There are no "liberated areas" in Iran any more, but the peshmergas still penetrate deep into Iran and stay there for weeks or even months on end, supported by the villagers and townspeople. As in Iraq, the Kurds can be a considerable nuisance to the government, but they do not pose a real threat. The KDPI's partners in the National Resistance Council never became the formidable force they once promised to be. This is probably why the party reversed its position again. In the summer of 1984, recognizing that the Islamic regime had at least the passive support of the majority of Iran's population, the KDPI signaled its readiness to negotiate. The negotiations were broken off in an early stage, ostensibly because the Kurds insisted on autonomy. (The government replied that there is no basis for this in the Qur’an.) Nevertheless, the KDPI left the National Resistance Council, which objected to its negotiating with the government at all. Shortly thereafter, in January 1985, the Komala and the KDPI declared war on one another. The KDPI clearly had the upper hand. Cynics (of which there are many among the Kurds) believe that this is the prelude to a new round of negotiations, between the only two forces in Iran that have been able to consolidate thernselves.
The struggle for control of Iraqi Kurdistan
One of the effects of the Gulf War has been the increased role of the opposing governments in providing logistic and financial support to the Iraqi KDP and the KDPI. This, and the fighting in Kurdistan, made it possible for these organizations to consolidate their positions at the expense of smaller and more radical rival groups. The process was clearest in Iraq. After the outbreak of the Gulf War, many villagers and Townspeople fled from the government-controlled areas to the zones held by the Kurdish organizations. Only those organizations with both territorial control and financial resources to support these new arrivals could profit from their presence. The KDP, supported by Iran, and the PUK, then supported by Syria and Libya, in this way gained more reinforcements than the SPKI and the ICP. The KDP soon controlled large areas near the Turkish border and could attract many of the peasants who had previously been deported from those zones, thus recreating a normal economic life there and giving its guerrilla a stronger base.
Further south, the zones actually controlled by the Kurdish movements were much smaller: until 1983, the PUK shared control with the SPKI and the ICP. Most Kurds deplored the PUK's violent attack on the headquarters of these parties, but it did have the desired effect. The PUK firmly established its superiority and attracted new supporters, while the weaker party's losses were much more serious than the military defeat alone. This is illustrated by current estimates of the Iraqi Kurdish parties' military strength. In 1981, the KDP had some 2000 peshmergas in Iraq, the SPKI and the ICP also around 2000 each, and the PUK some 3000; by 1985, the KDP's forces had grown to 6000, the SPKI's had dwindled to less than a thousand, the ICP's to just over thousand, while the PUK could boast 5000 armed men. The PUK owed its growth to a large extent to its violent competition with its rivals, a tribal style of politics that was initially alien to this organization. It is not clear whether the PUK now has outside financial support. Syria seems at present to support the KDP instead, since the PUK had broken with Damascus in order to negotiate with Baghdad. To some extent it can finance itself with local contributions and taxation, especially surcharges on smuggling, but these sources of revenue are probably dwindling under the present wartime conditions. If it does not find a foreign sponsor, the PUK will soon have to demobilize its peshmergas, which will further strengthen the KDP.
The KDP presently depends even more on the Islamic Republic than Mulla Mustafa Barzani ever depended on the shah. Mas'ud and Idris Barzani perceive an identity of interest with the Tehran government. The KDP is the only Kurdish organization that agrees with Iran's determination to continue the war until the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. This is also why they give crucial military support to Iranian offensives in northern Iraq, even if this means that they have to relinquish control of parts of Iraqi Kurdistan to the Iranian army. This unconditional support earns the KDP sufficient financial support to recruit large numbers of peshmergas and sophisticated weaponry. The offensives towards Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk (in the autumn of 1983 and most recently in February 1986) gave the KDP a foothold in Sorani-speaking territory. It hopes to reduce its single serious rival, the PUK, with Iranian support. In strictly military terms, the KDP is in the best position among the Iraqi Kurdish groups, and it continues reinforcing itself. This recalls the position it had under Mustafa Barzani in the late 1960s. Barzani then could reach the most promising peace agreement the Kurds ever concluded with any government. It seems highly unlikely that his sons will be able to repeat that achievement.
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Bio
I am Sarbast Alzebari. I speak Kurdish as L1, Arabic as L2 and English as Foreign language. I also speak several variants of Kurdish and Arabic. I can translate from any of Kurdish, Arabic, English to any of Kurdish, Arabic, English.
Keywords: Kurdish, Arabic, English, Translation, Education, Languages, Linguistics, Cultures, Communications, Teaching. See more.Kurdish, Arabic, English, Translation, Education, Languages, Linguistics, Cultures, Communications, Teaching, Learning, Psychology, Humanities, Human Resources. See less.
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