English to Russian Bus/Financial Economics CEO home purchase

Коллеги, это из лекции о сделках с недвижимостию, совершаемых директорами компаний. Фрагменты для контекста:

We study real estate purchases by major company CEOs, compiling a database of the principal residences of nearly every top executive in the Standard & Poor's 500 index. When a CEO buys real estate, future company performance is inversely related to the CEO's liquidation of company shares and options for financing the transaction. We also find that, regardless of the source of finance, future company performance deteriorates when CEOs acquire extremely large or costly mansions and estates. We therefore interpret large home acquisitions as signals of CEO entrenchment. Our research also provides useful insights for calibrating utility based models of executive compensation and for understanding patterns of Veblenian conspicuous consumption.
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Acquiring an expensive house would provide a dual stream of benefits to an entrenched CEO: utility in consumption, and also a public signal about the executive's status and security. If CEO acquisitions of nice houses are consistent with entrenchment, they should augur badly for future shareholder returns.
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Beyond the implications of our study for understanding signals of commitment and entrenchment, we expect that our cross-sectional sample of CEOs' real estate holdings will have general interest for researchers into management incentives. In this literature, the most advanced theoretical approaches involve utility-based models of management incentives that use the manager's outside wealth as one of several input variables. Excellent expositions of such models appear in Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991), which uses a utility based model to value stock option awards, and Kahl, Liu, and Longstaff (2003), which takes a similar approach to valuing restricted stock.

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